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The aim of the dissertation is to explore firms’ innovation strategies during certain stressful periods.
This dissertation consists of 3 chapters. . .
Chapter 1: Innovation Diversification Under Policy Uncertainty
Using detailed data on patent grants and applications, I explore the effect of policy uncertainty
on firms’ innovation strategies. I show that firms that invest in R&D tend to pursue more diver-
sified strategies and are more likely to explore unfamiliar fields during periods of policy uncer-
tainty. These findings hold after adjusting for possible sample-selection bias using variation from
patent examiners’ historical approval rates, and after adjusting for potential endogeneity using
pre-scheduled gubernatorial elections for neighbor states. To understand the factors that under-
lie this phenomenon, I conduct a variety of heterogeneity tests and find that a firm’s tendency to
diversify is limited if it is financially constrained, holds irreversible assets, or relies heavily on
pay-performance incentive contracts for managers. In addition, firms with higher sensitivity to
government spending follow less diversified strategies, while firms facing higher product market
competition are more likely to explore new fields.
Chapter 2: Less Competition, Slower R&D: The Impact of Joint Ventures Under Policy
Uncertainty
I provide evidence showing that during periods of high policy uncertainty, firms with R&D joint
ventures defer innovation investments further compared to firms that use competing innovation
v
strategies. The deferral effect is mainly driven by joint ventures among potential market competi-
tors and joint ventures among domestic firms. Furthermore, the deferral effect dies away when
firms face a higher level of market competition. The results provide a detailed picture of the in-
fluence of R&D joint ventures during the period of policy uncertainty. It reduces the preemption
value of the investment when competitors share the proprietary benefits but allow firms to fully
appreciate the flexibility value of the project by waiting longer.
Chapter 3: Ripple Effect of Patent Litigation Shock
I show that firms react positively to their peers’ patent litigation suffering by increasing their in-
vestments in R&D and their applications for patents protection. The reaction is mainly taken when
more peer firms are asserted by non-practicing entities (NPEs) and largely disappears when more
peer firms are asserted by practicing entities (PEs). Furthermore, the reaction is stronger for firms
that are more likely to be litigated, firms that perform in the highly competitive market and firms
with high CEO pay-performance sensitivity. The results support the threat side story that the in-
crease in peer firms’ litigation risk enhances firms’ awareness of patent protection. I test it directly
on a subsample of firms that report non-zero R&D expenditure and find that the probability of hav-
ing a patent protection increases significantly after more peer firms get involved in patent litigation
issues.
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Chapter 1
Innovation Diversification Under Policy
Uncertainty
1.1 Introduction
Uncertainty about government policy concerns both households and firms. Changes in government
policy affect the environment in which firms operate by changing financing and production costs
as well as the future market demand. Since the financial crisis, this concern has been particularly
acute 1 and has raised anew the discussion of how firms respond to it when they make investment
decisions.
Much of our understanding centers on firm’s choices of investment types and investment ag-
gregated amount due to data availability. For example, a growing number of papers find that the
effect of policy uncertainty varies according to the types of investment. On one hand, firms reduce
their capital expenditure (Julio and Yook (2012) and Gulen and Ing (2016)), merger and acquisi-
tion (M&A) (Bonaime et al. (2018) and Nguyen and Phan (2017) ), initial public offering (IPO)
(Colak et al. (2017) ) and overall investment during the period of policy uncertainty. One ex-
1The Federal Open Market Committee (2009) and the IMF (2012, 2013) suggest that uncertainty about U.S. and
European fiscal, regulatory, and monetary policies contributed to a steep economic decline in 2008-09 and slow recov-
eries afterwards. Current events include Euro debt crisis, Brexit, North Korea, Tax Reform, Government shut down,
trade wars et al.
1
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planation for the negative relationship is suggested by the real option theory2 which implies that
firms have stronger incentives to defer irreversible investment as uncertainty increases the value of
the real option. On the other hand, firms increase their research and development (R&D) during
uncertain periods (Atanassove et al. (2018), Stein and Stone (2013)). Several uniquenesses about
R&D erode the incremental flexibility value of waiting. First, it is the technical uncertainty, not
the policy uncertainty that plays the most important role in R&D options, which can only be re-
solved through the investment process (Pindyck (1993b)). Second, as Weeds (2002) points out, the
winner-takes-all patent system undermines firms’ ability to delay R&D. Third, R&D during uncer-
tain periods helps firms to get competitive advantages in the future. As pointed out by Kulatilaka
and Perotti (1998), Brander and Spencer (1983) and others, early investment in R&D can create
a strategic advantage yielding a higher market share and the increasing uncertainty intensifies the
incentive to be the first mover. As a result, firms increase their R&D investment during the period
of policy uncertainty.
But how do firms achieve this? Is there any risk sharing process that goes hand in hand with
the increasing R&D amount? Do firms with the same amount of R&D also use similar innovation
strategies during uncertain periods? Standard corporate data sources usually report only aggre-
gates. Information on firms’ precise investment activities such as how many projects that firms
have chosen and whether firms pursue more diversified or less diversified investment is difficult or
even impossible to measure. For example, firm A and B may report the same amount of R&D ex-
penditure within the fiscal year, but firm A may invest all the money on one or two projects while
firm B diversifies its investment across multiple projects and in a much broader range of fields.
Firm A may choose projects that they are familiar with while firm B may choose more exploratory
projects. What kind of strategies are preferred during the period of policy uncertainty? In this
paper, I explore how firms respond to policy uncertainty in their choice of R&D portfolios.
2Bernanke (1983), who points out that high uncertainty gives firms an incentive to delay investment and hiring
when investment projects are costly to undo or workers are costly to hire and fire. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) offer a
review of the early theoretical literature.
Empirically,Bloom (2009) find rapid drop and rebound in aggregate output and employment around major shocks,
Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta and Terry (2018) find that reasonably calibrated uncertainty shocks can explain
drops and rebounds in GDP of around 3%.
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I attempt to deal with the data limitation by using the information from the detailed patent fil-
ings of innovative firms. Firms’ new patent grants are published weekly on the website of the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The filings present a detailed picture of a firm’s innovation
investment portfolio, including what the innovation is and which U.S. patent class it belongs to.
I assume that if a firm’s patent portfolio contains patents from many different classes, the firm is
more likely to follow diversified R&D strategies after controlling for the total amount of R&D and
the total number of new innovation projects that the firm has at time t. The assumption is based
on the supposition that different classes demonstrate different technological and functional fea-
tures of the investment projects. Up until 2018, patents are separated into more than 470 classes3.
However, the U.S. Patent Classification (USPC) is not strictly in line with the supposition men-
tioned above. As pointed out by Macro et al. (2015), the patent class is generated purely for
administrative purposes and it provides no straightforward link to established products or industry
classification and is too numerous to use4. Therefore I follow the widely used the NBER patent
class generated by Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) and later extended in Macro et al. (2015).
This patent class aggregates USPC into 6 main technology categories and 37 subcategories. (See
Table B-1). While each classification has its subjectivity, the NBER classification has been widely
used in innovation-related studies5. Following the literature, I use the policy uncertainty index gen-
erated by Baker, Bloom, Davis (2016) (BBD Index) for policy uncertainty. The index is a weighted
average of the news component, tax code change, monetary policy forecast dispersion and fiscal
forecast disagreement. It has been proved to contain policy-related uncertainty and is widely used
in papers such as Gulen and Ing (2016) and Bonaime et al. (2018) and so on.
I find that firms follow more diversified innovation strategies during the period of high policy
uncertainty. From a time-series perspective, I find that the effect lasts for at least three years. To
assess whether different components of the BBD index have different effects, I run the regres-
3438 different main categories for utility patents, 33 different categories for design patents and 1 category for plant
patents.
4For example, USPC class such as 126 Stoves and Furnaces, 127 Suger, Starch and Carbohydrates. while USPC
class 600 Surgery, 601 Surgery: kinesitherapy can hardly be separated.
5Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) has been cited by more than 3000 papers according to Google citation
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sion separately on each one of the subcomponents and find that news-based component and the
component measuring fiscal policy uncertainty play the main role in explaining firms’ diversifica-
tion strategies. From a time series perspective, I find that the weak predictive power of the other
two components (the component measuring tax-related uncertainty and the component measuring
monetary policy uncertainty) can be explained by a longer latency in firms’ reaction. In addition, I
further explore the way in which firms diversify and find that firms strategically expand their inno-
vation to fields that they never explored in the past three years, as a supplement to their diversified
strategies.
Why should firms pursue more diversified innovation strategies during the period of high policy
uncertainty? The first reason may be the firms’ motivation to reduce risk. Low correlations between
innovation projects in different fields enable the firm to diversify away the idiosyncratic technical
uncertainty of individual projects. However, risk reduction is not the only motivation as suggested
by the increasing interests for new fields. The second reason may be the firms’ usage of strategical
R&D investment during uncertain periods to get the first-mover advantage in the future. In the
models of Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998). Smit and Trigeorgis (2012), Brander and Spencer (1983)
for example, firms conduct R&D in the first stage to get the cost advantage in the second stage’s
market competition. As market uncertainty may lead to a reduction of market demand, the medium
level demand makes it unprofitable for the competitor to operate and thus helps the first mover to
gain extra preemption profits. Diversifying into more fields helps firms to maintain competitive
advantages by making obstacles for potential competitors from similar fields.
The basic results contain several potential limitations. First, the patent-based diversification
measure that I employ is only available for firms that have at least one new innovation project
in that year 6. This restriction allows me to achieve only a conditional implication from the evi-
dence: firms that choose to invest during a period of policy uncertainty are more prone to follow
diversified investment strategies. A more essential problem, however, is that the diversification
measure also depends on the patent application being approved. This would lead to potential bias
6In robustness checks, restricting the sample to firms with at least two new innovation projects provides similar
results. See Table B-4 for details
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if the approval rate for patent applications changes with periods of policy uncertainty. To exam-
ine whether the empirical findings result from sample selection bias or the correlation between
policy uncertainty and the approval rate of patent applications, I use an instrument variable that
captures the exogenous variance in the patent approval process following Sampat and Willimas
(2015) and Farre-Mensa, Hegde and Ljungqvist (2017). The identification validity comes from the
institutional features of the patenting examination process of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) in which applications are assigned randomly to examiners based on their workload and
experience. The approval of each application depends on examiners’ valuation of the innovation
which is directly related to examiners’ own experience and characteristics. Examiner’s historical
approval rates thus can influence the likelihood of observing granted patents but cannot directly
influence firms’ diversification. I calculate the median examiners’ approval rates for all firms’
applications starting at time t and use a Heckman two stage regression to adjust for the potential
selection issue, the results suggest that the effect of policy uncertainty on firms’ diversification is
not purely driven by selection bias. In addition, I use a diversification measure that is based on
both granted patents and non-granted applications and re-examine the issue, I still find that firms
use more diversified investment strategies during periods of policy uncertainty.
The second limitation of my approach is the possible endogeneity of the policy uncertainty
measure and firms’ investment. As Julio and Yook (2012), Colak et al. (2017), Atanassov et al.
(2018) and others point out, the policy uncertainty measure may contain the overall economic un-
certainty that is endogenous of firms’ investment decisions. Even though the endogeneity problem
is not so severe to firms’ diversification decisions as it is to the aggregate investment decisions,
it may also result from any unobserved impact. I attempt to deal with this endogeneity problem
in a variety of ways. First, I used a one-year-lagged policy uncertainty measure in the baseline
regressions to control for the reverse causality. Second, following the literature, I use the U.S.
gubernatorial elections as exogenous events to further test whether election-induced policy uncer-
tainty would lead to similar results. I assume that the state-level election increases the probability
of state policy changes that cause direct (tax code update for example) or indirect (consumer sen-
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timent change for example) uncertainty to firms in that state. More importantly, the gubernatorial
election was pre-scheduled regardless of economic condition and the cycle varies to each state.
This lead to enough cross-sectional and time-series variation in the analysis.
I conduct the test in a variety of ways. First, I use the baseline difference-in-difference test set-
ting that contains multiple time periods and multiple treatment groups following Bertrand, Duflo
and Mullainathan (2004) and Roberts and Whited (2013). The coefficient for the election dummy
shows supportive results that firms use more diversified strategies in post gubernatorial years com-
pared to similar firms that did not have the election event, stronger results can be found for close
elections7. In a dynamic effect analysis, I follow Amore, Schneider and Zaldokas (2013) and Kerr
and Nanda (2009) by setting dummies with leads and lags that consolidates into a [-1, +2] 4-year
window8 and find that the trend did not happen before the election and quickly disappeared after
the election. For additional robustness check, I conduct a placebo test by moving the event dummy
to different years in the same 4-year window, the pseudo event dummy captures any time specific
shocks that happen around the true event year but not the effect of the election, I find no results for
pseudo election events.
Two additional limitations draw my attention. First, as Bertrand et al. (2004) point out, includ-
ing long post-event window lead to inconsistent standard error. Second, similar to what claimed
in Colak et al. (2017), any unobserved state-year shocks that correlated with both firms’ diversi-
fication and policy uncertainty may lead to bias. To further address these concerns, I conduct a
post-election test following the neighbor state method similar to Colak et al. (2017). Specifically,
I calculate the difference in diversification between firms in states that just conducted an election
and firms in the neighboring states that did not have elections. If I assume that the state and its
non-election neighbors suffer the same unobserved shock in the year and these shocks would lead
to the same change in firms’ diversification, then any additional changes in firms’ diversification
before and after the election are induced by the election only. I find that firms in election states
7Following Atanassov et al. (2018), a closed election is the one whose vote difference between the first place
candidate and the second place candidate is less than 5%. It indicates stronger policy uncertainty.
8U.S. states hold gubernatorial election on the first Tuesday in November and the majority of them hold elections
every four years. Please check Colak, Durnev and Qian (2017) Appendix for detailed explanation.
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adopt more diversified innovation than firms in non-election neighboring states. To better meet the
“parallel trends” assumption for the difference-in-difference settings and control for the influence
of the different number of neighbors for each state, I generate a balanced sample by matching each
treated firm with 5 most similar controls that operate in non-election neighbor states in that year
using propensity score generated from pre-event characteristics of firms and states. The balanced
sample shows similar results.
To understand the mechanisms, I investigate whether the positive effect of policy uncertainty
on firms’ diversification exhibits cross-sectional heterogeneity.
First, I look at whether the impact is different for firms with different financial constraint situa-
tions. I find that more constrained firms would choose less diversified innovation compared to less
constrained firms during the period of high policy uncertainty. One possible explanation is that,
the large wedge between firms’ opportunity cost of internal and external capital makes it harder for
constrained firms to diversify their innovation investment if policy uncertainty increases the overall
financing cost and diversification exacerbates the information asymmetry problem, even though it
helps resolve the uncertainty and enhance the strategic value of the innovation package. The argu-
ment is supported by a number of papers that attribute the cost of policy uncertainty to increasing
financing costs. For example, Gilchrist et al. (2014) point out that the impact of uncertainty on
investment occurs primarily through the changes in credit spreads. Pastor and Veronesi (2013)
model the situation when stock prices respond to government policy choice. They point out that
additional political uncertainty risk premium occurs especially during weak economic conditions.
In addition, the results are also related to literature that tests the impact of financial constraint on
firms’ innovation. For example, Almeida, Hus and Li (2013) show that financial constraint may
benefit innovation by improving the efficiency of innovative activities. However, Gorodnichenko,
Yuriy and Schnitzer (2013) argue that the financial constraint is an important factor preventing
countries to catch up. During the period of high policy uncertainty, if agency problem is not as
severe as in normal times, the positive channel in Almeida, Hus and Li (2013) may play a minor
role compared to the negative impact from financing side thus lead to a less diversification.
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Second, I test whether the difference in firms’ investment irreversibility leads to different diver-
sification strategies motivated by the implications from the real option theory. Following Gulen and
Ion (2016) and Kim and Kung (2017), I measure firms’ irreversibility as either the capital intensity
or the redeployability and find that firms with high irreversibility (defined as firms whose costs
of adjusting capital downwards are high) adopt less diversified innovation investment strategies
during the period of high policy uncertainty than firms with low irreversibility. According to the
real option literature, the high cost of adjusting capital downwards increases the value of the real
option, making the flexibility value effect outweigh the commitment effect of gaining strategic ad-
vantages. Firms with high irreversibility may find it harder to diversify their innovation investment
and lose the motivation for strategic movements.
Third, I test whether the diversification decisions vary if firms use different managerial incen-
tive schemes, motivated by extensive discussions on the optimal contract that motivate R&D. For
example, Ederer and Manso (2013) provide evidence that pay-performance principle is only effec-
tive in inducing higher levels of effort and productivity but inhibit creativity and innovation9. A
better contract to motivate innovation is the combination of tolerance for early failure and reward
for long-term success. Manso (2011) suggests that in the context of managerial compensation, the
optimal incentive scheme to motivate innovation can be implemented via a combination of stock
options with long investing periods, option repricing, golden parachutes, and managerial entrench-
ment10. Following Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) and Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009), I test
the impact of policy uncertainty on firms’ innovation investment diversification through manager
pay-performance incentives (delta), risk incentives (vega) and entrenchment. Consistent with the
literature, I find that strong pay-performance incentives lead to less diversified innovation strate-
gies as managers give up part of the benefit from diversification but gain the “quiet life”. More
entrenched managers are more likely to use diversified innovation, yet it is not significantly differ-
9Other related literature that support the finding are McGraw (1978), McCullers (1978), Kohn (1993), and Amabile
(1996)
10In reality, some of the most innovative and creativity-driven firms like pharmaceutical and advertising firms even
reward the failure in order to motivate innovative activities (“Better ideas Through Failure: companies reward em-
ployee mistakes to spur innovation”,the Wall Street Journal, 2011).
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ent from less-entrenched firms. Moreover, vega is also not the driving force in the positive impact
of policy uncertainty and diversification.
Forth, I explore whether firms with different sensitivity to government expenditure perform
differently during the period of policy uncertainty. On one hand, firms with high sensitivity to
government have higher demands for diversifying away the risk. On the other hand, firms’ ability
to diversify is constrained if the high sensitivity induces high costs which force firms to look at
short-term benefits by giving up strategic R&D investment. Following Herron et al. (1999), Julio
and Yook (2012) and Atanassov et al. (2018), I generate a political sensitivity indicator that equals
to one for several Fama French industries. As an alternative, I use BEA input-output tables and
calculate the percentage of industry’s total output purchased by the government sector following
Belo, Gala and Li (2013) and Gulen and Ion (2016). Regardless of the measure, I find that firms
with higher sensitivity to policy uncertainty use less diversified innovation strategies during the
period of policy uncertainty comparing to firms that are lower sensitive to government behavior.
Lastly, I explore whether firms use different strategies during the period of policy uncertainty
if they face different levels of competition. Models show that firms facing a high threat from pro-
duction market are more likely to perform as the first mover and view R&D as a strategy to gain
future competitive position11. Thus I would expect higher competition leads to more diversified
innovation and triggers strong motivation to explore new fields during the period of policy uncer-
tainty. I use the fluidity measure for product market threat following Hoberg and Philips (2016),
a high fluidity implies more competition in the market (low market power) and a greater product
market threats from rivals. I find that firms facing high product market threat are neither more or
less diversified in their innovation investment strategies but are more likely to explore new fields
compare to firms facing less product market threat.
This paper is closely associated with the literature exploring the real impact of policy uncer-
tainty. It contributes to the literature by providing evidence from the prospective of firms’ response
in their investment strategies. The negative side of policy uncertainty is echoed in the literature on
11See Grendadier and Weiss (1997), Williams (1993) and Grenadier (2002) for example. See Smit and Trigeorgis
(2012) for a good summary.
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both macro and micro level and papers use a variety of ways to show the impact. On one hand,
there are a number of papers that use Baker, Bloom and Davis (BBD) policy uncertainty index to
explore the real effect of policy uncertainty. For example, Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) find that
policy uncertainty is associated with increases in stock price volatility and reductions in industry
production and employment. Gulen and Ing (2016) find that policy uncertainty decreases firms’
investment. Bonaime, Gulen, Ion (2018) and Nguyen, Phan (2017) find policy uncertainty has a
negative impact on merger and acquisition, Brogaard and Detzel (2015) argue policy uncertainty
as a risk factor in asset pricing. On the other hand, there are a number of papers that use the exoge-
nously scheduled election dates to study the same type of question. For example, Julio and Yook
(2012) find that investment falls around national elections, Durnev (2010) finds that corporate in-
vestment becomes less responsive to stock prices in election years, Colak et al. (2017) find fewer
IPOs during gubernatorial election years and Atanassov et al. (2018) find positive R&D investment
of firms during election years. Bhattacharya et al. (2017), however, show that industry-level inno-
vation activities drop significantly during times of national elections with an international sample.
In addition, Other methods are also explored in the literature. For example, Stein and Stone (2013)
find that uncertainty depresses capital investment, hiring, and advertising, but encourages R&D
spending based on implied volatility from equity options and oil price shock. In this paper, the
finding that firms use more diversified innovation strategies add a new angle to the literature and it
holds up to a battery of robustness tests. Moreover, firms’ increasing use of diversification strategy
during the period of policy uncertainty helps alleviate the seeming conflict results of Atanassov
et al. (2018) and Bhattacharya et al. (2017). More diversified patent portfolios make the num-
ber of patents in each technical industry looks smaller, but this does not necessarily exclude the
possibility that the total number of patents is higher for each firm.
In addition, I provide a method to look at firms’ investment strategies using patent filing in-
formation. Compared to other diversification measures such as the one based on firms’ segments
sales, innovation diversification measure reflects more of a firm’s own choice and is less sensitive
to the overall economic situation. Moreover, the upfront cost of starting innovation in a new field is
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much lower and more flexible than starting a new business segment, making the measure a reflec-
tion of firms’ responses in a timely manner. This is important as the period of policy uncertainty is
temporary compared to the period of doing investment.
Similar measures that are based on patent citations can be found in the literature. For exam-
ple, the patent originality that generated by Trajtenberg, Henderson and Jaffe (1997) measures
explorative behavior in a patent base. Similarly, Benner and Tushman (2002) construct patent ex-
ploration and exploitation based on how many citations made by the patent are outside of firms’
existing expertise. Compared to these citation based measures, diversification in this paper reflects
more of managers’ decisions instead of the idea of innovation researchers and experts. It is worth-
while to point out that all the diversification measures are subjected to the selection issue to some
extent thus restrict the implication to a conditional one. For example, diversification based on sales
can only be observed for conglomerate firms that choose to report the segment data while original-
ity is based on patents that receive citations. my measure is similar to the technology diversification
measure used in a recent paper of Hsu, Lee, Peng and Yi (2017).
Although there are many models explaining the influence of uncertainty on overall investment,
few models can be found that particularly study the influence of uncertainty on firms’ diversifica-
tion strategies. This makes the findings of this paper more independent. The results do not rely
on the correctness of specific theories or evidence: firms’ diversification strategies do not have to
depend on evidence showing an increase in overall investment quantity. Taking as a whole, the
results from the paper show a novel picture of firms’ innovation investment strategies during the
period of policy uncertainty.
The structure of the paper is as follows, Section 2 describes the data and measures for policy
uncertainty and diversification. Section3 discusses the methodology. Section 4 and 5 presents my
empirical results on firms’ diversification strategies. Section 6 shows evidence on the probability
of investing in new fields. Section 7 provides the results for cross-sectional heterogeneity analysis
and section 8 concludes.
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1.2 Measure Policy Uncertainty and Innovation Diversification
1.2.1 Policy Uncertainty Index
I measure policy uncertainty using the index developed by Baker, Bloom, Davis (2016) following
Gulen and Ion (2016), Bonaime, Gulen and Ion (2018), Nguyen and Phan (2017) and others.
The monthly BBD index is generated as a weighted average of four components, with 1/2 from
the news-based component, 1/6 from the tax component, 1/6 from CPI forecast disagreement,
and 1/6 from government spending forecast disagreement. Following Gulen and Ion (2016), the
monthly index is matched to firms’ fiscal year and annualized by taking the natural logarithm of
the arithmetic mean.
The news-based component is constructed using the text analysis method. It is generated by
searching through 10 large newspapers for articles containing the term “uncertainty” or “uncer-
tain”, the terms “economic” or “economy” and one or more of the following terms: “congress”,
“legislation”, “the White House”, “regulation”, “the Federal Reserve”, or “deficit”. As a result, it
reflects all kinds of economic and policy uncertainty. The index is normalized by the total number
of articles to make it comparable.
Tax code expiration is a measure for temporary tax uncertainty which is drawn from Congres-
sional Budget Office (CBO) reports. According to Baker, Bloom, Davis (2016), the uncertainty
comes as Congress often extends temporary tax measures in the last minute before the tax code
expires. That leads to a source of uncertainty for businesses as well as households.
Economic forecaster disagreement is from Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters
quarterly survey. The one year ahead forecast dispersion on CPI, purchase of goods and services by
state and local governments, and purchases of goods and services by the federal government reflect
the uncertainty about monetary policy, and about government purchases of goods and services at
state and federal level.
Table 1 summarizes the correlation between policy uncertainty index and other macro-level
economic measures. Following Gulen and Ion (2016), Bonaime, Gulen and Ion (2018), macroe-
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conomics opportunities measures include the following: (1) consumer sentiment index from the
University of Michigan. (2) the real GDP growth. Overall economic uncertainty measures include
the following: (1) firms’ cross-sectional profit growth standard deviation. (2) Volatility index
VIX12. (3) Cross-sectional standard deviation of firms’ monthly stock returns. The result shows
that policy uncertainty measures are positively associated with other economic uncertainty mea-
sures and negatively associated with investment opportunity measures. Besides, they contain other
uncertainty information that cannot be fully explained by the existing variables.
1.2.2 Diversification Measures
Financial measures used in literature such as capital expenditure or R&D expense provide no clear
investment starting point for certain projects and no clear suggestions on how the money is in-
vested. The limitation leads me to the non-financial patent and application database for innovative
firms. Firms innovation investment can be specified as the total number of projects they have.
Apart from that, detailed information on each of the innovation projects provides an opportunity
for me to explore how firms diversify their innovation portfolio.
To be specific, a firm’s diversification is generated as a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index style mea-
sure based on the number of patents (or applications) in different classes. The patent class follows
the NBER classification developed by Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) who aggregate the U.S.
Patent Classification (USPC) into six economically relevant technology categories and 37 sub-
categories. Macro et al. (2015) update the NBER categories to match the recent USPC classifica-
tion for both granted patents and applications up to 2015. I use the two-digit aggregated subclass
and measure the investment diversification as the following:






12In robustness check I still tried VXO (implied volatility index) which is highly correlated with VIX and give me
similar result. Check Table B-8 for details.
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Where j is the NBER two digit subcategory, Ni jt is the total number of patents in class j for
firm i at time t, Nit is the total number of patents for firm i at time t. The definition shows that the
measure ranges from 0 to 1, the lower the measure, the more diversified the firm’s investments are.
Patent data includes all the patents that granted within 1985 to January 2017 with clear clas-
sification13. To be specific, I gather all the utility patents that have clear class information and
are granted between 2000 and January 2017 in the data and supplement it with the NBER patent
database14 and the database of Kogan et al. (2017) 15 for previous years. The data is merged with
the Compustat database by firm name following the method used for the NBER patent database
as introduced in Bessen (2009) and Bernstein, Giroud and Townsend (2016). To check the match-
ing accuracy, I compare the data with the NBER patent database and the database of Kogan et al.
(2017) so as to guarantee that firms with valid Compustat link in previous patent databases are
also identified properly in the data. The diversification measure in the basic results is based on
granted patents. For robustness checks, I also generate the measure using all patent applications.
It is based on all regular applications that get published since 200116 with a clearly identifiable
assignee name and patent class. The differences between the two measures start to show up from
2001 when application data is available from USPTO.
Why not use all applications to generate the measure throughout the paper? There are a couple
of limitations related to the application data. First of all, as mentioned above, firms never report
their application until 2001 and all the publications have an 18 months lag in general (and even
longer for special patents). This will make the sample period relatively short. Secondly, most of
13As USPTO stops using USPC after 2015, the data is subjected to a truncation problem as granted patents data is
dropped afterwards due to the lack of class information. First, the diversification measure used in the paper suffers
less of the truncation issue compared to the total number of patent measure. The reason is that if I assume patents
in different classes suffer similar truncation problem, the diversification measure for later years is proportional to the
true measure. Second, I conduct three robustness checks to address the concern. In Table 4, I use heckman selection
models. In Table 5 I use all patent applications (abandon, granted or pending) to generate the diversification measure
and re-exame the tests. In addition, I restrict the sample up to 2012 and re-exame the tests (Table B-9). These results
show that truncation issue do not have any significant influence on the results.
14The NBER patent database is from https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home, for data details please
refer to Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001)
15I thank the author for sharing the database at https://iu.app.box.com/v/patents
16According to U.S.C.122 rules, general application for a patent shall be published, promptly after the expiration of
a period of 18 months from the earliest filing date for which a benefit is sought under this title. At the request of the
applicant, an application may be published earlier than the end of such 18-month period.
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the application data is published before the patents examination process, thus the information is
not as valid as the granted patent data. Some of the applications will change from one class to the
other during the R&D process and the examination process. As a result, using the raw application
class at the early stage may add noise to the diversification measure. Thirdly, published application
files do not necessarily include a clear owner. It may be assigned to individuals (inventors) or leave
as missing17. Failure to assign the application to the firm may lead to new selection issue.
The second challenge in this study is to identify a more accurate starting point of each inno-
vation project. As the period of policy uncertainty is relatively short and temporary compared to
the period of R&D, failing to identify the accurate decision making period may add noise in the
analysis and even lead to biased results. Due to the long lag between the real innovation invest-
ment period and final patent grant date, in the patent literature, a patent is always merged to firms’
financial information by its application date as people think that is more likely to be the period
where the real innovation investment happens. One concern of using the application year is that
firms won’t start a provisional application until there are some preliminary results, the true financ-
ing period thus should be earlier than the application date. In this paper, I am trying to deal with
this concern by looking for the earliest date when the application is observable. About 44% of all
granted patents have filed priority with USPTO or International patent office, this guarantees the
priority for the patents when there are near-simultaneous inventors who both file applications for
the same invention in the future. The priority date is on average about one and a half years earlier
than regular application filing dates and it is more likely the real time when firms start to invest in
the new innovation, I use the earliest priority year as the time t in the diversification measure and
supplement it with the application year is priority date is not applicable for the patent. Thus the
time captures the earliest time the project is filed with the government.18
17In the patent system, patents are mostly assigned to individuals and latter transfer to firms through pre-invention
assignment agreements. In most granted patents files firms are reported directly as the assignees.
18The adjustments used in the paper also reflect the idea of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA).
It is referred to as the most significant change to the U.S. patent system since 1952. The act changes the U.S. patent
system from the “first to invent” to the “ first inventor to file”, which gives patenting priority to inventors who disclose
the idea publically first instead of inventors who file applications first.
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1.3 Data and Methodology
I study an unbalanced panel of non-financial, non-utility Compustat firms that have at least one
patent application in its history and have a valid (non-missing and non-zero) diversification mea-
sure in year t. The data covers from 1990 to 2014 so as to get the policy uncertainty index and
VIX. Patents status are determined at January 31th 2017. Any patents get granted or abandoned
before that date are considered as finalized; patents that haven’t get a final status but are published
are considered as pending applications. All the financial variables are trimmed at the first and
ninety-ninth percentile to reduce the influence of outliers.
The cross-sectional variance of policy uncertainty index comes from firms’ different fiscal-year
ends. Adding time fixed effect, however, is still absorbing the explanatory power of this particular
variable that has most of its variance coming from time series. Following Gulen and Ion (2016) and
Bonaime, Gulen and Ion (2018) who use BBD policy uncertainty index, I do not have year fixed
effect but add other macro-level controls as well as a time trend for general investment opportunity
and economic uncertainty shocks. I model firms’ investment strategies as a function of policy
uncertainty as the following:
yit = αi +β1PUt−1 +β2Controli,t +β3Controli,t−1 +β4Mt−1 +β5Trend + εit (1.1)
Where yit is the firms’ investment strategies matter.
Controlit and Controli,t−1 are firms’ financial controls. To be specific, I include the total num-
ber of new patents that firms have in year t. Following the investment literature (such as Chen,
Goldstein and Jiang (2007) and Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003)), I include firms’ investment
opportunity (market to book ratio), profit (cash flow, sales growth) and firm size (sales). Following
the patent literature (such as Tian and Wang (2014), He and Tian (2013) and so on) I add controls
for firms’ specific risk (the standard deviation of firms’ daily return), firms’ investment (R&D,
R&D indicator), firms’ fundamental characteristics (tangibility, book leverage and firm age) and
the industry competition faced by the firm (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index based on sales). Measures
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that generated using balance-sheet information (the market to book ratio, tangibility, leverage) are
calculated at the beginning of the fiscal year and I get similar results when I measure them in the
simultaneous years. Appendix A describes the detailed definitions and summary statistics for the
variables for the sample of innovative firms with new patents in year t.
For concerns that the period of high policy uncertainty coincides with investment opportu-
nity and other overall uncertainties which jointly decide firms’ investment diversification, I in-
clude macro-level controls Mt−1 following the policy uncertainty literature (such as Gulen and
Ing (2016) and Bonaime, Gulen and Ion (2018) and so on). To be specific, I include controls for
macroeconomics opportunities (consumer sentiment index from the University of Michigan and
real GDP growth) and controls for uncertainty (the cross-sectional standard deviation of firms’
profit growth, volatility index VIX, and cross-sectional standard deviation of firms’ monthly stock
returns) Detailed definitions and summary statistics are discussed in Appendix A. As a robustness
check, I add additional macroeconomic uncertainty measures (macroeconomic uncertainty index
and financial uncertainty measure following Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015), leading economic
indicator, VXO) and get similar results as reported in Table B-8.
1.4 Policy Uncertainty and Investment Diversification
In this section, I explore firms’ decisions on investment diversification during the period of pol-
icy uncertainty following the specification of equation (1) where yit is measured as patent based
investment diversification measure.
Diversi f icationit = αi+β1PUt−1+β2Controli,t +β3Controli,t−1+β4Mt−1+β5Trend+εit (1.2)
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1.4.1 Baseline Result
Table 2 reports the basic result. The negative and significant coefficient β1s imply that firms use
more diversified innovation strategies in the period of high policy uncertainty. On one hand, it
helps reduce the overall risk of the portfolio. On the other hand, diversified innovation helps firms
to achieve the first-mover advantage in wider fields and gain more market power and extra profit
in the future.
To assess which one of the subcomponents of the BBD index is driving the results, I re-estimate
equation (2) for each of them. The results in Table 2 show that nearly all subcomponents of the
BBD index make firms use more diversified investment strategies in the following year, while
news-based components play the strongest role in terms of coefficient magnitude, CPI forecast
dispersion fails to show predictive power for firms’ diversification strategies in year t.
Using the level of policy uncertainty index, I answer the question “How do firms make invest-
ment decisions when managers are facing a high level of uncertainty?”. Similar to what Gulen
and Ion (2016) argue, the specifications in levels capture the slow-moving and long lasting rela-
tionship between policy uncertainty and investment. It is preferred since R&D investment always
takes a long time. In spite of that, it is also interesting to see how firms’ R&D respond to policy
uncertainty shocks. I consider three alternative measures for policy uncertainty shock. The first
one is the percentage change of policy uncertainty level PUt−PUt−1PUt−1 . The second and third measures
capture the percentage number of months when firms suffer policy uncertainty shock in one fiscal
year: number o f highPU monthsTotal number o f months in f iscal year t . Policy uncertainty shock is an indicator that equals to one if
the overall level of BBD index of this month is higher than the median or mean of that of the past
twelve months. I re-estimate equation (2) for the policy uncertainty shock measures. The insignif-
icant results in Table B-5 suggest that policy uncertainty shocks are not significant predictors of
firms’ diversification.
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1.4.2 Effect Over Time
How long does the impact last? Table 3 summarizes the results for this question.
I move the diversification measure to leads and lags that consolidate into a [-1, +4] window. As
is shown in Table 3, policy uncertainty in year t does not change firms’ diversification strategies
in year t-1, but motivates firms to hold more diversified innovation portfolio right afterwards. The
effect lasts for at least three years as is suggested by the estimated β1s that are significantly different
from zero.
Different subcomponents of the BBD policy uncertainty measure have different influence over
time. While the news component has a long term influence, government spending uncertainty and
tax component have a relatively shorter influence as is suggested by the insignificant coefficient for
later years. CPI forecast dispersion, by comparison, has a long latency and will not work until two
years later. The differences may shed light on firms’ main information source of policy uncertainty.
It suggests that to some extent, firms’ ideas of policy uncertainty mainly come from newspapers.
1.4.3 Selection Bias Adjustment
The diversification measure is only observable for firms with at least one new innovation in that
year. This restriction allows me to achieve only a conditional implication from the evidence: firms
that choose to invest during a period of policy uncertainty are more prone to follow diversified
investment strategies. A more essential concern is that the diversification measure also depends on
how successful firms get their patent granted which may or may not reflect firms’ true innovation
strategies. Potential bias comes from the situation where the approval rate for patent applications
changes with policy uncertainty. To test whether the results are driven by the possible relationship
between application approval rate and policy uncertainty, I perform a Heckman two-stage model
and in addition conduct a test using a diversification measure that is generated by both granted and
non-granted patent applications.
To meet the exclusive restriction, I need an instrumental variable in the first stage that can influ-
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ence the probability of patent to get granted but can not influence firms’ diversification strategies
directly. This motivates me to follow the recent papers that use the approval rate of patent exam-
iners as the instrument for application approval in the future. The method is first used by Sampat
and Williams (2015)19 and gets more widely used in the literature20.
The validity of the instrument variable (IV) comes from the institutional features of the patent-
ing examination process of USPTO. When the examination process starts, applications in a certain
art-unit are assigned randomly to patent examiners based on their predetermined workloads. The
approval rate not only depends on the specific application characteristics but also relates to the
characteristics of the examiners. The random assignment and differences in examiner provide a
“lottery” feature in the patent review process according to Farre-Mensa, Hegde and Ljungqvist
(2017). It is an instrument variable that meets the exclusive restriction as one can hardly think of
the different examiners’ characteristics having anything to do with firms’ innovation diversifica-
tion.
Following Farre-Mensa, Hegde and Ljungqvist (2017), I calculate the cumulative approval rate
up to year t as the following:
Examiner Approval Ratei jat =
ngranted jat
nreviewd jat
ngranted jat is the total number of applications reviewed by examiner “j” in art unit “a” that get
granted prior to “t”, whereas nreviewed jat is the total number of applications in art unit “a” that are
reviewed by examiner “j” prior to “t”. In a word, the examiner’s approval rate captures the histor-
ical approval rate of certain examiner “j” in art unit “a” which is exogenously determined at the
time when the current application is submitted.
I assign the approval rate for each of the new applications21. To get a firm-level measure, I
19Sampat and Willimas (2015) use it as IV to measure the effect of gene patents on follow-up innovation in the
human genome field.
20Farre-Mensa, Hegde and Ljungqvist (2017) use it as IV to test the the influence of the approval of first-time
application on startups’ future performance. Gaule (2015) use it as IV to study the impact of patent on the likelihood
of going public (or being acquired). The most recent work of Kempf and Spalt (2018) use the method to show that
meritless class action lawsuits target successful innovation.
21Patent application time is used to match with the examiner successful rate as it is a time when application get
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match each application to firm “i” based on their starting time discussed above and take the median
of the examiner approval rate for all the applications for the firm in year t. In the robustness check,
I also take the mean of the approval rates and achieve a similar conclusion. The firm-level measure
captures the average successful rates for the patent portfolio chosen by firm “i” at time t.
The results of the first stage are reported in Table B-2. It is a Probit model regression testing the
probability of having at least one patent grants in year t. The dependent variable is a dummy set to
one if firms have at least one application at time t that eventually get granted and zero if firms have
at least one application which has not granted yet. I find that higher examiner historical approval
rates significantly predict the probability of having patent grants, suggesting the validity of the
IV. Following the innovation literature (for example: Amore, Schneider and Žaldokas (2013)) I
include the firm capital to labor ratio and other related controls in the first stage and calculate the
inverse mill’s ratio.
The second stage results are reported in Table 4. The significant coefficient of the inverse mill’s
ratio suggests that the selection bias exists in the baseline results. After adjusting for that, I still
find the the predictive power of policy uncertainty on firms’ diversification.
In addition to the selection model, I re-estimate the baseline results using the diversification
measure that is generated by all patent applications observable up until January 2017. The results
are summarized in Table 5. The sample is restricted to [2001, 2014] when the majority of appli-
cations are published before they get granted. For the concern that the result is driven by different
time period used in these two tests, I re-exam the basic test in Table 2 by restricting the samples to
[2001, 2014]. None of these changes lead to a different conclusion.
Panel A in Table 5 shows that firms diversify their innovation investment during the period
of high policy uncertainty as suggested by the negative and significant coefficient β1. As for the
different influences of the subcomponents of the overall BBD index, the news component continues
to play an important role. Government spending uncertainty is also significant and there is no
predictive power for the other two components (the component measuring tax-related uncertainty
officially filed with USPTO and is prepared to be assigned to examiners.
CHAPTER 1. INNOVATION DIVERSIFICATION UNDER POLICY UNCERTAINTY 22
and the component measuring monetary policy uncertainty).
1.5 Gubernatorial Election
In this section, I attempt to deal with the possible endogeneity between policy uncertainty and
firms’ diversification strategies using the gubernatorial election events. The method has been used
by a growing number of papers such as Colak, Durnev and Qian (2017), Atanassov et al. (2018)
and so on. The identification power comes from the fact that gubernatorial elections are pre-
scheduled, the cycles vary to different states and the event itself increases the policy uncertainty to
firms in that state.
The election data covers all gubernatorial elections for all U.S. states between 1987 to 2014
from CQ Election Library. There are a total of 363 normal elections and 3 special elections in-
cluded22. The sample includes firm-year observations with no-missing and non-zero diversification
measures and the sample size vary with the availability of the control variables. For estimations
including state-level controls, the data covers1988 through 2014 when all state variables are avail-
able.
1.5.1 Baseline Differences-in-Differences
Following Betrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) and Roberts and Whited (2013), I use the
general model that is designed to handle multiple time periods and multiple treatment groups as
the following:
yist+1 = β0 +β1dst +Xist−1Γ+ pt +ms + εist+1 (1.3)
22The 3 special elections include the 2003 California gubernatorial recall election which resulted in the replacement
of the incumbent Democratic governor. The 2010 Utah special election that conducted to fill the remainder of the term
for the resigned governor Jon Huntsman and the 2011 West Virginia special election for the resigned Governor Joe
Manchin.
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Where dst is the election dummy which is equal to one if the state has an election in year t and
0 otherwise. Following Colak et al. (2017), the election period is set to a 12 months window prior
to the election day for the state in year t. For example, the gubernatorial election for New York
happened on 11/07/2006, the election period is thus [11/2005,11/2006]. When matching the event
year with firms’ fiscal year, I use the rule of thumb when the majority of fiscal months fall into the
event window. The dependent variable yist+1is the firms’ post-election diversification measure23.
pt is the year fixed effect, ms is the state fixed effect.
Xist−1 include both firm-level and state-level controls for the pre-election period so as to make
them unaffected by the event itself. To be specific, firms’ characteristics include the total number
of new patents, investment opportunity (market to book ratio), investment measure (R&D, R&D
dummy, capital expenditure), profitability (sales growth), firms’ stock market risk (the standard
deviation of daily stock return), leverage and firms’ characteristics (size, age). State-level controls
include real GDP growth rate, unemployment rate, population growth rate and dispensable income
growth rate. Firms’ characteristics measures are trimmed at 1th and 99th quantiles to control for
outliers. The error is clustered by state and year to control for cross-state and year correlation.
The basic results are reported in Panel A of Table 6. The estimated β1 in column 1 and 2 sug-
gests that firms use more diversified innovation strategies after the election event, after controlling
for pre-election firm-level and state-level factors. The results are more significant when I restrict
the test to close elections as shown in column 3 and 4. The election dummy is set to one if the state
election belongs to a close election, which is defined as elections whose victory margin is less than
5% following Atanassov et al. (2018). These elections have higher policy uncertainty with more
unpredictable results.
In Panel B of Table 6, I conduct a dynamic effect differences-in-differences model following
Amore et al. (2013) and Kerr and Nanda (2009) to see the impact of the election overtime. If
23The majority of papers use yist in the analysis. For one thing, I use yist+1 so as to be consistent with the previous
baseline analysis. For another, the uniqueness of using gubernatorial election for policy uncertainty is that it is not
clear when the post event year is as the uncertainty may also be induced when new governor change tax code after
the election, using t+1 represent more post-event related results than t. The specification is also consistent with the
literature such as Bhattacharya et al. (2017).
CHAPTER 1. INNOVATION DIVERSIFICATION UNDER POLICY UNCERTAINTY 24
election represents policy uncertainty, I would expect the impact to be temporary as it will be
resolved soon after the new governor is in power and in a cyclical manner as most states have
a 4-year election cycle. I replace dst into 4 dummies that represent leads and lags around the
close election event window24 and re-estimate equation (3). The results reported in panel B are
consistent with the expectation, firms use more diversified strategies after the election but the
impact disappears in the following year. The cyclical trend starts to show up towards the end of
the 4-year window when the next election is on the way.
In Panel C of Table 6, I conduct a placebo test to see the robustness of the event dummy. To be
specific, I replace dst with one of the leads and lags dummies each time and re-estimate equation
(3). For example, in the first row, the pseudo dst is equal to one if it is one year before the close
election year and zero otherwise. It suggests that the impact will not exist if I assign the indicator
around the true event year. In sum, the results in the basic test reflect firms’ response to higher
policy uncertainty induced by gubernatorial elections.
1.5.2 Neighbor States Method
Two limitations are related to the baseline difference-in-difference approach. First, as Bertrand
et al. (2004) pointed out, including long post event window leads to the underestimation of stan-
dard errors due to the serial correlation and low variance of the outcome variables. Second, as
Colak et al. (2017) pointed out, the estimated differences may also contain some unobserved state
time-varying factors that change the outcome variable and are related to policy uncertainty 25. In
addition, the significant estimated control variables in unreported results rise the concern that the
results are driven by differences between the treatment group and the control group before the
24The results is based on close election event only as it is the most significant one in Panel A. Using other event will
lead to similar result but may rise concerns that the results are driving by low testing power.
25To some extent, this concern is dealt with in the baseline settings. The identification power of the event dummy
comes from the fact that more than one states have gubernatorial election in the same year t,but these states do not
share the same time-varying shocks. In addition, all endogeneity that is induced by state time-invarying characteristics
are controlled by state fixed effect.
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event. I attempt to deal with these concerns using a post-event neighbor states test in this subsec-
tion and balanced sample test in the following subsection.
Following the same intuition of Colak et al. (2017), I assume that two firms are subjected to
same time-varying factors which lead to similar changes in their diversification decisions if they
operate in states that share the same border. If one firm is in a state with an election in year t and
the other firm is in a neighbor state without an election in year t, the difference of the two firms’
diversification contains the influence of election only given the assumption. To be specific, the
following equation is estimated similar to Colak et al. (2017):
∆Diversi f icationi jt+1 = β1Electioni,t +β2∆Xi jt−1 +∆εi jt (1.4)
where t is the election year, firm i represents firms that in a state with gubernatorial election
at time t while firm j operates in neighbor states that do not have gubernatorial election at time t,
the dependent variable is the differences of post event diversification for firm i and j, ∆Xi jt−1 is
the differences of other pre-event firm-level and state-level variables for firm i and j so as to make
these characteristics exogenous of the election. As the equation is estimated for all firm i, firm j
pair for each election year thus Electioni,t is equal to a constant 1 in the estimation. The neighbor
states are specified as states that share the borders with the election states. Following Colak et al.
(2017), Alaska and Hawaii are dropped as they share no borders with others. 26
The results are reported in Table 7. The negative estimated β1 suggests that firms in states with
a gubernatorial election in year t are choosing more diversified investment strategies in post-event
period, compared to firms in the neighbor state with no gubernatorial election in that year. The
results are consistent after controlling for the pre-event cross sectional difference of firms’ charac-
teristics and states’ characteristics. It suggests that the results in the baseline setting are not mainly
driven by time-varying factors of the state but the policy uncertainty induced by gubernatorial
elections.
26Please check Colak et al. (2017) Table 4 for an example of qualified neighbor between year 2005 to 2008
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1.5.3 Propensity Score Matching
The neighbor state method helps reinforce the results in the baseline setting but is still subjected
to some shortcomings. First, it is not really a traditional difference-in-difference but a post-event
cross-sectional difference test. It may contain the unobserved differences between the treatment
and control groups prior to the treatment and add new endogeneity to the test27. A primary way to
deal with it is to include pre-event cross-sectional differences, as is shown in Table 7. The other
way to deal with this is to conduct a propensity score matching for pre-event characteristics and
conduct a difference-in-difference test on a balanced sample. In addition, as states have a different
number of neighbors and a different number of firms, using equally weighted OLS test may lead
to some bias. To deal with the concerns, I generate a balanced sample and restrict each treated firm
to have the same number of matched controls.
I assign firms in states with elections as the treated group and firms in non-election neighbor
states in that year as the control group. I conduct the algorithm of Imbens and Rubin (2015) to
estimate a propensity score based on pre-event firms’ and states’ characteristics. Specifically, a
Logit model is used to fit models on a linear or quadratic function of the covariates, each covariate
and its quadratic forms are added to the model one by one and only those covariates with the
highest likelihood ratio remains. To get a balanced sample, for each firm in an election state at
time t, I choose the 5 nearest neighbor control firms based on the propensity score calculated
above. To further achieve a good match, I impose a common support restriction in the selection
by dropping treatment observations whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or lower
than the minimum propensity score of the controls28.
Panel A Table 8 shows the test for sample balance. It suggests that in terms of firms’ character-
istics, the majority of them reach the balance as indicated by the insignificance in the differences.
In terms of the state-level and industry-level characteristics, states with elections have higher dis-
27If the difference lead to a nonzero selection bias which will be captured in the treatment dummy, OLS regression
cannot reflect the casual effect. Please check Roberts and Whited (2013) for further discussion.
28Following the literature (Shipman, Swanquist and Whited (2017), Rovert and Whited (2013) for example), I match
the sample with replacement in order to improve a better and less biased control. To deal with the concern of a higher
weights to extreme values I restrict the sample to common support.
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posable income growth and slightly higher population growth than states without. But they share
similar unemployment and economic situations as suggested by GDP growth. A raw Average
Treated on Treated test in Panel B indicates that firms would have chosen less diversified strategies
had they not encountered policy uncertainty.
In Panel C of Table 8, I report the results for a common difference-in-difference test for the
balanced sample similar to the specification in Roberts and Whited (2013):
∆diversi f ication = β0 +β1d +∆Xψ + pt +∆ε (1.5)
where the dependent variable is the time-series difference in firms’ diversification of post-
election to pre-election period. ∆X is a matrix of the time-series difference in the characteristics
of firms and states from post-election to pre-election period. The election time t is the year when
firms in the treatment group have elections and the controls that do not have elections.d is a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 for firms in the treatment group and 0 otherwise. As elections happen
in different years, a year fixed effect is added to the model so as to control for the common year
associated shocks for all election states in year t. The coefficient of interest is β1 which captures the
average difference of firms’ diversification change between firms in an election state and matched
firms in a non-election state at time t. To add efficiency, I also control for the time-series difference
of other firm-level and state-level variables for the post-election and the pre-election periods. In
comparison with the estimation in equation (5), β1 captures the differences-in-differences effect of
the election.
The results are summarized in Table 9. The negative and significant estimated β1suggest that
firms increase their investment diversification after the election compared to similar firms that
do not have an election in that year and the results are consistent by adding firm-level controls
and state-level controls. Most of the controls show no significance in the results. It is a good sign
suggesting that the matched firms most likely meet the “parallel trend” assumption. The cross-state
and year correlation has been adjusted by clustering. In robustness check, changing the controls to
the difference before the event, i.e. from t-2 to t-1 still lead to a similar conclusion.
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Overall, the results in the section show support that firms use more diversified innovation strate-
gies after the period of policy uncertainty and the results are consistent after dealing with some
endogeneity concerns.
1.6 Policy Uncertainty and New Field Exploration
In this section, I explore whether firms stay in familiar fields or take the chance to explore new
fields during the period of policy uncertainty.
Diversification can be achieved in at least two ways. For one thing, firms can diversify their
investment but still maintain in fields that they are familiar with, by doing so they may enjoy
the benefit of diversifying risk and the economies of scale but potentially suffers the increased
threat of patent race within the firm’s own innovation portfolio. For another, diversification can
be made by jumping out of the familiar field and explore some new fields; this kind of investment
sounds risk-seeking and costly in a short term but may strengthen market power in the long run
once the innovations successfully turn into patents and help firms gain the first-mover advantage in
competition. During the period of policy uncertainty when the outcomes for both the conservative
investment and the risky investment become more uncertain, diversifying by exploring new field
looks more attractive. As pointed out by Oi (1961), Hartman (1972,1976) and Abel (1983), firms
can use expansion to exploit good news and contraction to insure against bad news, making them
potentially risk seeking in an uncertain environment.
I model the likelihood of investing in a new field as a function of policy uncertainty as the
following:
Prob(New)= c+β1PUt +β2Controli,t +β3Controli,t−1+β4Mt +β5Trendt +Industryi+εit (1.6)
The test is made for all innovative firms defined as those that have at least one innovation
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application in history. I use a Probit model for equation (3). The dependent variable is equal to
1 if firm i has at least one new patent (or applications) that is in a new class in year t. A new
class is defined as the one that none of the firm’s new patents and applications belong to in the
past three years. Three years are chosen because of the long influence of policy uncertainty on
investment strategies as discussed in section 5. In robust check, using a shorter window still lead
to the same conclusion. The measure follows a similar intuition as the new class measure generated
by Balsmeier et al. (2017) but reflects more of firms’ choices than the technology development of
the society.
Following the previous sections, policy uncertainty measure is the overall level of BBD index.
I include both firm-level and macro-level controls in all specifications. The results are reported in
Table 1.10. Firms are more likely to explore new fields as suggested by the positive and significant
β1 in column one. To see how long the effect would last, I change the dependent variable with
leads and lags in column (2) and (3). The results suggest that the effect is temporary: it lasts for
two years and have no influence afterwards.
One concern is that the result may only reflect firms’ willingness to invest on innovation instead
of exploring new field as the indicator is one when firms do not start any new innovation investment
in the previous years but start a new investment this year. To test the possibility, I restrict the sample
to firms that have new innovation investment for all three years. The results reported in panel B
suggest the effect is not driven by firms’ decisions to invest.
1.7 Heterogeneity Analysis
In this section I investigate whether firms’ diversification strategies are equally affected by policy
uncertainty if firms face different financing constraint, investment irreversibility, overall industry
force (political sensitivity and product market competition) and if they use different incentive con-
tracts for their managers. I use the following specification to test the cross-sectional differences:
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Diversi f icationit = αi +β0PUt−1 +β1PUt−1 ×Hi,t−1 +β2(Hi,t−1 ×Controls)+
β3Controli,t +β4Controli,t−1 +β5Mt−1 +β6Trendt + εit (4)
Hi,t−1 is the proxy for different channels. In the baseline test, I include the interaction of
PU and the channel proxy and control for firm-level and macro-level characteristics. In order
to get rid of the possibility that β1reflects the influence of Hi,t−1 through channels other than
policy uncertainty, I add interaction of Hi,t−1 with controls of firms’ investment opportunity and
macroeconomic investment opportunity as robustness checks. β1 demonstrates the cross-sectional
differences of the effect of policy uncertainty.
Firm-level controls are the same as before. i.e., the number of patents, firms’ investment op-
portunity (market to book ratio), profit (cash flow, sales growth), firms’ specific risk (the standard
deviation of firms’ daily stock return) firms’ investment (R&D, R&D indicator)and firms’ funda-
mental characteristics (size, tangibility, book leverage and firm age). In addition, I further control
for the industry competition faced by the firm using Herfindahl-Hirschman Index based on sales.
Macroeconomic investment-opportunity controls include (1) The consumer sentiment index from
the University of Michigan (2) GDP growth and Macro uncertainty controls (the cross-sectional
standard deviation of firms’ profit growth, Volatility index VIX 29, cross-sectional standard devia-
tion of firms’ monthly stock returns).
1.7.1 Financial Constraint
According to Fazari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), firms are financially constrained if the wedge
between a firm’s opportunity cost of internal capital and external capital is large. Innovative firms
have a lot of intangible assets and are more likely to suffer financial constraint due to the in-
29In robustness check I still tried VXO (implied volatility index) which is highly correlated with VIX and give me
similar results.
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formation asymmetry. Starting new innovation projects, especially projects in different classes
exacerbates the information asymmetry problem, making it more difficult for constrained firms to
use external financing. To make matters worse, the financial cost is higher during the period of
policy uncertainty as the period is often combined with low equity prices (Pastor and Veronesi,
2012), bad economic performance, high market volatility (for example: Baker, Bloom and Davis
(2016)), high credit spreads (Gilchrist et al., 2014) and high political uncertainty risk premium
(Pastor and Veronesi (2013)). As a result, constraint firms may find it harder to use diversified
innovation strategies due to the high financing cost during the period of high policy uncertainty.
In addition, Almedia, Hus and Li (2013) show that financial constraint benefits innovation by
improving the efficiency of innovative activities as it eliminates the effect of “free cash flow”.
Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2013), however, argue that financial constraint is an important fac-
tor preventing countries to catch up. They suggest that firms’ innovation activities are very sensi-
tive to financial frictions and find negative relationship using Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Surveys (BEEPS). During the period of high policy uncertainty, it is reasonable to as-
sume that managers face a strong career concern; the “free cash flow” channel will play a minor
role than the cost of financing channel. The arguments imply less diversification for constraint
firms.
The results are summarized in Table 10. The firm constraint is measured by KZ index follow-
ing Lamont, Polk and Saaa-requejo (2001), according to Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2015), it is
the most popular measure for financial constraints. I set a constraint indicator that is equal to one if
a firm’s KZ index value is above median and zero otherwise. The positive and significant β1 sug-
gests that financial constraint firms are significantly less diversified in their innovation investment
compared to non-constraint firms during the period of high policy uncertainty.
Another concern is that the negative effect may be driven purely by financial constraint firms
who cut their overall innovation investment because of bad investment opportunities. For example,
Nguyen and Phan (2017) find that financial constraint firms are less likely to conduct M&A during
the period of high policy uncertainty. To exclude the influence of total investment amount and
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change in the investment opportunities, I add additional interaction controls of policy uncertainty
with firms’ total number of patents and with firms’ investment opportunities. In unreported result,
the coefficients of the additional interactions are not significant. As shown in Table 10 column 2,
the results are not driven by these additional channels. In column 3 I add additional interaction
controls of policy uncertainty with macroeconomic investment opportunities and still get the same
conclusion.
In sum, firms use more diversified innovation investment strategies when firms are not finan-
cially constrained but have to be more concentrated while firms are financially constrained during
the period of policy uncertainty.
1.7.2 Investment Irreversibility
The real option theory implies that the irreversibility of investment increases the value of postpon-
ing the project during uncertain periods30 thus firms who find it extremely costly to adjust back
investment are more willing to postpone the investment. Whether do firms with high irreversibility
follow different diversification strategies during the period of policy uncertainty?
To find an answer to the question, I conduct a heterogeneity test for firms with different ir-
reversibility. Following Gluen and Ion (2015), Bonaime et al. (2018), the first proxy I use for
irreversibility is the capital intensity ratio measure as firms’ tangibility. As pointed out by Gluen
and Ion (2015), if firms have a lot of upfront investment on physical assets that are specific for the
innovation project, firms will have a high irreversiblity that reflects into a high tangibility ratio.
Table 11 Panel A shows the results. The positive and significant coefficient β1 suggests that firms
with high irreversibility are less able to diversify their innovation investment during the period
of high policy uncertainty compared to firms with low irreversibility. In order to check whether
the effect is driven by cutting the number of innovation investment, in column 2 I include addi-
tional interaction controls of policy uncertainty with firms’ total number of new patents and with
30Dixit and Pindyck (1994) offer a review of the early theoretical literature
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firms’ investment opportunities. In column 3 I include additional interaction controls of policy
uncertainty with macroeconomic investment opportunities. The results are insensitive to any of the
adjustments.
Tangibility approach has some limitations. As pointed out by Gluen and Ion (2015) and Kes-
sides (1990), it fails to take into account asset mobility and asset specificity, i.e. the liquidity related
to different type of assets. In addition, tangibility is also related to the cost of capital and cannot
offer a pure explanation related to the real option theory. To get a measure that reflects the asset-
level liquidity, I follow Kim and Kung (2017) and generate the redeployability measure as a proxy
for irreversibility. The redeployability of Kim and Kung (2017) takes into account the usability of
assets within and across industries. Based on the BEA capital flow table that breaks down capital
expenditure into asset categories across industries, they first generate asset redeplyability for each
asset then use industrial market capitalization of Compustat firms as the weight to get the average
redeployability score for the firm year. The higher the firm’s redeployability, the more liquid the
firm’s assets are and the lower the cost of adjusting capital downwards. (low irreversibility). The
results are shown in Table 11 Panel B. Consistent with the previous results, the negative and sig-
nificant coefficient β1 suggests that firms with high irreversibility are less likely to diversify their
innovation investment during the period of high policy uncertainty.
In sum, for firms with high irreversibility, the cost of innovation investment outweigh the ben-
efit, if diversification may further lead to higher irreversibility, firms with high irreversibility will
follow less diversified strategies.
1.7.3 Managerial Incentives
In this section, I explore whether different types of manager incentives lead to different choices of
investment strategies during the period of policy uncertainty.
I include three types of manger incentive contracts following Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006)
and Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009). The first one is the manager pay-performance sensitivity
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(or delta), measured as the change in the dollar value of manager wealth to 1% change in stock
price. According to Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006), delta aligns the incentives of managers with
the interest of shareholders by exposing managers to more risk. As managers are less diversified
than shareholders, the additional risk exposure prevents risk taking and explosive behavior (e.g.,
Panousi and Papanikolaou, 2012). In addition, according to Aghion, Reenen and Zingales (2013),
managers may either prefer a quiet life or face a career concern, both of which imply that managers
with high delta will do less innovation investment during the period of high policy uncertainty. As
with innovation diversification, for one thing, more diversification leads to lower risk for the whole
portfolio; for another, it is against the “quiet life” expectation of the managers if diversification
to different fields requires additional effort. The implication for investment diversification is the
result of the trade-off.
The second one is the manager risk-taking incentive (vega), measured as the change in the
dollar value of manager wealth to 0.01 change in standard deviation annualized stock return. Man-
agers benefit from increasing risk with equity-based compensation, as a consequence, the incentive
motivates them to take more risky and explosive projects. According to Coles, Daniel and Naveen
(2006), higher vega leads to more investment in R&D, less investment in tangibility and higher
leverage after controlling for the level of delta. I would expect firms with high vega have more
innovation investment. As with innovation diversification, If innovation diversification leads to
lower risk in general, vega implies more concentration. However, if diversification means strategic
expansion, vega leads to higher diversification.
The third one is the manager entrenchment index of Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009). Manso
(2011) suggests that more entrenched managers are prone to explore new opportunities. Thus I
would expect higher manager entrenchment leads to more diversified innovation strategies during
the period of policy uncertainty.
The results are summarized in Table 12. The positive and significant coefficient β1s in panel
A demonstrates that managers with high pay-performance choose to be less diversified during
the period of high policy uncertainty. The results are consistent by adding additional interaction
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controls. In the last column, I include vega and vega interaction with policy uncertainty to control
for managers’ risk incentives following Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006). None of them leads to
significant differences in firms’ decision to diversify. The results in panel B indicate that higher
vega leads to lower diversification but the difference is not significant. In Panel C I show that higher
manager entrenchment results in higher diversification. The insignificance may partly result from
the weak testing power and limitation on data availability.
1.7.4 Government Spending Sensitivity
In the following subsection, I explore whether firms with different sensitivities to government
spending implement different diversification strategies.
Firms in politically sensitive industries suffer more during the period of high policy uncertainty.
Julio and Yook (2012) and Jens (2016) find that the negative influence of policy uncertainty is more
severe for politically sensitive firms. Atanassov et al. (2018) find that politically sensitive firms
increase their R&D more than other firms during election periods. In terms of diversification, for
one thing, politically sensitive firms have higher demands for risk diversification strategies during
uncertain periods, for another, firms’ ability to diversify is limited due to the uniqueness and cost
of exploring innovation in a wider field. The result is the trade-off between the two. Following the
literature, I use two proxies for political sensitivity.
The first proxy is the policy sensitive indicator that sets to one if firms are in politically sensitive
industries and zero otherwise31. The results are reported in Table 13. The positive and significant
β1suggest that firms in politically sensitive industries are less diversified than firms that are less
sensitive to policy uncertainty.
The second proxy is based on firms’ dependence on government purchase. To be specific,
31Policy sensitive industries include the following: Tobacco Products (5), Pharmaceuticals (13), Health Care Ser-
vices (11), Defense (26), Petroleum and Natural Gas (30), Telecommunications (32) and Transportation (40), as used
in Herron et al. (1999) and Julio and Yook (2012) and Atanassov, Julio and Leng (2018). Fama French 48 industries
is used as the industry classification
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following Belo, Gala and Li (2013), Gulen and Ion (2016) and Bonaime et al. (2018), I use
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Benchmark Input-Output Accounts table and find the gov-
ernment spending on commodities on each industry, then I use Industry-by-commodity table to get
the Leontief coefficient and find the government spending on each industry’s final products. The
government spending dependence is measured as total industry input xi purchased by government
section (federal, state and local) over total industry output yi. The higher the ratio, the stronger the
government dependence. The benchmark table is updated every 5 years starting from 1982. In-
stead of adding additional lags as in Belo, Gala and Li (2013), I use the time when benchmark table
is reported and update the value once a new table comes out. The detailed definition is described
in Appendix A.
Table 14 summarizes the results. High dependence will limit firms’ ability to diversify during
the period of high policy uncertainty as is suggested by the positive and significant β1. The results
are not driven through channels such as the total number of patents and the difference in firm-level
and macroeconomic investment opportunities as suggested in column 2 and 3.
In sum, both Table 13 and Table 14 suggest that firms with higher sensitivity to policy un-
certainty choose less diversified innovation investment strategies during highly uncertain periods
compared to firms with lower sensitivity to government behavior. The results suggest that diversi-
fication is hard to achieve if high sensitivity to policy uncertainty leads to higher cost that makes
firms to sacrifice the long-term strategic movement.
1.7.5 Threat From Product Market
In this subsection, I explore whether firms choose different levels of diversification if they face
different levels of competition during the period of policy uncertainty. Market competition is
measured as fluidity following Hoberg and Philips (2016). It is a text-based measure that describes
the product similarity. A high fluidity implies higher competition in the market (low market power)
and greater product market threats from rivals.
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Table 15 summarize the results. The results in panel A suggest that firms facing a high threat
from the product market are equally diversified in their portfolio in comparison with firms facing
a low threat. However, these firms are more likely to explore new fields as is suggested by the
positive and significant β1 in Panel B. The results are not driven by channels like differences in
the total number of patents or differences in firm-level and macro-level investment opportunities
as are shown in the last two columns. The results indicate that if the existing field has too much
competition, firms are more prone to explore new fields and achieve the first-mover advantage
during the period of policy uncertainty.
1.8 Conclusion
In summary, I find that firms pursue more diversified innovation strategies during the period of
high policy uncertainty. The effect is different on a variety of the firm-level and industry-level
characteristics. I find that firms are less diversified if they are financially constrained, have high
asset irreversibility and have a strong reliance on pay-performance incentives. I also find that
firms are less diversified if they are too sensitive to policy uncertainty. Moreover, the threat from
product market motivates firms to strategically explore new fields so as to achieve the first-mover
advantage.
Compared with other related measures, patent based investment diversification measure has its
advantages. In the patent literature, originality, generated by Trajtenberg, Henderson, and Jaffe
(1997), is often used as a proxy for firms’ explorative behavior. If the citations of the patent cover
a broader array of technology classes, the patent is viewed as more explorative. Similarly, Benner
and Tushman (2002) construct measures for exploration and exploitation based on how many cita-
tions made by the patent are outside of firms’ existing expertise. These citation-based approaches
suffer the same limitations: they are patent-specific and reflect the idea of researchers and experts
in the related field. By comparison, the diversification measure used in the paper is a more direct
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proxy that reflects the investment decisions of the management team. Therefore, it reflects the
strategic movement of the firm. By contrast, firms’ investment diversification is also measured by
non-patent proxies such as segment sales for conglomerate firms. The limitation is that sales itself
is volatile to policy uncertainty and cannot be fully controlled by firms themselves. As a result,
the measure is a joint proxy that reflects both firms’ choices and the overall economic turmoil.
Apart from that, the investment cycle length of exploring new segment is too long compared to the
change of policy uncertainty. Thus the measure fails to capture firms’ instantaneous investment
responses.
In sum, this paper focuses on firms’ decisions to diversify their innovation portfolio and shed
light on the mystery of how firms control risk and expand through R&D investment during uncer-
tain periods.
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1.9 Figures
Figure 1.1: Policy Uncertainty Index
The Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) Policy uncertainty index together with the NBER business
cycle periods from January 1985 to December 2014
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1.10 Tables
Table 1.1: Correlation for Policy Uncertainty Measures
PU News Gov.Spend CPI dispersion Tax CS Return SD VIX CS Profit SD Sentiment GDP %
PU 1
News 0.901*** 1
Gov.Spend 0.562*** 0.320*** 1
CPI dispersion 0.610*** 0.334*** 0.608*** 1
Tax 0.738*** 0.547*** 0.177*** 0.330*** 1
CS return SD -0.0857*** 0.0689*** -0.187*** -0.0830*** -0.239*** 1
VIX 0.404*** 0.520*** -0.0868*** 0.363*** 0.151*** 0.547*** 1
CS Profit SD 0.0290*** 0.183*** -0.0116** -0.116*** -0.191*** 0.156*** 0.128*** 1
Consumer Sentiment -0.745*** -0.617*** -0.466*** -0.569*** -0.556*** 0.320*** -0.158*** 0.0906*** 1
GDP % -0.562*** -0.539*** -0.208*** -0.474*** -0.346*** -0.0577*** -0.423*** 0.106*** 0.760*** 1
Period: 1990-2014
Correlation between the policy uncertainty index of Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) and macroe-
conomic opportunities and uncertainty measures. Detailed variable definition can be found in
Appendix A. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respec-
tively.
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Table 1.2: Policy Uncertainty and Investment Diversification
This table presents results for equation (2)Diversi f icationit = αi + β1PUt−1 + β2Controli,t +
β3Controli,t−1 +β4Mt−1 +β5Trend + εit . Policy uncertainty is measured as the BBD index (col-
umn 1) and its subcomponents (columns 2-5) following Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016).The de-
pendent variable is the innovation diversification measure at time t. Macroeconomic variables are
measured as averages over the prior fiscal year. Firm tangibility, market to book ratio and leverage
ratio are measured at t-1 while other variables are measured at the current year t. Detailed variable
definitions are in Appendix A. All models are estimated with time trend and firm fixed effect and
standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm and year. t-statistics are re-
ported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
Overall Index News Gov. Spending CPI disagree Tax
PUt−1 -0.0774*** -0.0511*** -0.0329*** -0.0344 -0.00946*
(-4.96) (-3.52) (-3.39) (-1.46) (-2.04)
Maker to Book 0.000339 0.000375 0.000223 0.000706 0.000597
(0.12) (0.13) (0.08) (0.24) (0.20)
Cash Flow 0.0281 0.0261 0.0297 0.0252 0.0261
(1.26) (1.17) (1.33) (1.14) (1.16)
Size -0.0284*** -0.0283*** -0.0274*** -0.0268*** -0.0272***
(-3.18) (-3.17) (-3.05) (-2.97) (-3.00)
Sales Growth 0.000745 0.000285 0.00263 0.000661 0.00210
(0.10) (0.04) (0.35) (0.09) (0.29)
Number of patent -0.00576*** -0.00576*** -0.00579*** -0.00579*** -0.00579***
(-16.55) (-16.53) (-16.53) (-16.48) (-16.46)
Firm return SD 0.171 0.197 0.168 0.220 0.205
(1.03) (1.13) (0.98) (1.16) (1.12)
R&D -0.153*** -0.155*** -0.147*** -0.156*** -0.159***
(-2.96) (-2.96) (-2.81) (-2.96) (-2.98)
R&D Dummy -0.0176 -0.0181 -0.0168 -0.0171 -0.0172
(-0.63) (-0.65) (-0.60) (-0.61) (-0.61)
HHI 0.0235 0.0198 0.0210 0.0207 0.0229
(0.52) (0.44) (0.47) (0.46) (0.51)
Tangibility 0.00640 0.00548 0.00450 -0.00417 -0.00580
(0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (-0.08) (-0.11)
Age -0.0466** -0.0467** -0.0462** -0.0453** -0.0440**
(-2.35) (-2.36) (-2.34) (-2.30) (-2.22)
Leverage 0.0808*** 0.0813*** 0.0813*** 0.0815*** 0.0819***
(3.36) (3.38) (3.37) (3.39) (3.39)
CS Return SD -0.142* -0.193** -0.142* -0.184** -0.237**
(-1.78) (-2.13) (-1.84) (-2.12) (-2.27)
VIX 0.00113* 0.00116* 0.0000894 0.000273 0.0000760
(2.05) (1.78) (0.17) (0.39) (0.12)
Consumer sentiment -0.00104** -0.000322 -0.000604 -0.00000723 -0.000266
(-2.20) (-0.71) (-1.48) (-0.02) (-0.50)
CS profit SD -0.0000288 0.00000113 -0.0000576 -0.0000946 -0.0000651
(-0.59) (0.02) (-0.99) (-1.48) (-1.13)
GDP Growth -0.00104 -0.00252 -0.00159 -0.00338 -0.00118
(-0.53) (-1.26) (-0.62) (-1.42) (-0.41)
Trend 0.00198 0.00183 0.000837 0.00135 0.00322**
(1.50) (1.29) (0.59) (0.94) (2.39)
N 16,703 16,703 16,703 16,703 16,703
adj R2 0.520 0.520 0.520 0.519 0.519
within R2 0.0671 0.0666 0.0664 0.0659 0.0661
Cluster Firm&Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect (FE) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.3: The Influence of Policy Uncertainty Over Time
This table presents results for equation (2) Diversi f icationit∗ = αi + β1PUt−1 + β2Controli,t∗ +
β3Controli,t∗−1 + β4Mt∗−1 + β5Trend + εit∗. Policy uncertainty is measured as the BBD index
(column 1) and its sub components (columns 2-5) following Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016). The
first column describes the dependent variable used in the each regression. All specifications include
simultaneous or beginning-of-year firm-level controls and macroeconomic controls.To be specific,
macroeconomic variables, tangibility, market to book and leverage are measured at time t*-1 while
other variables are measured at the current year t*. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix
A. In all models I include firm fixed effect and cluster standard errors by firm and year. t-statistics
are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respectively.
Overall Index News Gov. Spending CPI disagree Tax
Diversi f icationi,t−1 0.0105 0.00758 -0.0187 0.0330 0.00299
(0.82) (0.65) (-1.35) (1.67) (0.90)
Diversi f icationi,t -0.0480*** -0.0427*** -0.0491** 0.0170 -0.00132
(-2.95) (-3.35) (-2.40) (1.10) (-0.50)
Diversi f icationi,t+1 -0.0774*** -0.0511*** -0.0329*** -0.0344 -0.00946*
(-4.96) (-3.52) (-3.39) (-1.46) (-2.04)
Diversi f icationi,t+2 -0.0484*** -0.0329*** -0.0314*** -0.0713*** -0.00936**
(-4.31) (-3.83) (-3.45) (-3.92) (-2.22)
Diversi f icationi,t+3 -0.0638*** -0.0594*** -0.0188 -0.0381 -0.00399
(-3.26) (-4.13) (-1.41) (-1.69) (-0.86)
Diversi f icationi,t+4 -0.0318* -0.0166 -0.00594 -0.0592*** 0.00411
(-1.72) (-1.40) (-0.38) (-3.38) (1.04)
Marco Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.4: Sample Selection Adjusted Result
The table summarizes the results from the second stage of two-stage Heckman selection model.
Equation (2) is re-estimated by addition the inverse mill’s ratio estimated from the first stage probit
model which is reported in Table B-2 in the appendix. Policy uncertainty is measured as the BBD
index (column 1) and its sub components (columns 2-5). The dependent variable is the innovation
diversification measure. The control variables are the same as in Table 2 and the detailed definitions
are in Appendix A. All the results include a time trend and firm fixed effect. Standard errors are
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm and year. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Overall Index News Gov. Spending CPI disagree Tax
PoliticalUncertaintyt−1 -0.0701*** -0.0456*** -0.0304*** -0.0347 -0.00968**
(-4.59) (-3.18) (-3.33) (-1.47) (-2.15)
Inverse Mill’s ratio 0.101** 0.101** 0.100** 0.108*** 0.114***
(2.56) (2.59) (2.61) (2.87) (3.04)
N 16,433 16,433 16,433 16,433 16,433
r2_within 0.0667 0.0662 0.0661 0.0656 0.0659
R2 0.591 0.590 0.590 0.590 0.590
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.5: Patent and Application Adjusted Test
The test follows equation (2) in Table 2. The dependent variable is the diversification measure
that is generated using all firms’ new patent applications from 2001 to 2014. Policy uncertainty
is measured as the BBD index (column 1) and its sub components (columns 2-5). The control
variables are the same as in Table 2 and the detailed definitions are in Appendix A. All the results
include a time trend and firm fixed effect. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and
clustered by firm and year. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Overall Index News Gov. Spending CPI disagree Tax
PoliticalUncertaintyt−1 -0.0996*** -0.0783*** -0.0363** 0.0205 -0.000875
(-4.57) (-4.29) (-2.51) (0.89) (-0.24)
N 9,715 9,715 9,715 9,715 9,715
R2 0.630 0.630 0.629 0.629 0.629
r2_within 0.0651 0.0650 0.0629 0.0624 0.0624
Macro Control Yes Yes Yes Yes R2
Firm Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.6: Difference in Difference Test On Gubernatorial Election Event
This table summarizes the results for the baseline differences-in-differences test specified in equa-
tion (3)yist+1 = β0 +β1dst +Xist−1Γ+ pt +ms + εist+1, The sample covers all firm-year with non-
missing and non-zero diversification measure from 1988 to 2014. Election year is an indicator that
equals to one if the state has election in year t and 0 otherwise. Close election is an indicator that
equals to one only when the election’s victory margin is less than 5%. The estimated β1 is reported
in panel A and the error is clustered by both state and year. In panel B, I re-estimate equation (3)
by replacing dst to 4 dummies indicating the leads and lags related to the close election year t in the
[-1, +2] window. For placebo tests, in panel C I replace dst to one of the 4 dummies each time and
run four regressions as specified in equation (3). Firm controls and state controls are all lagged to
pre-election. I include the total number of new patents, investment-opportunity measure (market
to book ratio), investment measures (R&D, R&D dummy, capital expenditure), protability (sales
growth), firm stock market risk (stock standard deviation), leverage and firms’ basic characteris-
tics (size, age). State-level controls contain real GDP growth rate of the state, unemployment rate,
popolation growth rate and dispensable income growth rate. Detailed definitions can be found in
Appendix A, t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A
Diversification Diversification Diversification Diversification
election -0.0128* -0.0111*
(-1.97) (-1.78)
close election -0.0200* -0.0237***
(-2.03) (-2.90)
N 14,561 14,159 14,561 14,159
r2_within 0.148 0.147 0.148 0.148
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Controls No Yes No Yes
State Fixed Effect (FE), Year Fixed Effect (FE) Yes Yes Yes Yes
State, Year Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B:Dynamic Test
Diversification t-statistics
1 Year Before -0.00433 -0.30
Close election year -0.0258*** -2.89
1 Year After -0.00338 -0.29




Firm, State Controls Yes
State FE, Yes FE Yes
State, Year Cluster Yes
Panel C: Placebo Test
Diversification t N within r2
1 Year Before -0.00141 -0.10 14,159 0.147
Close election year -0.0237*** -2.90 14,159 0.148
1 Year after -0.000315 -0.03 14,159 0.147
Two Years after 0.00396 0.47 12,819 0.133
Firm, State Controls Yes
State FE, Year FE Yes
State, Year Cluster Yes
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Table 1.7: Post-Event Difference-in-Difference Using Neighbor Method
This table summarizes the results for the post-election cross-sectional differences-in-differences
test following the neighbor state method. For each state-year with an election, the follow-
ing specification is estimated ∆Diversi f icationi jt+1 = β1Electioni,t + β2∆Xi jt−1 + ∆εi jt where
∆diversi f icationi j,t+1is the difference of post election diversification for firm i in states with gu-
bernatorial election at time t with firm j in neighbor states that do not have gubernatorial election at
time t, Electioni,t is a constant 1, ∆Xi jt−1 is the pre-election firm-level and state-level differences
of firm i and firm j. The sample include all firm-years with non-zero and non-missing diversifi-
cation measure and operate in state other than Alaska and Hawaii. Standard errors are clustered
by f irmi j groups and year. Detailed definitions can be found in Appendix A, t-statistics are re-
ported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
∆diversi f icationt+1 ∆diversi f icationt+1 ∆diversi f icationt+1
Election Year -0.00693*** -0.0104*** -0.0124***
(-5.77) (-6.77) (-7.70)


































N 239,563 107,448 104,233
R2 0.000 0.217 0.218
Cluster by firm pair and year Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.8: Balanced Sample Test and Differences-in-Differences
The balance test for propensity score matched sample. The treatment groups are the firms whose
current headquarters are located in states with gubernatorial election in year t and controls are firms
in neighbor states without a gubernatorial election in year t. The sample is restricted to innovative
firms that have valid diversification measures (non-missing and non-zero) and non-missing control
variables in pre-election year and post-election year. One treated firm is matched with 5 similar
controls using nearest neighbor method after requesting for common support region. Propensity
score is estimated following the algorithme of Imbens and Rubin (2015). Detailed definitions can
be found in Appendix A, t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Main Characteristics of Propensity Score Matching
Treat (Mean) Control (Mean) bias (%) t p>|t|
Firm Characteristicst−1
Diversification 0.414 0.407 1.7 0.79 0.429
Number of patent 31.989 31.486 0.3 0.14 0.888
Age 23.252 22.289 5.7 2.62 0.009***
Leverage 0.468 0.460 3.2 1.42 0.154
Tangibility 0.251 0.247 2.6 1.15 0.252
Market to Book 2.109 2.150 -1.8 -0.93 0.35
R&D expenditure 0.079 0.084 -3.2 -1.53 0.127
R&D dummy 0.826 0.828 -0.4 -0.19 0.847
Cash Flow 0.051 0.050 0.3 0.14 0.892
Capital Expenditure 0.062 0.064 -1.5 -0.97 0.33
Sales Growth 0.152 0.167 -2.1 -1.13 0.257
Size 5.789 5.712 3.4 1.51 0.13
Industry Characteristicst−1
HHI 0.277 0.273 2.2 0.98 0.329
State Characteristicst−1
Unemployment Rate 5.946 5.951 -0.4 -0.16 0.875
Population Growth 0.971 1.004 -4.2 -1.79 0.074*
Disposable Income Growth 4.643 4.799 -6.3 -2.65 0.008***
GDP Growth 2.476 2.523 -1.9 -0.83 0.409
Panel B: Average Treated on Treated for matched sample
Outcome Variable Sample Treated Controls Differences T-statistics
Diversi f icationt+1 Unmatched 0.1706 0.1948 -0.0242*** -4.00
Matched 0.1709 0.1853 -0.0144*** -2.12
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Table 1.9: Difference-in-Difference using Neighbor Method
This panel reports the differences-in-differences test on the balanced sample following the specifi-
cation in equation (5) ∆diversi f ication = β0+β1d+∆Xψ + pt +∆ε . ∆diversi f ication and ∆X are
the differences of firms’ diversification and firm, state controls for post-election and pre-election
period. d is a dummy set to one if firms belong to treatment group (defined as firms whose head-
quarter locates in election state in year t) in year t and 0 otherwise. Detailed definitions can be
found in Appendix A, t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
∆diversi f ication ∆diversi f ication ∆diversi f ication
































N 15,494 15,059 15,059
adj. R2 0.026 0.031 0.032
Firm, State Controls No Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Cluster by state & year Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.10: Likelihood of Investing in New Field
This table summarizes the results from Probit regression following the specification of equation (6)
Prob(New) = c+β1PUt +β2Controli,t +β3Controli,t−1 +β4Mt +β5Trendt + Industryi + εit . The
sample used in panel A contains all innovative firms (non-financial, non-utility Compustat firms
with at least one patent application in history) and the sample in panel B is restricted to firms that
have at least one new patent application each year in the window of [t-3,t). The dependent variable
is specified on the first row. It equals to one if the firm has patents (or applications) in a new class
that is different from all the classes of firms’ patents in the past three years and zero otherwise.
Policy uncertainty is measured as BBD policy uncertainty index. Industry is defined following
the 48 industries of Fama and French. All the controls are the same as Table 2. Macroeconomic
variables are measured as averages over the prior fiscal year; tangibility, market to book ratio
and leverage ratio are measured at time t-1 while other variables are measured at current year t.
Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A. All models are estimated with time trend and
standard errors are clustered by firm and year. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Newi,t Newi,t+1 Newi,t+2
Panel A
PU 0.272*** 0.173** 0.0540
(3.52) (2.24) (0.76)
N 36,849 35,769 35,443
Panel B
PU 0.516*** 0.269*** 0.0586
(4.43) (3.51) (0.63)
N 10,983 10,641 10,545
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Year Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.11: Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity Test: Financial Constraint
This table summarizes the cross-sectional heterogeneity in terms of the financial constraint.
All specifications follow equation (4)Diversi f icationit = αi + β0PUt−1 + β1PUt−1 × Hi,t−1 +
β2(Hi,t−1 ×Controls)+β3Controli,t +β4Controli,t−1 +β5Mt−1 +β6Trendt + εit (4). The sample
contains innovative firms (non-financial, non-utility Compustat firms with at least on patent ap-
plication in history) with valid diversification measure (non-missing and non-zero) at time t. The
dependent variable is firms’ diversification measure. Policy uncertainty is the news component of
BBD index following Gulen and Ing (2016). Financial constraint is measured as KZ index follow-
ing Lamont, Polk and Saa-requejo (2001). The financial constraint indicator equals to one if the
KZ index of firm i at time t is above the median of the distribution and zero otherwise. Controls
are the same as in Table 2. In the second column I add interaction of financial constraint with
firm-level investment opportunities (market to book ratio, sales growth, cash flow) and the overall
number of new patents; In the third column I add additional interactions of financial constraint
with macroeconomic investment-opportunity measures (consumer sentiment and GDP growth).
KZ index is added as an additional control in all specifications. Detailed variable definitions are in
Appendix A. All regressions are estimated with a time trend and standard errors are clustered by
firm and year. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Diversification Diversification Diversification
PU -0.0763*** -0.0733*** -0.0748***
(-4.56) (-4.21) (-4.12)
Constraint -0.249*** -0.188** -0.310**
(-3.25) (-2.28) (-2.49)
PU ×Constraint 0.0546*** 0.0464** 0.0462**
(3.30) (2.70) (2.07)
N 12,081 12,081 12,081
R2 0.541 0.541 0.542
r2_within 0.0668 0.0676 0.0686
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Year Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Interact with Firm controls No Yes Yes
Interact with Macro controls No No Yes
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Table 1.12: Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity Test: Tangibility and Irreversibility
This table summarizes the cross-sectional heterogeneity in terms of irreversibility. All speci-
fications follow equation (4)Diversi f icationit = αi + β0PUt−1 + β1PUt−1 ×Hi,t−1 + β2(Hi,t−1 ×
Controls)+β3Controli,t +β4Controli,t−1 +β5Mt−1 +β6Trendt + εit (4). The sample contains in-
novative firms (non-financial, non-utility Compustat firms with at least on patent application in
history) with valid diversification measure (non-missing and non-zero) at time t. The dependent
variable is firms’ diversification measure. Policy uncertainty is the news component of BBD index
following Gulen and Ing (2016). In panel A, irreversibility is measured as the firm’s tangibility
ratio. In panel B I use an indicator based on firms’ assets redeployability generated by Kim and
Kung (2017). The redeployability indicator equals to 1 if redeployability is above the median of
the distribution and zero otherwise. Other controls are the same as previous tables. In the sec-
ond column I add interactions of irreversibility with the firm’s investment opportunities (market to
book ratio, sales growth, cash flow) and the overall number of new patents; In the third column I
include additional interactions of irreversibility with macroeconomic investment-opportunity mea-
sures (consumer sentiment and GDP growth). In panel B I add firms’ redeployability levels as
an additional control for all specifications. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A. All
regressions are estimated with a time trend and the standard errors are clustered by firm and year.
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Tangibility
PU -0.0900*** -0.0842*** -0.0916***
(-4.88) (-4.50) (-4.51)
Tangibility -0.912*** -0.889*** -1.273**
(-2.90) (-3.05) (-2.25)
PU ×Tangibility 0.193*** 0.179** 0.222**
(2.91) (2.76) (2.67)
N 13,219 13,469 13,469
R2 0.541 0.541 0.541
r2_within 0.0644 0.0653 0.0658
Panel B: Redeployability
PU -0.0291** -0.0290** -0.0221
(-2.20) (-2.20) (-1.55)
Redeploy 0.252*** 0.247*** 0.387**
(3.40) (3.16) (2.48)
PU ×Redeploy -0.0562*** -0.0564*** -0.0755***
(-3.54) (-3.50) (-3.14)
N 13,013 13,013 13,013
R2 0.541 0.541 0.541
r2_within 0.0654 0.0656 0.0658
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Year Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Interact with Firm controls No Yes Yes
Interact with Macro controls No No Yes
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Table 1.13: Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity Test: Manager Incentives
This table summarizes the results for cross-sectional heterogeneity analysis in terms of manager
incentives. All specifications follow equation (4)Diversi f icationit = αi + β0PUt−1 + β1PUt−1 ×
Hi,t−1 +β2(Hi,t−1 ×Controls)+β3Controli,t +β4Controli,t−1 +β5Mt−1 +β6Trendt + εit (4). The
sample contains innovative firms (non-financial, non-utility Compustat firms with at least on patent
application in history) with valid diversification measure (non-missing and non-zero) at time t that
have non-missing measures for manager incentives. The dependent variable is firms’ innovation
diversification measure. Policy uncertainty is the news component of BBD index following Gulen
and Ing (2016). Manager incentives are measured as manager pay-performance sensitivity (delta)
in panel A and manager wealth to stock volatility (vega) in panel B. Both measures follow Coles,
Daniel and Naveen (2006). Manager entrenchment is measured as Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell
(2009) entrenchment Index in panel C. Controls and interaction specifications are the same as in
previous tables. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A. All regressions are estimated with
a time trend and the standard errors are clustered by firm and year. t-statistics are reported in paren-
theses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
CHAPTER 1. INNOVATION DIVERSIFICATION UNDER POLICY UNCERTAINTY 53
Table 1.13: Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity Test: Manager Incentives
Panel A: Delta
PU -0.0681*** -0.0644*** -0.0507** -0.0685***
(-4.02) (-3.68) (-2.81) (-3.88)
Delta -0.000631*** -0.000599*** 0.000147 -0.000577***
(-3.60) (-3.07) (0.46) (-3.54)
PU ×Delta 0.000133*** 0.000111** 0.0000254 0.000120***





N 7,341 7,341 7,341 7,340
R2 0.539 0.541 0.541 0.539
r2_within 0.0607 0.0635 0.0650 0.0608
Panel B: Vega
PU -0.0614*** -0.0610*** -0.0499**
(-3.59) (-3.50) (-2.78)
Vega -0.00140 -0.00180** -0.000386
(-1.67) (-2.17) (-0.29)
PU ×Vega 0.000308* 0.000308 0.000139
(1.72) (1.65) (0.62)
N 7,548 7,548 7,548
R2 0.543 0.544 0.545
r2_within 0.0606 0.0645 0.0654
Panel C: Manager Entrenchment
PU 0.0433 0.0470 0.155
(0.105) (0.104) (0.167)
Entrench 0.118 0.123 0.356
(0.0710) (0.0715) (0.325)
PU ×Entrench -0.0249 -0.0254 -0.0668
(0.0158) (0.0157) (0.0542)
N 2,519 2,519 2,519
R2 0.676 0.677 0.677
r2_within 0.0658 0.0680 0.0693
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interact with Firm controls No Yes Yes No
Interact with Macro controls No No Yes No
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Table 1.14: Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity Test: Political Sensitivity
This table summarizes the results for cross-sectional heterogeneity analysis in terms of firms’
political sensitivity. All specifications follow equation (4)Diversi f icationit = αi + β0PUt−1 +
β1PUt−1 × Hi,t−1 + β2(Hi,t−1 ×Controls) + β3Controli,t + β4Controli,t−1 + β5Mt−1 + Trendt +
εit (4). The sample contains innovative firms (non-financial, non-utility Compustat firms with
at least on patent application in history) with valid diversification measure (non-missing and non-
zero) at time t. The dependent variable is firms’ innovation diversification measure. Policy uncer-
tainty is the news component of BBD index following Gulen and Ing (2016). Following Herron
et al. (1999), Julio and Yook (2012) and Atanassov et al. (2018), politically sensitive industries
(PSIs) is an indicator variable set to one if firms belong to the following industries: Tobacco Prod-
ucts (5), Pharmaceuticals (13), Health Care Services (11), Defense (26), Petroleum and Natural
Gas (30), Telecommunications (32) and Transportation (40). Fama French 48 industries is used
as the industry classification. Controls and interaction specifications are the same as in previous
tables. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A. All regressions are estimated with a time
trend and the standard errors are clustered by firm and year. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Political Sensitivity
PU -0.0597*** -0.0596*** -0.0622***
(0.0154) (0.0153) (0.0154)
PU ×PSI 0.0606** 0.0592* 0.0798**
(0.0280) (0.0288) (0.0340)
N 16,703 16,703 16,703
R2 0.591 0.591 0.591
r2_within 0.0669 0.0670 0.0672
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Year Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Interact with Firm controls No Yes Yes
Interact with Macro controls No No Yes
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Table 1.15: Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity Test: Sensitive to government spending (SGS)
This table summarizes the results for cross-sectional heterogeneity analysis in terms of sensi-
tivity to government spending. All specifications follow equation (4) Diversi f icationit = αi +
β0PUt−1 + β1PUt−1 ×Hi,t−1 + β2(Hi,t−1 ×Controls)+ β3Controli,t + β4Controli,t−1 + β5Mt−1 +
Trendt + εit (4). The sample contains innovative firms (non-financial, non-utility Compustat firms
with at least on patent application in history) with valid diversification measure (non-missing and
non-zero) at time t. The dependent variable is firms’ innovation diversification measure. Policy
uncertainty is the news component of BBD index following Gulen and Ing (2016). Sensitive to
government spending (SGS) follows Belo,Gala and Li (2013) and Gulen and Ion (2016). Controls
and interaction specifications are the same as in previous tables. Detailed variable definitions are
in Appendix A. All regressions are estimated with a time trend and the standard errors are clus-
tered by firm and year. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
SGS
PU -0.0481** -0.0490** -0.0457*
(-2.58) (-2.68) (-2.02)
SGS -1.085** -1.165** -1.236
(-2.27) (-2.17) (-1.09)
PU ×SGS 0.224** 0.233** 0.232
(2.18) (2.14) (1.44)
N 16,552 16,552 16,552
R2 0.322 0.322 0.322
R2_within 0.00881 0.00885 0.00889
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Year Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Interact with Firm controls No Yes Yes
Interact with Macro controls No No Yes
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Table 1.16: Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity Test: Competition
This table summarizes the results for cross-sectional heterogeneity analysis in terms of mar-
ket competition. The sample in panel A contains innovative firms (non-financial, non-utility
Compustat firms with at least on patent application in history) with valid diversification mea-
sure (non-missing and non-zero) at time t. The sample for panel B contains all innovative
firms. Panel A reports the results for diversification following the specification of equation
(4) Diversi f icationit = αi +β0PUt−1 +β1PUt−1 ×Hi,t−1 +β2(Hi,t−1 ×Controls)+β3Controli,t +
β4Controli,t−1 +β5Mt−1 +Trendt + εit (4) with the dependent variable generated by firms’ patent
grants. Panel B reports the results from a Probit model as specified in equation (6)Prob(New) =
c+β0PUt−1 +β1PUt−1 ×Hi,t−1 +β2(Hi,t−1 ×Controls)+β3Controli,t +β4Controli,t−1 +β5Mt +
Trendt +εit with the dependent variable set to one if the firm has patents (or applications) in a new
class that is different from all the classes of firms’ patents in the past three years and zero other-
wise. Policy uncertainty is the news component of BBD index following Gulen and Ing (2016).
Market competition is measured as fluidity following Hoberg and Philips (2016). It is a text-based
measure that describes product similarity. A high fluidity indicates more competition in the market
(low market power) and greater product market threats from rivals. Controls and interaction spec-
ifications are the same as in previous tables. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A. All
regressions are estimated with a time trend and the standard errors are clustered by firm and year.
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Diversification
PU -0.0534** -0.0538** -0.0442
(-2.44) (-2.44) (-1.32)
fluidity -0.0104 -0.00776 0.000906
(-0.82) (-0.59) (0.04)
PU × f luidity 0.00153 0.00156 0.000849
(0.59) (0.58) (0.18)
N 12,106 12,052 12,052
R2 0.608 0.608 0.608
R2_within 0.0590 0.0621 0.0625
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: New
PU -0.0794 -0.0799 -0.0388
(-0.74) (-0.72) (-0.35)
fluidity -0.0910*** -0.0849** -0.0636
(-3.03) (-2.33) (-1.05)
PU × f luidity 0.0155** 0.0153** 0.0140
(2.36) (2.02) (1.50)
N 26,329 26,329 26,329
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Year Yes Yes Yes
Interact with Firm controls No Yes Yes
Interact with Macro controls No No Yes
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions
The sample contains Compustat firms that list on the main exchange (NYSE, AMEX and NAS-
DAQ), following the literature, I exclude financial firms (sic 6000-7000) and utilities (sic 4900 to
5000) and firms with missing or negative total assets. The data ranges from 1990 to 2014. I restrict
the sample to firms whose stock price is higher than $5 so as to get valid stock-level data and firms
with at least one patent application in history. All the variables are winsorized at the lst and 99th
percentiles. Detailed variable definitions are explained in the following subsections.
A.1 Macro Level Controls
The following variables are used to control for the overall investment opportunities and uncertainty
of the economy. For data that is not reported annually, I match the calendar dates to firms’ fiscal
year and take the arithmetic mean.
1. Real GDP growth: the data is from Federal Reserve Economic Database32. It is a quarterly
data but annualized and seasonally adjusted. I match the data to firms’ fiscal year by quarter.
2. Consumer sentiment index: the monthly, survey-based index of consumer sentiment devel-
oped by the University of Michigan33
3. VIX: Daily Volatility Index (VIX) from Chicago Board Options Exchange.
4. CS return SD: following Gulen and Ion (2016), it is measured as the cross-sectional standard
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5. CS profit SD: measured as the cross-sectional standard deviation of firm-level profit growth
which is measured as the annual growth rate of ROA.
6. VXO index: daily index of implied volatility based on S&P 100 Options. It is released by
the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE).
7. Leading economic indicator: an national index from the Conference Board to measure future
economic activity.
8. JLN_Uncertainty: Macroeconomic uncertainty index following Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng
(2015). It is generated from the unforeseeable component in a system of 279 macroeconomic
variables.
9. JLN_fin_Uncertainty: financial uncertainty index following Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015).
A.2 Industry Level Controls
1. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: the sum of squared sale-based market shares of all firms in a
given three-digit SIC industry in each year.
2. Fluidity: Text-based measure for product similarity following Hoberg and Philips (2016).
A high fluidity implies more competition in the market (low market power) and a greater
product market threats from rivals.34
3. Politically sensitive industries indicator: a dummy equals to one if firms belong to the fol-
lowing industries: Tobacco Products (5), Pharmaceuticals (13), Health Care Services (11),
Defense (26), Petroleum and Natural Gas (30), Telecommunications (32) and Transportation
(40), as used in Herron et al. (1999) and Julio and Yook (2012) and Atanassov, Julio and
Leng (2018). Fama French 48 industries is used as the industry classification.
34http://hobergphillips.usc.edu/industryconcen.htm
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4. Government spending sensitivity. The percentage of industry sales to government entities.
Following Belo, Gala and Li (2013) and Gulen and Ion (2016), The measure is based on the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Benchmark Input-Output (I-O) Accounts table which
is updated every five years. The government spending measure is estimated as xi/yi where
xi represents total direct or indirect input necessary from industry i to meet government
demand (including all federal, state and local governments, both defensive and non-defensive
spending) and yi represents industry i ’s total output. Industry-level government spending can




• where ai jthe Leontief coefficient defined as the dollar amount of the input from industry i
to produce one dollar of final goods produced by industry j.g jis the value of output from
industry i sold directly to the government. I-O accounts begin in 1982 and updates every 5
years, I match the government spending measure to the industry year and update the measure
in a 5 year frequency when the new number get published. For robust check, I have tried
to match the data by adding 5-year lag or 10-year lag to take into account the information
updating frequency. (Belo, Gala and Li (2013) use even more lags as they point out that
it takes a really long time for the market to know). The measure is merged to the firm by
either SIC code (prior to 2002) or NAICS codes following the BEA concordance tables.
If multiple industries in the I-O accounts correspond to the same SIC or NAICS code, I
calculate a weighted average to generate the SIC or NAICS level measure with the weights
being the total industry outputs. If 4 digit SIC fails to find a match, I use 3 digits and then 2
digits SIC. I use the same method for NAICS code starting from 6 digits to 3 digits.
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A.3 Firm Level Controls
1. Size: natural logarithm of sales (SALE) measured in 2005 U.S. dollars.
2. Cash flow: The sum of Income Before Extraordinary items (IB) and Depreciation and Amor-
tization (DP) over Total asset (AT) at the beginning of the fiscal year.
3. Sales growth: percentage change in sales (Compustat annual item SALE).
4. Market-to-Book: market value of equity divided by book value of equity. Market value of
equity is the share price (PRCC_F) times common shares outstanding (CSHO). Book value
of equity is shareholders’ equity (SEQ) minus preferred stock plus deferred taxes (TXDITC).
I measure preferred stock using liquidation value (PSTKL), redemption value (PSTKR) or
carrying value (PSTK) in this order, depending on availability. If SEQ is missing, I measure
book value of equity as common equity (CEQ) plus carrying value of preferred stock (item
PSTK). Finally, if CEQ is missing, I measure book value of equity as total assets (AT) minus
total liabilities (LT). I use the lag of market to book in the regression.
5. Book leverage: long term debt (DLTT) plus debt in current liabilities (DLC) over total assets
(AT), I use the lagged book leverage in the regression.
6. R&D: Research and Development Expense (XRD) over Sales (SALE), replace XRD to zero
if missing.
7. R&D missing Dummy: equal to one if Research and Development Expense (XRD) is miss-
ing.
8. Tangibility: Property, Plant and Equipment (PPENT) over Total assets (AT).
9. Age: natural logarithm of the number of years firm i is in the Compustat database.
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10. Number of granted patents: the total number of new applications in year t that are finally
granted before 2017. In robust check, this measure is also measured as the sum of the
number of new applications in year t whether or not granted in the future.
11. Firm stock return standard deviation (SD): Standard Deviation of Daily stock returns for
firms’ fiscal year.
12. Financial constraint indicator: a dummy set to one if the KZ index for the firm year is above
the median of all firms in the sample and 0 otherwise. KZ index follows Lamont, Polk, and
Saa-Requejo (2001) and is constructed as –1.001909[(ib+d p)/ppentt−1]+0.2826389[(at+
prcc f ×csho− ceq− txdb)/at]+ 3.139193[(dltt + dlc)/(dltt + dlc+ seq)]–39.3678[(dvc+
dvp)/ppentt−1]–1.314759[che/ppentt−1].
13. Manager incentive delta: following Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006), it is measured as the
change in the dollar value of manager wealth to 1% change in stock price. 35
14. Manager risk incentive vega: change in the dollar value of manager wealth to 0.01 change
in standard deviation annualized stock return following Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006).
15. Firm redeployability: Firm-year level measure of asset redeployability in Kim and Kung
(2017). It is computed as value-weighted averages of industry-level redeployability indices
across business segments for Compustat firms.36
16. Grant indicator: a dummy that equals to one if the number of new patents (that get granted in
the future) at time t is not zero and zero when firms have new patent applications that haven’t
get granted yet or already abandoned.
17. Capital to labor ratio (Ln (K/L)): following Amore, Schneider and Žaldokas (2013), it is the
logarithm of property, plants, and equipment (PPENT) over the number of employees.
35https://sites.temple.edu/lnaveen/data/
36http://blogs.cornell.edu/hyunseobkim/research/
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18. Profitability: Operating Income Before Depreciation (oibdp) over total assets (TA) at the
beginning of the fiscal year
19. Manager Entrenchment: entrenchment index following Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009).
A4. State Level Controls
1. Unemployment rate: the unemployment rates for states from Bureau of Labor Statistics
2. GDP growth: annually real GDP growth rate from Bureau of Economic Analysis
3. Disposable income growth rate: annual growth rate from Bureau of Economic Analysis
4. population growth rate: annually growth rate from Bureau of Economic Analysis
5. Election dummy: a dummy equals to one if the majority of fiscal year months are in a 12
months window prior to the gubernatorial election day for the state in year t.
6. Close election dummy: equals to one if the election dummy equals to one and the vote
difference between the first place candidate and the second place candidate is less than 5%
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Table 1.17: Appendix A: Summary for Firm Characteristics
The sample covers U.S. innovative firms with valid diversification measure (Non-missing and non-
zero) and non-missing values for all the variables at time t. Innovative firms is defined as those with
at least one patent application in their history. It is a subsample of U.S.non-financial, non-utility
firms that listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ with COMPUSTAT and CRSP coverage during
1990-2014. Policy uncertainty is measured as the overall index of Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016)
and its subcomponents. It is annualized by taking the natural logarithm of the arithmetic mean.
Detailed definition for other variables can be found in Appendix A.
mean sd p50 p25 p75
Firm-level
Diversification 0.367 0.390 0.200 0.042 0.625
Number of patent 12.834 20.547 4.000 2.000 13.000
Market to Book 2.209 1.513 1.717 1.259 2.591
Cash Flow 0.059 0.177 0.094 0.030 0.147
Size 18.229 36.180 4.691 1.320 16.814
Sales Growth 0.151 0.351 0.089 -0.008 0.224
Firm return SD 0.033 0.021 0.029 0.020 0.040
R&D 0.090 0.108 0.054 0.014 0.128
R&D indicator 0.880 0.325 1.000 1.000 1.000
HHI 0.266 0.193 0.193 0.128 0.345
Tangibility 0.220 0.160 0.181 0.098 0.302
Age 20.740 14.590 16.000 9.000 31.000
Leverage 0.423 0.207 0.416 0.248 0.572
Macroeconomic variables
PU 4.592 0.250 4.533 4.371 4.760
News 4.634 0.265 4.625 4.381 4.857
Gov. Spending 4.371 0.351 4.314 4.078 4.685
CPI_disagree 4.489 0.173 4.451 4.359 4.568
Tax 4.116 1.649 3.359 2.757 5.414
CS return SD 0.150 0.035 0.144 0.121 0.162
VIX 19.972 5.976 19.283 14.229 24.449
Consumer Sentiment 88.408 11.834 89.242 80.275 95.200
CS Profit SD 31.223 32.967 22.411 13.366 38.529
GDP Growth 2.695 1.628 2.700 1.800 4.000
N 16,703
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Figure 1.2: Patenting Process Timeline
The graph shows the simplified patenting process. The priority date (or the application date if
priority is not applicable) is used as the investment starting date. For Granted patent-based diversi-
fication measure, the patents must have its priority date after 1987 and before 2015 and get granted
before 2017. For application-based diversification measure, the application should have its priority
date (the application date if priority is not applicable) after 2000 and before 2015. In addition, the
application should have its early publication date no latter than January 2017 and can either get a
final decision (granted or abandoned) or still pending.
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Table 1.18: Appendix B-Tables: the NBER Patent Class
Class Name Subclass Name
1 Chemical 11 Agriculture,Food,Textiles
1 Chemical 12 Coating
1 Chemical 13 Gas
1 Chemical 14 Organic Compounds
1 Chemical 15 Resins
1 Chemical 19 Miscellaneous-chemical
2 Cmp&Cmm 21 Communications
2 Cmp&Cmm 22 Computer Hardware & Software
2 Cmp&Cmm 23 Computer Peripherals
2 Cmp&Cmm 24 Information Storage
2 Cmp&Cmm 25 Electronic business methods and software
3 Drgs&Med 31 Drugs
3 Drgs&Med 32 Surgery & Med Inst.
3 Drgs&Med 33 Biotechnology
3 Drgs&Med 39 Miscellaneous-Drgs&Med
4 Elec 41 Electrical Devices
4 Elec 42 Electrical Lighting
4 Elec 43 Measuring & Testing
4 Elec 44 Nuclear & X-rays
4 Elec 45 Power Systems
4 Elec 46 Semiconductor Devices
4 Elec 49 Miscellaneous-Elec
5 Mech 51 Mat. Proc & Handling
5 Mech 52 Metal Working
5 Mech 53 Motors & Engines + Parts
5 Mech 54 Optics
5 Mech 55 Transportation
5 Mech 59 Miscellaneous-Mechanical
6 Others 61 Agriculture,Husbandry,Food
6 Others 62 Amusement Devices
6 Others 63 Apparel & Textile
6 Others 64 Earth Working & Wells
6 Others 65 Furniture,House Fixtures
6 Others 66 Heating
6 Others 67 Pipes & Joints
6 Others 68 Receptacles
6 Others 69 Miscellaneous-Others
7 Not classified 70 Not Classified or missing
The NBER Patent Classification following Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) and Macro et al.
(2015)
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Table 1.19: Appendix B-Tables: The First Stage of Heckman Two-Stage Model
The results from the first stage of Heckman two stage model for sample selection bias adjustment.
The dependent variable is a dummy that equals to 1 when firms have non-zero new patent that
get granted later and zero when firms have new patent applications that haven’t get granted yet or
already abandoned. The key identification comes from examiner approval rate prior to time t which
is defined as the number of patents granted by examiner j over the total number of applications that
examiner j reviewed in one art unit prior to date t. I use the median number if firms have more than
one applications in year t. The regression is run as a Probit model. Policy uncertainty is measures
as the overall index following Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) (column 1) and its subcomponents
(columns 2-5). Macroeconomic variables are measured as averages over the prior fiscal year. Firm
tangibility ratio, market to book ratio and leverage are measured at t-1 and other variables are
measured at the current year. The definitions for all control variables can be found in Appendix A.
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.19: Appendix B-Tables: The First Stage of Heckman Two-Stage Model
Overall Index News Gov. Spending CPI disagree Tax
Examiner_Approval 2.703*** 2.707*** 2.682*** 2.732*** 2.735***
(27.86) (27.84) (27.52) (28.29) (28.13)
PUt−1 0.357*** 0.192* 0.374*** -0.00857 0.00687
(2.93) (1.89) (4.75) (-0.06) (0.23)
lnKL 0.110*** 0.108*** 0.113*** 0.107*** 0.107***
(4.52) (4.47) (4.66) (4.43) (4.43)
Market to Book 0.0257* 0.0253* 0.0265** 0.0257* 0.0258*
(1.92) (1.90) (1.97) (1.93) (1.93)
Cash Flow 0.366*** 0.368*** 0.351*** 0.365*** 0.364***
(3.13) (3.16) (2.98) (3.13) (3.12)
Size 0.136*** 0.135*** 0.138*** 0.135*** 0.135***
(9.24) (9.21) (9.33) (9.20) (9.20)
Sales Growth 0.0381 0.0402 0.0221 0.0381 0.0376
(0.73) (0.77) (0.42) (0.73) (0.72)
Firm return SD -0.146 -0.268 0.122 -0.343 -0.326
(-0.16) (-0.30) (0.12) (-0.39) (-0.37)
R&D 1.401*** 1.406*** 1.381*** 1.410*** 1.410***
(6.15) (6.18) (6.04) (6.19) (6.19)
R&D Dummy 0.296*** 0.296*** 0.298*** 0.295*** 0.294***
(5.34) (5.34) (5.35) (5.32) (5.32)
HHI -0.0727 -0.0716 -0.0768 -0.0745 -0.0750
(-0.74) (-0.73) (-0.78) (-0.76) (-0.76)
Tangibility -0.548*** -0.540*** -0.579*** -0.521*** -0.520***
(-3.22) (-3.17) (-3.39) (-3.07) (-3.06)
Age 0.0140 0.0145 0.0131 0.0130 0.0127
(0.46) (0.48) (0.43) (0.43) (0.42)
Leverage -0.0655 -0.0622 -0.0745 -0.0588 -0.0587
(-0.67) (-0.63) (-0.76) (-0.60) (-0.60)
CS Return SD 1.898 2.639** 0.907 2.935** 2.897**
(1.57) (2.26) (0.72) (2.34) (2.50)
VIX -0.0129* -0.0126* -0.00741 -0.00774 -0.00757
(-1.92) (-1.82) (-1.08) (-1.23) (-1.20)
Consumer sentiment -0.0190*** -0.0238*** -0.0165*** -0.0260*** -0.0253***
(-3.61) (-4.93) (-3.08) (-4.56) (-5.07)
CS profit SD -0.00187*** -0.00195*** -0.00198*** -0.00164*** -0.00163***
(-3.86) (-3.85) (-4.04) (-3.32) (-3.41)
GDP Growth 0.0536** 0.0713*** 0.0556** 0.0847*** 0.0827***
(2.25) (3.17) (2.48) (3.76) (3.66)
Trend -0.108*** -0.104*** -0.108*** -0.0975*** -0.0987***
(-12.27) (-12.27) (-11.68) (-13.00) (-10.81)
N 19,101 19,101 19,101 19,101 19,101
pseudo R2 0.296 0.295 0.297 0.294 0.294
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Table 1.21: Appendix B-Tables: Diversification Under Policy Uncertainty: Restricted Sample
This table summarizes the results following Table (2) on a sample of firms that have at least two
new patent in year t. Policy uncertainty is measured as the BBD index (column 1) and its subcom-
ponents (columns 2-5) following Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016).The dependent variable is the
innovation diversification measure at time t. Macroeconomic variables are measured as averages
over the prior fiscal year. Firm tangibility, market to book ratio and leverage ratio are measured
at t-1 while other variables are measured at the current year t. Detailed variable definitions are in
Appendix A. All models are estimated with time trend and firm fixed effect and standard errors are
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm and year. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.21: Appendix B-Tables: Diversification Under Policy Uncertainty: Restricted Sample
Overall Index News Gov. Spending CPI disagree Tax
PUi,t−1 -0.0532*** -0.0374*** -0.0264*** -0.0171 -0.00176
(-4.91) (-3.62) (-4.29) (-0.96) (-0.65)
Market to Book 0.000420 0.000455 0.000251 0.000636 0.000567
(0.21) (0.22) (0.13) (0.31) (0.28)
Cash Flow -0.00933 -0.0106 -0.00686 -0.0109 -0.0104
(-0.56) (-0.63) (-0.41) (-0.66) (-0.63)
Size -0.0267*** -0.0268*** -0.0260*** -0.0259*** -0.0261***
(-4.01) (-4.04) (-3.89) (-3.86) (-3.88)
Sales Growth 0.0000633 -0.000330 0.00162 0.000181 0.000596
(0.01) (-0.05) (0.23) (0.03) (0.08)
Number of patent -0.00296*** -0.00296*** -0.00298*** -0.00298*** -0.00297***
(-16.81) (-16.84) (-16.68) (-16.66) (-16.72)
Firm return SD 0.0805 0.0974 0.0706 0.112 0.109
(0.50) (0.59) (0.44) (0.63) (0.63)
R&D -0.101*** -0.102*** -0.0952*** -0.103*** -0.102***
(-3.22) (-3.27) (-3.07) (-3.25) (-3.24)
R&D Dummy -0.0131 -0.0134 -0.0127 -0.0124 -0.0126
(-0.52) (-0.53) (-0.50) (-0.49) (-0.50)
HHI 0.0166 0.0143 0.0157 0.0151 0.0145
(0.46) (0.39) (0.43) (0.41) (0.40)
Tangibility 0.0540 0.0534 0.0541 0.0479 0.0478
(1.51) (1.50) (1.51) (1.31) (1.31)
Age -0.0548*** -0.0549*** -0.0547*** -0.0539*** -0.0537***
(-3.74) (-3.73) (-3.71) (-3.68) (-3.69)
Leverage 0.0456** 0.0461** 0.0457** 0.0464** 0.0466**
(2.64) (2.67) (2.63) (2.67) (2.68)
CS Return SD -0.103 -0.138 -0.0933 -0.140 -0.163*
(-1.23) (-1.61) (-1.20) (-1.69) (-1.93)
VIX 0.000305 0.000373 -0.000418 -0.000310 -0.000375
(0.79) (0.86) (-1.03) (-0.62) (-0.75)
Consumer sentiment -0.000317 0.000148 -0.000130 0.000478 0.000562
(-0.95) (0.41) (-0.46) (1.34) (1.40)
CS profit SD 0.0000371 0.0000606 0.0000196 -0.00000369 0.00000851
(0.95) (1.48) (0.45) (-0.08) (0.19)
GDP Growth -0.00123 -0.00221 -0.00137 -0.00283 -0.00245
(-0.77) (-1.28) (-0.64) (-1.47) (-1.08)
Trend 0.00192* 0.00182* 0.00106 0.00153 0.00194
(1.95) (1.76) (1.08) (1.47) (1.54)
N 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750
R2 0.528 0.528 0.528 0.527 0.527
adj. R2 0.446 0.446 0.446 0.445 0.445
r2_within 0.0633 0.0629 0.0628 0.0619 0.0618
Cluster Firm&Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.22: Appendix B-Tables: Policy Uncertainty Shocks
The table summarizes the estimated results for equation (2)Diversi f icationit = αi + β1PUt−1 +
β2Controli,t + β3Controli,t−1 + β4Mt−1 + β5Trend + εit on innovative firms using three different
measures for policy uncertainty shocks. To be specific, In column (1), it is measured as the per-
centage change of BBD overall index. In column (2) and (3), nmonth% is generated as the number
of months in a firm’s fiscal year that belong to a high uncertainty month; high uncertainty month is
defined as the month with the level of BBD overall index exceeds the past twelve months’ median
(in column (2)) or mean (in column (3)). All three measures capture short-term policy uncertainty
shocks. All the controls are the same as in Table 2 and the detailed definitions can be found in
Appendix A. All models are estimated with time trend and firm fixed effect and standard errors are
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm and year. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.








N 16,564 16,701 16,701
R2 0.592 0.590 0.590
r2_within 0.0664 0.0658 0.0658
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Year Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.23: Appendix B-Tables: Application Year Only
This table presents results of equation (2)Diversi f icationit = αi + β1PUt−1 + β2Controli,t +
β3Controli,t−1 + β4Mt−1 + Trend + εit where the patents are merged to firms’ financial charac-
teristics by their application year. Policy uncertainty is measured as the BBD index (column 1)
and its subcomponents (columns 2-5) following Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016).The dependent
variable is the innovation diversification measure at time t. Macroeconomic variables are mea-
sured as averages over the prior fiscal year. Firm tangibility, market to book ratio and leverage
ratio are measured at t-1 while other variables are measured at the current year t. Detailed variable
definitions are in Appendix A. All models are estimated with time trend and firm fixed effect and
standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm and year. t-statistics are re-
ported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
Overall Index News Gov. Spending CPI disagree Tax
PUt−1 0.0216 0.0223 0.0283 -0.00312 -0.00681
(0.71) (0.62) (1.33) (-0.07) (-0.95)
N 17,857 17,857 17,857 17,857 17,857
R2 0.617 0.617 0.617 0.617 0.617
r2_within 0.0220 0.0221 0.0227 0.0218 0.0222
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.24: Appendix B-Tables: Tobit Model
The table summarizes the results from a Tobit model with censoring at zero at the lower end and
one at the upper end. Policy uncertainty is measured as the BBD index (column 1) and its subcom-
ponents (columns 2-5) following Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016). The dependent variable is the
innovation diversification measure at time t. Macroeconomic variables are measured as averages
over the prior fiscal year. Firm tangibility, market to book ratio and leverage ratio are measured
at t-1 while other variables are measured at the current year t. Detailed variable definitions are
in Appendix A. All models are estimated with time trend and industry (Fama French 48 industry
classification) fixed effect and standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm
and year. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.24: Appendix B-Tables: Tobit Model
Overall Index News Gov. Spending CPI disagree Tax
PU -0.108*** -0.0850*** -0.0318** -0.0343 -0.0161***
(-4.14) (-3.92) (-2.04) (-1.19) (-2.86)
Maker to Book -0.00503* -0.00499* -0.00512* -0.00492* -0.00506*
(-1.87) (-1.86) (-1.90) (-1.83) (-1.88)
Cash Flow 0.125*** 0.123*** 0.127*** 0.124*** 0.125***
(4.61) (4.56) (4.67) (4.59) (4.62)
Size -0.0901*** -0.0900*** -0.0899*** -0.0896*** -0.0897***
(-24.64) (-24.59) (-24.53) (-24.42) (-24.50)
Sales Growth 0.0237** 0.0230** 0.0257** 0.0241** 0.0254**
(2.19) (2.12) (2.37) (2.22) (2.34)
Number of patent -0.00755*** -0.00755*** -0.00757*** -0.00758*** -0.00758***
(-36.94) (-36.93) (-36.96) (-36.95) (-36.93)
Firm return SD 0.465 0.481 0.474 0.500 0.485
(1.47) (1.51) (1.48) (1.52) (1.50)
R&D -0.786*** -0.788*** -0.783*** -0.788*** -0.790***
(-15.92) (-15.95) (-15.87) (-15.98) (-16.01)
R&D Dummy -0.177*** -0.177*** -0.177*** -0.177*** -0.177***
(-11.63) (-11.64) (-11.62) (-11.61) (-11.59)
HHI 0.0330 0.0320 0.0320 0.0319 0.0329
(1.48) (1.44) (1.44) (1.43) (1.48)
Tangibility 0.0603* 0.0602* 0.0585* 0.0558* 0.0545*
(1.91) (1.91) (1.86) (1.77) (1.73)
Age 0.00221 0.00202 0.00213 0.00201 0.00251
(0.35) (0.32) (0.34) (0.32) (0.40)
Leverage 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.146*** 0.146***
(6.83) (6.82) (6.85) (6.79) (6.80)
CS Return SD -0.0664 -0.126 -0.109 -0.151 -0.218
(-0.40) (-0.78) (-0.65) (-0.91) (-1.34)
VIX 0.00173* 0.00202** 0.000311 0.000526 0.000277
(1.92) (2.15) (0.36) (0.61) (0.32)
Consumer sentiment -0.00164** -0.000774 -0.000552 0.0000787 -0.000657
(-2.13) (-1.17) (-0.72) (0.12) (-0.92)
CS profit SD -0.000186* -0.000121 -0.000238** -0.000271*** -0.000231**
(-1.81) (-1.14) (-2.33) (-2.62) (-2.26)
GDP Growth 0.00623 0.00425 0.00458 0.00262 0.00629
(1.62) (1.12) (1.18) (0.69) (1.57)
Trend -0.00184** -0.00199*** -0.00301*** -0.00235*** 0.000841
(-2.57) (-2.79) (-3.74) (-3.23) (0.67)
sigma 0.434*** 0.434*** 0.434*** 0.434*** 0.434***
(129.13) (129.15) (129.09) (128.99) (128.96)
N 17,598 17,598 17,598 17,598 17,598
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.25: Appendix B-Tables: Controlling Additional Macroeconomic Measures
The specification follows equation (2) by adding more macroeconomic controls. The sample cov-
ers 1987 through 2014. VXO is daily index of implied volatility based on S&P 100 Options.
Leading index is an national index from the Conference Board to measure future economic activ-
ity. jln_h12 and jln_fin_h12 are macroeconomic uncertainty index and financial uncertainty index
following Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015). Policy uncertainty is measured as the BBD index
(column 1) and its subcomponents (columns 2-5) following Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016). The
dependent variable is the innovation diversification measure at time t. Macroeconomic variables
are measured as averages over the prior fiscal year. Firm tangibility, market to book ratio and
leverage ratio are measured at t-1 while other variables are measured at the current year t. Detailed
variable definitions are in Appendix A. All models are estimated with time trend and firm fixed ef-
fect and standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm and year. t-statistics
are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respectively.
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Table 1.25: Appendix B-Tables: Controlling Additional Macroeconomic Measures
Overall Index News Gov. Spending CPI disagree Tax
PU -0.0598*** -0.0357* -0.0206* -0.0307* -0.00954***
(-2.88) (-1.79) (-1.75) (-1.72) (-3.01)
Maker to Book 0.000855 0.000884 0.000852 0.00119 0.00105
(0.29) (0.30) (0.29) (0.40) (0.35)
Cash Flow 0.0276 0.0272 0.0278 0.0265 0.0277
(1.20) (1.18) (1.21) (1.15) (1.19)
Size -0.0267*** -0.0267*** -0.0262*** -0.0262*** -0.0264***
(-3.10) (-3.10) (-3.05) (-3.05) (-3.08)
Sales Growth -0.00163 -0.00199 -0.000825 -0.00185 -0.000592
(-0.21) (-0.25) (-0.11) (-0.24) (-0.08)
Number of patent -0.00574*** -0.00574*** -0.00575*** -0.00575*** -0.00575***
(-16.86) (-16.84) (-16.83) (-16.80) (-16.79)
Firm return SD 0.189 0.213 0.201 0.218 0.201
(1.10) (1.18) (1.12) (1.19) (1.15)
R&D -0.151*** -0.150*** -0.148*** -0.151*** -0.153***
(-2.91) (-2.89) (-2.86) (-2.90) (-2.93)
R&D Dummy -0.0161 -0.0164 -0.0157 -0.0158 -0.0157
(-0.62) (-0.63) (-0.61) (-0.61) (-0.61)
HHI 0.0494 0.0458 0.0484 0.0478 0.0501
(1.14) (1.06) (1.11) (1.10) (1.16)
Tangibility 0.0204 0.0208 0.0200 0.0191 0.0172
(0.41) (0.42) (0.40) (0.38) (0.34)
Age -0.0473** -0.0480** -0.0472** -0.0474** -0.0463**
(-2.60) (-2.65) (-2.61) (-2.61) (-2.54)
Leverage 0.0784*** 0.0791*** 0.0788*** 0.0787*** 0.0790***
(3.25) (3.29) (3.26) (3.26) (3.28)
Consumer Sentiment -0.000920* -0.000361 -0.000480 -0.000138 -0.000453
(-1.76) (-0.72) (-1.12) (-0.32) (-1.12)
Leading Index -0.0119 -0.0204** -0.0116 -0.0133 -0.0178*
(-1.21) (-2.15) (-1.04) (-1.31) (-2.05)
GDP Growth 0.00228 0.00361 0.00264 0.00337 0.00658*
(0.65) (1.09) (0.60) (0.91) (1.88)
CS return SD 0.000647 0.0213 0.106 0.0409 -0.00156
(0.01) (0.17) (0.86) (0.34) (-0.01)
vxo 0.00263** 0.00286*** 0.00317** 0.00297** 0.00270***
(2.62) (2.82) (2.75) (2.67) (2.86)
CS profit SD -0.000111* -0.000113 -0.000158** -0.000187** -0.000159**
(-1.88) (-1.59) (-2.34) (-2.78) (-2.76)
jln_h12 -0.0805 -0.109 -0.0124 0.117 0.0802
(-0.76) (-0.89) (-0.13) (1.07) (0.90)
jln_fin_h12 -0.294 -0.375** -0.519*** -0.518*** -0.512***
(-1.68) (-2.08) (-2.95) (-3.13) (-3.59)
Trend 0.00227* 0.00247** 0.00168 0.00187 0.00381***
(1.98) (2.17) (1.37) (1.53) (3.33)
N 17,685 17,685 17,685 17,685 17,685
adj. R2 0.520 0.520 0.520 0.520 0.520
r2_within 0.0667 0.0665 0.0664 0.0664 0.0667
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm&Year Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.26: Appendix B-Tables: Possible Truncation Issue: Restricted Sample up to 2012
The test follows the specification of equation (2) using a sample covers 1990 through 2012. Policy
uncertainty is measured as the BBD index (column 1) and its subcomponents (columns 2-5) fol-
lowing Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016). The dependent variable is the innovation diversification
measure at time t. Macroeconomic variables are measured as averages over the prior fiscal year.
Firm tangibility, market to book ratio and leverage ratio are measured at t-1 while other variables
are measured at the current year t. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A. All models are
estimated with time trend and firm fixed effect and standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
and clustered by firm and year. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.26: Appendix B-Tables: Possible Truncation Issue: Restricted Sample up to 2012
Overall Index News Gov. Spending CPI disagree Tax
PUt−1 -0.0747*** -0.0485** -0.0266*** -0.0441 -0.00972**
(-4.02) (-2.55) (-2.99) (-1.64) (-2.18)
Maker to Book 0.000403 0.000387 0.000282 0.000772 0.000655
(0.13) (0.13) (0.10) (0.25) (0.22)
Cash Flow 0.0238 0.0222 0.0253 0.0221 0.0229
(1.05) (0.98) (1.12) (0.98) (1.00)
Size -0.0311*** -0.0312*** -0.0302*** -0.0296*** -0.0301***
(-3.35) (-3.35) (-3.24) (-3.19) (-3.23)
Sales Growth 0.00233 0.00187 0.00380 0.00153 0.00326
(0.29) (0.23) (0.48) (0.19) (0.43)
Number of patent -0.00579*** -0.00579*** -0.00582*** -0.00584*** -0.00584***
(-16.14) (-16.09) (-16.11) (-16.16) (-16.13)
Firm return SD 0.179 0.200 0.176 0.210 0.195
(1.06) (1.13) (1.01) (1.14) (1.11)
R&D -0.154*** -0.155*** -0.147** -0.153*** -0.155***
(-2.94) (-2.94) (-2.79) (-2.90) (-2.92)
R&D Dummy -0.0233 -0.0236 -0.0226 -0.0229 -0.0231
(-0.84) (-0.86) (-0.82) (-0.83) (-0.84)
HHI 0.0190 0.0152 0.0168 0.0195 0.0212
(0.38) (0.31) (0.34) (0.39) (0.42)
Tangibility 0.0113 0.0110 0.0113 0.00832 0.00671
(0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.15) (0.12)
Age -0.0426* -0.0429* -0.0424* -0.0418* -0.0404*
(-2.05) (-2.06) (-2.04) (-2.02) (-1.94)
Leverage 0.0956*** 0.0963*** 0.0962*** 0.0958*** 0.0963***
(3.88) (3.91) (3.90) (3.88) (3.89)
CS Return SD -0.147* -0.194** -0.153* -0.155* -0.220**
(-1.78) (-2.10) (-1.94) (-1.90) (-2.17)
VIX 0.00112* 0.00115 0.0000258 -0.0000497 -0.000257
(1.84) (1.50) (0.05) (-0.07) (-0.39)
Consumer sentiment -0.000971* -0.000316 -0.000431 -0.000148 -0.000311
(-1.86) (-0.64) (-1.09) (-0.33) (-0.59)
CS profit SD -0.0000384 -0.0000168 -0.0000736 -0.000113* -0.0000768
(-0.81) (-0.35) (-1.27) (-1.79) (-1.41)
GDP Growth -0.000942 -0.00202 -0.00147 -0.00298 -0.000724
(-0.48) (-1.01) (-0.61) (-1.32) (-0.26)
Trend 0.00171 0.00163 0.000981 0.00178 0.00372**
(1.20) (1.05) (0.65) (1.21) (2.45)
N 15,686 15,686 15,686 15,686 15,686
adj R2 0.524 0.524 0.523 0.523 0.523
within R2 0.0681 0.0677 0.0675 0.0674 0.0675
Cluster Firm&Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chapter 2
Less Competition, Slower R&D: The
Impact of Joint Ventures Under Policy
Uncertainty
2.1 Introduction
In classical investment models, firms choose to invest in projects that provide positive a net present
value (NPV). But in the real world, firms’ investment decision may also be influenced by situations
that are out of their control such as uncertainty about government policy or threat from potential
market competition. Changes in government policy affect the environment in which firms operate
by changing financing and production costs as well as future market demand. On one hand, firms
can overcome the difficulties on their own; on the other hand, firms can share the risk and cost
through cooperation. According to The Allen & Overy merger and acquisition (M&A) Index of
2013, joint ventures have become increasingly popular since the financial crisis and corporate joint
ventures account for nearly 86% of all deals. How do these joint ventures change the way firms
invest during the period of policy uncertainty? And how does the influence vary when firms face
different levels of market competition? In this paper, I empirically explore these questions and
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focus on one unique type of firms’ investments: Research and Development (R&D).
R&D investment has been assessed extensively in the industrial organization literature. (Check
Smit and Trigeorgis (2012) for a good summary). In a simplified model that generalizes the idea,
the value of firms’ R&D investments can be separated into three components. The first component
is the traditional net present value of the project. The second component is the flexibility value of
deferring the projects due to the ongoing uncertainty. As real option theory implies1, firms have
the incentive to defer irreversible investment and gain the flexibility value by waiting. The more
uncertain the market is, the more valuable it is to keep the option alive. By contrast, certain kind of
early investment such as research and development (R&D) can be used to gain strategic advantages
in the future. As a result, they contain the third component that captures the strategic value. On
one hand, firms benefit from any successful R&D since the winner-takes-all patent system guar-
antees that firms can enjoy exclusive cost advantages and investment opportunities in their future
production. On the other hand, firms gain more if the first-mover advantages alter competitor’s
reaction and the overall market structure. As Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) point out, high uncer-
tainty increases the first mover’s market share and the relative value of early investments. Smit
and Trigeorgis (2012) point out that strategic preemption makes it unprofitable for competitors to
operate and eliminates competitor’s learning advantages. As a result, how firms choose their R&D
investments depends on not only the real costs but also the tradeoff of flexibility value if firms hold
the option by deferring the investment during uncertain periods and commitment value if firms
conduct the R&D immediately to gain strategic advantages.
How does the joint venture influence the value of the R&D project? Conducting proprietary
R&Ds on their own, firms achieve the most increments in the commitment value (the third compo-
nent) as uncertainty drives the market demand into a zone where it is unprofitable for competitors
to produce. As a result, first-mover firms are able to achieve monopolistic profit. However, the
1Bernanke (1983), who points out that high uncertainty gives firms an incentive to delay investment and hiring
when investment projects are costly to undo or workers are costly to hire and fire. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) offer a
review of the early theoretical literature.
Empirically,Bloom (2009) find rapid drop and rebound in aggregate output and employment around major shocks,
Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta and Terry (2014) find that reasonably calibrated uncertainty shocks can explain
drops and rebounds in GDP of around 3%.
CHAPTER 2. LESS COMPETITION, SLOWER R&D 81
competition in R&D erodes all flexibility value (the second component) of waiting and even leads
to “prisoner’s dilemma” as firms start a patent race and conduct premature R&Ds, even though all
firms are better off by fully appropriating the flexibility value by waiting during uncertain periods.
(Garlappi (2004), Weeds (2002))
By contrast, forming R&D joint ventures, firms can bring complementary skills together to gain
synergy (Li, Qiu and Wang (2018)) and share the direct cost of R&D (the first component). More
importantly, it helps ease the preemption concern by controlling for potential competition. As
Smit and Trigeorgis (2012) point out, collaborations in R&D stage allow firms to fully appropriate
the flexibility value (the second component) by waiting and thus help firms to avoid investing
prematurely. However, the shared ownership of R&D erodes the commitment value (the third
component) as firms cannot achieve the first-mover advantages. Weeds (2002) shows that fear of
patent race in a joint-investment equilibrium will make all firms delay the projects until they reach
the joint-investment point.
The discussions above lead to two plausible implications. First, firms are more prone to defer
their shared R&D rather than proprietary R&D during the period of high policy uncertainty. Sec-
ond, firms with R&D joint ventures are more likely to defer their investment compared to firms
that conduct independent R&D.
In this paper, I empirically assess the implications and explore firms’ overall R&D investments,
measured as the R&D expenditure, and proprietary R&D, measured as the number of patent grants,
during the period of policy uncertainty. To get started, I test whether firms defer their innovation
investment during the periods of policy uncertainty. Following the literature (Gulen and Ing (2016),
Bonaime, Gulen and Ion (2018), Nguyen and Phan (2017) and so on), I measure policy uncertainty
as the index of Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) (BBD index). The index captures the policy
uncertainty feelings from news articles as well as uncertainty from government spending, monetary
policies and taxes. Consistent with Atanassov et al. (2018) and Stein and Stone (2013), I find that
firms increase their R&D investments and patent holdings when they face high policy uncertainty.
The results suggest that for U.S. public firms that have at least one patent in history, the strategic
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value of conducting R&D, especially the proprietary R&D, outweigh the option value of waiting
when firms face high policy uncertainty. However, this is only true if firms can enjoy the full value
of exclusive patenting rights. The results show that the effect disappears for firms’ co-patents,
defined as patents that are shared by more than one assignees. The disappearance of the effect is
consistent with the discussions above. When firms share the innovation, the value of commitment
is diluted. In the meantime, cooperation eases the preemption concern, thus allows firms to fully
appreciate the value of waiting during the period of policy uncertainty.
To get more direct evidence of the influence of cooperation, I use two measures for firms’ R&D
cooperation based on firms’ R&D joint ventures. The first measure is the total number of firms’
R&D joint ventures in the past 4 years. The cumulative measure is used to capture the possible
lags of the cooperation effect due to the long investment process. The second measure is the total
number of business partners that firms have by forming R&D joint ventures in the past 4 years, the
measure directly captures how “much” competition gets reduced. Following Chemmanur, Shen
and Xie (2016), I take a natural logarithm transfer for both measures in order to control for the
right-skewness.
I find that firms with more R&D joint ventures have a lower investment in R&D and much fewer
patent projects when policy uncertainty is severe. For firms who have the median number of R&D
joint ventures, the sensitivity of the number of firms’ patent projects to policy uncertainty changes
from positive 0.17 to negative 0.02 for one unit increase in the number of R&D joint ventures.
Meanwhile, one unit increase in the number of partners reduces the sensitivity by 75%2. From a
time-series perspective, evidence shows that the deferral effect of firms’ R&D joint ventures lasts
for 4 years. It is longer than the effect of policy uncertainty which lasts for approximately two years
on average. The long delay is consistent with the discussions above and suggests that firms with
cooperation are able to defer their innovation, especially the proprietary innovation, as measured
by patent grants, so as to fully appreciate the flexibility value during highly uncertain periods.
The deferral effect is true for not only the shared R&D projects, as measured by the number of
2The sensitivity of having R&D joint ventures for firms who have median number of R&D is 0.167-0.181*LN (2),
that is 75% of the sensitivity of firms without R&D joint ventures.
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co-patents, but also for the pure proprietary projects, as measured by the number of single-patents.
By contrast, consistent with Chemmanur, Shen and Xie (2016), I find R&D joint ventures lead
to higher R&D investment and more patents for firms when there is no policy uncertainty going
on. The evidence suggests that deferral effect only appears when there is policy uncertainty that
increases the flexibility value of waiting and changes the value of first-mover advantages.
The basic findings hold up to a variety of robustness tests. First, as Julio and Yook (2012),
Colak et al. (2017), Atanassov et al. (2018) and others point out, the results may be driven by the
endogeneity of policy uncertainty measure and omitted variables. To address this concern, I use the
partisan-conflict index from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia as an instrumental variable
for policy uncertainty following Bonaime, Gulen and Ion (2018). The index follows Azzimonti
(2013) and is based on the text analysis of news articles containing the terms that are related to
lawmakers’ policy disagreements. As Azzimonti (2017) point out, partisan conflicts are influential
to firms’ investment decisions by affecting the efficacy and uncertainty of government policy in
preventing bad economic outcomes such as recessions and crises. Nevertheless, it is not directly
related to firms’ investments. This exogeneity makes it a perfect instrument for policy uncertainty.
Evidence shows that the basic results hold in the IV specification. Second, to address the concern
that patent grants do not fully represent firms’ innovation investments, I replace the dependent
variable with the total number of firms’ patent applications and find consistent support for the
findings. Third, I verify that the results are not driven by the differences among firms’ investment
opportunities resulting from R&D joint ventures by controlling for additional interaction terms.
The basic results are extended into four dimensions. To start with, I assess which one of the
subcomponents of the BBD index is driving the results. The results suggest that the deferral effect
of R&D joint ventures exists for all the subcomponents of BBD index. In terms of economic
magnitudes, for firms who have the median number of R&D joint ventures, the sensitivity of the
number of firms’ patents to the news-based component changes from positive 0.14 to negative
0.04 with one unit increase in the number of R&D joint ventures 3 and that changes to negative
30.141-0.257*Ln(1+1)
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0.494 when the uncertainty comes from monetary policy. In the appendix, I replace the policy
uncertainty with different types of macroeconomic uncertainty and financial market uncertainty.
The discussions above are largely borne out by almost all kinds of market uncertainty, indicating
that firms with R&D joint ventures invest less in innovation than firms without R&D joint ventures
during highly uncertain periods.
Next, I explore whether the effect is different for different types of R&D joint ventures. To
begin with, I explore whether it is related to joint ventures that are more effective in controlling
for potential competition. According to the discussions above, the deferral effect is resulting from
the cooperations that ease the competition and the preemption concern thus the effect should be
stronger for joint ventures that are able to reduce potential competition in the future. To validate the
argument, I generate two measures that separate R&D joint ventures and the number of partners
into the competition-reduction type and supplementary type, which are based on the SIC industry
code for each of the participants. By looking at a subsample of firms who have at least one com-
pleted R&D joint ventures in the past 4 years, I find that the deferral effect of supplementary joint
ventures disappears completely after controlling for competition reduction joint ventures, the neg-
ative and significant effect is only driven by cooperations that are able to ease potential competition
in the future.
Following this, I explore whether the effect is different for foreign-dominant R&D joint ven-
tures and domestic-dominant R&D joint ventures. If the U.S.-based policy uncertainty can be
effectively diversified away by cooperating with foreign firms, I would expect a much weaker de-
ferral effect for firms that cooperate with more foreign firms as lower uncertainty exposure results
in lower flexibility value and less motivation to wait. Besides, if the potential competition is more
severe among domestic firms, cooperating with more domestic partners eases the preemption con-
cern and dilutes the first-mover advantages, I would expect a much stronger deferral effect for
firms that participate in the domestic-dominant R&D joint ventures. To assess these predictions, I
generate two measures that separate R&D joint ventures and the number of partners into foreign-
4-0.0234-0.672*Ln(1+1)
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dominant type and domestic-dominant type, which are based on firms’ nationalities. The analysis
shows that the deferral effect only exists for domestic-dominant measures, which is consistent with
the discussions above.
Last but not least, I assess how the effect varies with different levels of market competition. If
the deferral effect is resulting from the ability to reduce potential competition, it would be much
weaker for firms that operate in a highly competitive market since the same number of joint ven-
tures is less effective in reducing future competition. To investigate the prediction, I repeat the
baseline analysis on a subsample of firms who face high market competition and a subsample of
firms who face low market competition. The comparison shows that firms with more R&D joint
ventures defer their innovation projects further when they face a low level of market competition
and there is no significant deferral effect for firms that operate in a highly competitive market.
To assess directly how the coefficients are different, I repeat the analysis on the whole sample
by adding a triple interaction of policy uncertainty, R&D joint ventures and market competition
indicator and the same conclusion can be achieved.
Overall, this is the first paper that provides empirical support for the cooperation-induced de-
ferral effect to firms’ investments under uncertainty, which results from the tradeoff between first-
mover advantage and the uncertainty-induced value of waiting. It is related to a group of papers
that study the influence of strategic alliances. For example, Chemmanur, Shen and Xie (2016)
study the influence of strategic alliance and find that it supports firms’ innovation outputs by ef-
ficiently redeploying human capital. Consistent with their findings, I find a positive effect of the
joint ventures on firms’ innovation outputs and furthermore I show that it is true only when there
is no policy uncertainty in the market. Li, Qiu and Wang (2018) show that the joint ventures based
on technological proximity can accelerate innovation output and the joint ventures formed to cope
with market threat have a negative impact on future innovation output. Consistent with their paper,
the deferral effect found in this paper only comes from the joint ventures that can ease potential
competition. However, different from their paper, the deferral effect is a joint result of the joint
ventures and policy uncertainty and the results cannot show lights on the question of whether joint
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ventures do harm to firms’ innovation or not. Other theoretical papers show that the cooperation-
induced delay may result from aspects other than competition. For example, Bonatti and Horner
(2011) model firms’ investments under uncertainty by adding information asymmetry problems
such as moral hazard and free rider problem. The model implies the same investment pattern as
what is found in this paper but does not result from competition. In addition, Campbell, Ederer and
Spinnewijin (2014) argue that the delay may also result from lack of communication. In this paper,
I show that the strategic alliance can lead to deferral effect even in an environment of complete
information. Moreover, this paper is silent on whether the R&D joint ventures are efficient or do
harm to the firms. In fact, if the deferral effect allows firms to appreciate the flexibility value of
waiting and avoid the prisoner’s dilemma as firms sub-optimally conduct pre-mature investments,
it is not necessarily bad for the firms even though it leads to less innovation and fewer patents
temporarily.
This paper also contributes to the recent studies on the impact of policy uncertainty on the
real economy. The negative impact of policy uncertainty has been echoed in many papers. From
a macro-level perspective, for example, Bloom et al. (2014) demonstrate that macroeconomic
uncertainty is robustly countercyclical; Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) find that policy uncertainty
is associated with an increase in stock price volatility and reductions in industrial production and
employment. In terms of firm-level influence, Julio and Yook (2012) find that investment falls
around national elections; Durnev (2010) finds that corporate investment becomes less responsive
to stock prices in election years; Brogaard and Detzel (2015) find that policy uncertainty reduces
asset returns; Handley and Limao (2015) find that trade-policy uncertainty delays firms’ entry;
Gulen and Ing (2016) find that policy uncertainty decreases firms’ capital expenditures; Bonaime,
Gulen, Ion (2018) and Nguyen, Phan (2017) find policy uncertainty has a negative impact on
merger and acquisition. In terms of the effect of policy uncertainty on firms’ R&D, Atanassov et
al. (2018) find positive R&D investment of firms during election years; Bhattacharya et al. (2017),
however, show that industry-level innovation activities drop significantly during times of national
elections with an international sample. One possible explanation could be that Bhattacharya et
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al. (2017) captures the effect for both public and private firms while Atanassov et al. (2018)
reflect the effect of U.S. policy uncertainty to public firms in the U.S.. On par with Atanassov et
al. (2018), Stein and Stone (2013) find that uncertainty depresses capital investment, hiring, and
advertising, but encourages R&D spending based on implied volatility from equity options and oil
price shock. As an extension to these papers, I show that the deferral effect varies for firms that
choose competitive innovation investment and firms that choose cooperative innovation. To some
extent, the results do not depend on whether there is any deferral effect on average, thus stay away
from the seeming conflict results in the literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I introduce the data source and
variable generation; In section 3, I analyze the empirical results for the impact of policy uncertainty
and the deferral effect from R&D joint ventures; In section 4, I extend the basic results and explore
the mechanism and section 5 provides the conclusion.
2.2 Data and Variables
I study an unbalanced panel of non-financial, non-utility Compustat firms that range from 1989 to
2014 so as to get the policy uncertainty index and enough data for firms’ R&D joint ventures. For
tests that use R&D as the dependent variable, I include firm-year data with non-missing reported
R&D; For tests with patent-based dependent variable, I use a sample of firms who report at least
one patent application in history.
I get patent and application data from the weekly reported files on the website of U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO). Each patent’s status is determined on January 31th 2017. Any
patents get granted or abandoned before that date are considered as finalized; patents that haven’t
got their final status but are published are considered as pending applications.
To get information on firms’ R&D joint ventures, I use the information from the Thomson
Financial SDC Platinum database. Firms’ financial information is from the Compustat database
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and stock price information is from the CRSP database.
All the financial variables are trimmed at the first and ninety-ninth percentile to reduce the
influence of outliers. The panel data excludes financial and utility firms and firm-years with a book
value of 0, but otherwise it includes all the observations with available financial data.
2.2.1 Policy Uncertainty Index
I use the policy uncertainty index of Baker, Bloom, Davis (2016) (BBD index) following Gulen
and Ion (2016), Bonaime, Gulen and Ion (2018), Nguyen and Phan (2017) and others to measure
the policy uncertainty in the U.S.. The overall level of the index is a weighted average of four
components, with 1/2 from the news-based component, 1/6 from the tax component, 1/6 from
CPI forecast disagreement, and 1/6 from government spending forecast disagreement. Following
Gulen and Ion (2016), the monthly index is matched to firms’ fiscal year and annualized by taking
the natural logarithm of the arithmetic mean.
The news-based component is the result of searching through 10 large newspapers for articles
containing the term “uncertainty” or “uncertain”, the terms “economic” or “economy” and one
or more of the following terms: “congress”, “legislation”, “white house”, “regulation”, “Federal
Reserve”, or “deficit”. It reflects all kinds of economic and policy uncertainty. The index is
normalized by the total number of articles to make it comparable.
The tax code expiration is a measure for temporary tax uncertainty drawn from Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) reports. According to Baker, Bloom, Davis (2016), the uncertainty comes
as Congress often extend temporary tax measures in the last minutes before the tax code expires.
That leads to an uncertainty about the federal tax code provisions for the coming year.
To measure the uncertainty of monetary policy and fiscal policy actions. Two components
are included. Economic Forecaster Disagreement (1/6) is the one year ahead forecast dispersion
on CPI from Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters quarterly survey and purchase of
goods and services by Fed, state and local government (1/6).
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Firms’ inability to choose the policy uncertainty level is important for the identification of
all analyses. To further maintain the exogeneity, I explore the influence of policy uncertainty
on next year’s innovation investment decisions. In order to distinguish policy uncertainty with
other uncertainty and investment-opportunity measures, I add relative controls in all the following
analysis. The results reflect the unique part of policy uncertainty controlling for all the common
parts measures in other measures.
BBD index has been widely used in the recent literature5. It has been proven to be a valid
measure for policy uncertainty and contain unique information that has not been measured be-
fore. Figure One summarizes the monthly index movement. It suggests that policy uncertainty
is temporary compared to the investment cycle of R&D projects. Table 1 summarizes the corre-
lation of BBD policy uncertainty measures with other uncertainty and opportunity measures used
in literature (discussed below). The analysis suggests that BBD policy uncertainty measures are
positively but imperfectly associated with other economic uncertainty measures and negatively but
imperfectly associated with investment-opportunity measures.
2.2.2 R&D Cooperation Measures
I consider two measures of firms’ R&D cooperation. The first measure is the number of completed
R&D joint ventures from year t-4 to year t-1 where t is the fiscal year for firms’ innovation invest-
ments. The second measure is the total number of business partners in the completed R&D joint
ventures from year t-4 to year t-1. A natural logarithm transfer is used in the baseline analysis to
control for the skewness. Both measures are set to zero for firm-years with no R&D joint ventures.
Only completed R&D type joint ventures that have at least one participant as a U.S. Compustat
firm are included in the calculation. I end up with 3,162 deals from the fiscal year 1989 to 2014.
Table 2 panel A presents the summary statistics for cooperation variables. Median of zero
suggests around half of the innovative firm-year does not have R&D joint ventures. The summary
5It has been added to Federal Reserve Economic Data on 10/07/2017.
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statistics look similar to Chemmanur, Shen and Xie (2016).
2.2.3 R&D Cooperation Type
According to the discussions above. I separate each joint venture deal into 4 different types to
further explore the mechanism.
First, I separate each joint venture deal into either competition-reduction type, defined as a
joint venture that groups together industry peers, or supplementary type, defined as a joint venture
that groups together firms from different industries. To be specific, for each joint venture deal, I
look at the 4-digit SIC code of each firm that participates in the deal, I define the firms as potential
competitors if they share the same SIC code and potential supplement if otherwise. In robustness
check, I use 2-digit SIC code for industry and get similar results. A joint venture deal belongs
to competition reduction type when at least 50% of its participants are in the same industry and
supplementary type when otherwise.
Second, I separate each joint venture deal into either foreign-dominant, defined as a joint ven-
ture if at least 50% of the participants are non-US firms, or domestic-dominant, if otherwise.
I construct two measures for each firm-year based on different types of joint venture deals.
The first measure, ln(1+NJVC) (ln(1+NJV S)), is the total number of competition-reduction
(supplement) deals from t-4 to t-1 for the firm. The second measure, ln(1+NPartnersc) (ln(1+
NPartnerss)), is the total number of industry peers (non-competitors) who have formed at least
one R&D joint venture with firm i from t-4 to t-1. A natural logarithm transfer is used for both
measures to control for the skewness.
Similarly, I construct two firm-year measures for foreign and domestic joint ventures. The
first measure, ln(1+NJV F) (ln(1+NJV D)), is the total number of foreign-dominant joint ven-
tures (domestic-dominant joint ventures) for the firm within [t-4,t-1]. The second measure, ln(1+
NPartners f ) (ln(1+NPartnersd)), is the total number of foreign firms (domestic firms) who have
formed at least one R&D joint venture with firm i from t-4 to t-1. A natural logarithm transfer is
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used for both measures to control for the skewness.
Table 2 panel A presents summary statistics. They indicate that firms are more likely to form
joint ventures with non-peers. This is partly resulting from the definition of industries used in the
analysis. 4-digit SIC code measures the most direct competition that firms face as these peers use
the most similar techniques and produce the most similar kind of products. Moreover, I find that
firms are more likely to form joint ventures with domestic firms. One explanation is that firms face
fewer barriers and have less information asymmetry when establishing joint ventures domestically.
2.2.4 Innovation Investment Measures
I consider both financial and non-financial measures for firms’ innovation investments. The fi-
nancial measure used is the research and development (R&D) investment. It captures both the
proprietary and the shared innovation investment of the firm. To better understand the outcome of
R&D, I use the number of patent counts, measured as the nature logarithm of one plus the total
number of patents, for firms’ proprietary innovation investments.
Most of the patent papers use the NBER patent database, the database of Kogan et al. (2017)
or Harvard Patent Network database to generate patent-based measures. These databases suffer at
least two limitations. The first limitation is the limited coverage. The NBER database covers all
the applications granted from 1976 to 2006 and the other two databases cover all granted patents
from 1976 to 2010. Due to the long patent examination process6, the last 2 or 3 year’s data suffer
severe truncation problem. Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1996). Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001,2005)
provide the distribution way to adjust the problem, but each method has limitations as Lerner and
Seru (2017) argue. If truncation problem is adjusted by cutting the data of the last two or three
years, none of the databases is able to cover the period after 2008 financial crisis, a period when the
concern for policy uncertainty becomes particularly acute. The second limitation is that none of
them cover information on applications that are not granted. Starting from 2001, the USPTO (the
6On average approximately 3.2 years according to Farre-Mensa, Hegde and Ljungqvist (2016)
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U.S. patent and trademark office) makes the application files available to the public before they are
actually granted. The decision, which is formalized as U.S.C.122 rules, offers an opportunity for
researchers to take a look at firms’ overall innovation package.
The weekly publication of granted patents and new patent applications from the USPTO offers
a possibility to deal with the limitations mentioned above. To be specific, I gather all the utility
patents that are granted between the year 2000 and January 2017 in the data and supplement it with
the NBER patent database7 and the database of Kogan et al. (2017) 8 for previous years. The data
is merged with the Compustat database by firm name following the method used for the NBER
patent database as introduced in Bessen (2009) and Bernstein, Giroud and Townsend (2016). To
check the matching accuracy, I compare the data with the NBER patent database and the database
of Kogan et al. (2017) so as to guarantee that firms with valid Compustat link in previous patent
databases are also identified properly in the database.
I measure firms’ innovation investments as the total number of new patent grants. In the robust-
ness test, I also measure it as the total number of new applications. The natural logarithm transfer
is taken for both measures following patent literature 9. To get a better understanding of whether
different types of innovation perform differently, I separate the total number of patents into the
total number of co-patents, defined as patents with more than one assignees, and single-patents,
defined as patents that are owned by only one assignee.
Due to the long lag between the real innovation investment period and final patent grant date,
in the patent literature, a patent is always merged to firms’ financial information by its application
date as people think that is more likely to be the period when the real innovation investment hap-
pens. One concern of using the application year is that firms won’t start a provisional application
until there are some preliminary results; the true financing period thus should be earlier than the
application date. About 44% of all granted patents have filed priority with USPTO or International
7The NBER patent database is from https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home, for data details please
refer to Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001)
8I thank the author for sharing the database at https://iu.app.box.com/v/patents
9The application publication has a latency of 18 months from the application date for general patents if firms are
not filing for even longer delay, the lag limits my sample period to 2014.
i.e. The total application measure is different from granted patent measure after 2000.
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patent office, which guarantees the priority for the patents when there are near-simultaneous in-
ventors who file applications for the same invention in the future. The priority date is on average
about one and a half years earlier than regular application filing dates and it is more likely the real
time when firms start to invest in the new innovation. I use the earliest priority year as the time
t and supplement it with the application year if the priority date is not applicable for the patent.
Thus the time measure captures the earliest date when the project is filed with the government. 10
Table 2 panel B presents the summary statistics for innovation measures. As the theory does not
imply anything on how the quality of investments matters, I do not include patent quality measures
in the analysis.
2.3 Basic Empirical Results
2.3.1 Innovation Projects Under Policy Uncertainty
In this section, I explore firms’ decision of innovation investments under policy uncertainty.
I model firms’ investments as a function of policy uncertainty, similar to Gulen and Ing (2016),
by changing the dependent variable to the number of patents. The model is specified as the follow-
ing :
yit = αi +β1PUt−1 +β2Controli,t +β3Controli,t−1 +β4Mt−1 +β5Trendt + εit (2.1)
where yit is firm i’s innovation investment at time t. When yit is measured as R&D, I include
the control variables following the investment literature (Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007) and
Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003)): firms’ investment opportunities (the market to book ratio);
profitability (cash flow). I also include firms’ characteristics (size, age), leverage (book leverage)
10The adjustments used in the paper also reflect the idea of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA).
It is referred to as the most significant change to the U.S. patent system since 1952. The act changes the U.S. patent
system from the “first to invent” to the “ first inventor to file”, which gives patenting priority to inventors who disclose
the idea publicly first instead of inventors who file applications first.
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and competition (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index based on sales) as additional controls. When yit is
measured as patents, I include additional control variables following the patent literature (Tian and
Wang (2014), He and Tian (2013), Amore, Schneider and Žaldokas (2013) and so on): profitability
(sales growth), firm-specific risk (the standard deviation of the daily stock return of firm i), firms’
investments (capital expenditure, R&D, R&D indicator set to one when the reported R&D is not
missing and zero otherwise) and capital to labor ratio. Firms’ balance-sheet variables are measured
at t-111, and other financing variables are measured at contemporaneous time t.
PUt−1 is either the overall level or the subcomponent of the BBD index in certain tests. Follow-
ing the policy uncertainty literature (Correia (2016), Gulen and Ion (2016), Bonaime, Gulen and
Ion (2018), Nguyen and Phan (2017) and so on), policy uncertainty is measured at t-1 in order to
observe investment pattern. For concerns that the period of high policy uncertainty coincides with
an investment opportunity and other overall uncertainties which jointly influence firms’ investment,
I also include macro-level controls Mt−1. To be specific, I include controls for macroeconomics op-
portunities (consumer sentiment index from the University of Michigan, real GDP growth, leading
economic indicator) and controls for uncertainty (the cross-sectional standard deviation of firms’
profit growth, the daily index of implied volatility VXO, and cross-sectional standard deviation
of firms’ monthly stock returns, macroeconomic uncertainty index and financial uncertainty mea-
sure following Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015)). Detailed definitions and summary statistics
are discussed in Appendix A. All the specifications include a time trend and firm fixed effect; the
standard deviations are clustered on both firm and year to control for serial correlation from both
dimensions.
Table 3 summarizes the results. The positive estimated β1 for the first column indicates that
firms increase their R&D investment during the period of high policy uncertainty. In terms of
magnitude, a raise in the BBD index by one percent would lead to a 0.3% increase in firms’ general
R&D. When I look at firms’ R&D outputs, the β1 in column two suggests that firms increase their
11 Financing variables that are measured at t-1: Market to Book, Tangibility, Book Leverage
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proprietary R&D as a 1% increase in BBD index leads to a 0.15% increase in the number of patents.
A comparison of the estimates in the last two columns leads to a conclusion that the effect only
exists for proprietary investment. Specifically, when the right is shared, measured as the number
of co-patents in column three, the insignificant estimates suggest that firms do not accelerate this
kind of investment. By contrast, firms increase their investment in patent projects that are fully
held by themselves, as measured by the number of single-patents. The results are consistent with
the discussions above; firms are less motivated to implement R&D immediately if the first-mover
advantage is shared through cooperation and defer such projects further as uncertainty raises the
value of waiting.
2.3.2 The Impact of Cooperation
To get more direct evidence for the impact of cooperation during the period of policy uncertainty, in
this section, I explore the influence of the past experience in R&D joint ventures on firms’ decisions
to defer innovation projects during uncertain periods. The results above suggest that investment
rebound right after high policy uncertainty. If cooperation cushions the pressure of preemption
concern and reduces the value of first-mover advantages, I would expect a weaker increment in the
investment for firms with past experiences in R&D joint ventures.
Firms’ innovation is modeled as the following:
yit = αi +β1PUt−1 +δPUt−1 × JVi,t−4,t−1 +β2JVi,t−4,t−1
+β3Controli,t +β4Controli,t−1 +β5Mt−1 + εit (2)
JVi,t−4,t−1 is the natural logarithm of the cumulative number of R&D joint ventures in window
t-4 to t-1. The control variables are the same as in the previous section. When yit is measured
as R&D, the sample used in the test contains all non-financial, non-utility firms that report non-
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missing R&D; When yit is patent-related measures, the sample used in the test contains only inno-
vative firms (firms with at least one patent application in history). In all specifications, the equation
is estimated with a time trend and the firm fixed effect, the standard deviations are clustered on both
firm and year. The above discussions imply that δ should be negative, suggesting that firms with
more cooperation choose to defer their innovation further during the period of policy uncertainty.
Table 4 summarizes the basic results based on the number of joint ventures measure. Overall,
the negative estimated δ bear out the discussions above. To be specific, for firms that do not have
any R&D joint ventures in the past, the positive estimated β1 implies that they are more likely to
increase their R&D and the proprietary R&D projects during the period of policy uncertainty. As
mentioned before, this is driven by the motivation to get first-mover advantages and the preemption
concern of R&D competition, even though waiting during uncertain periods makes everyone better
off. By contrast, the negative and significant interaction term implies that firms with R&D joint
ventures defer the projects further compared to firms without such experience during the uncertain
periods. Note that the interaction term is not significant for firms’ overall R&D expenditures. One
possible reason is that overall R&D contains both the proprietary investment and the shared part,
but not both of them are responsive to R&D joint ventures. In the robustness check, I explore the
response of firms’ R&D expenditures to other types of economic uncertainty. To be specific, I test
firms’ responses to financial market uncertainties (VXO, VIX, cross-sectional standard deviation
of firms’ stock returns, financial uncertainty measure following Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015))
and macroeconomic uncertainties (Economic uncertainty measure following Jurado, Ludvigson
and Ng (2015), economic uncertainty measure following Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2014)) and
the first component of all the uncertainty measures. As shown in Table B-2, the overall results
suggest that firms with R&D joint ventures choose to defer their R&D investment further dur-
ing uncertain periods compared to firms without any experience in R&D joint ventures. Policy
uncertainty has a slightly weaker effect compared with other types of uncertainty.
In terms of the effect of R&D joint ventures, the positive estimated β2 in Table 4 indicates
that it triggers more firm innovation when there is no policy uncertainty in the market. The results
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are consistent with Chemmanur, Shen and Xie (2016) who find a positive relation between R&D
joint ventures and firms’ subsequent innovation outcomes. During the period of policy uncertainty,
however, the positive effect is weakened as cooperation also motivates firms to fully appreciate the
value of flexibility.
The potential limitation on the number of joint ventures measure is that it ignores the size or
the number of participants. Joint ventures with more participants are more effective in reducing
potential competition than joint ventures that are grouped by two. To explore the effect, I replace
the number of joint ventures with the cumulative number of business partner measure and re-
estimate equation (2). The results are summarized in Table 5. Overall, I find similar results that
are consistent with the previous discussions.
To assess whether the subcomponents of the BBD index have different effects, I re-estimate
equation (2) with each one of the subcomponents of the BBD index. The results in Table 6 sug-
gests that the deferral effect of R&D joint ventures works under all sources of policy uncertainty.
In terms of the effect of policy uncertainty, I find that the positive effect comes mainly from the
news-based component. The effect of government spending uncertainty leads to a negative re-
sponse of firms’ innovation and the tax-related uncertainty and monetary policy uncertainty are
not significant predictors of firms’ innovation, as is consistent with the literature.
2.3.3 The Length of the Influence
In this subsection, I explore how long the deferral effect will last. Following the same specification
of equation (2), I add lags to policy uncertainty index, the joint venture related measures and
the interaction from the contemporaneous year t to 5 years before and see whether they have
predictive power for firms’ innovation at time t. The coefficient of interest is the estimated δ , the
negative impact of previous R&D joint ventures will last until the estimated δ become positive and
insignificant.
Table 7 summarizes the results. As suggested by the negative and significant δ s, firms with
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more past experience in R&D joint ventures have less R&D investment for at least 4 years than
firms that do not have. The pattern is true for both types of cooperation measures when comparing
the results in each panel. As for the effect of R&D joint ventures, the estimated β2 suggests that it
improves firms’ innovation outputs for at least 4 years during normal times. By contrast, the effect
of policy uncertainty is more temporary as suggested by β1 which is only significant for the first 2
years.
Overall, these results draw a detailed picture of the influence of R&D joint ventures on firms’
investments during the period of policy uncertainty. As an aside, it is also interesting to compare
the effect of joint ventures during the periods of high policy uncertainty and low policy uncertainty.
Taking the results in Table 4 column (2) as an example, when the policy uncertainty index ranges
from minimum to maximum, the sensitivity of the number of firms’ patent grants to R&D joint
ventures changes from postive 0.2 12 to -0.1313. The positive effect is consistent with Chemmanur,
Shen and Xie (2016). By contrast, I show that impact varies with the different levels of uncertainty
in the market and the positive effect can even turn to negative when the policy uncertainty is more
severe. Yet, this paper is not aiming to answer the question of whether it does harm to firms’
innovation or not. In fact, deferring the innovation projects during highly uncertain periods allows
firms to fully appreciate the value of waiting and it may even better if this prevents firms from
conducting pre-mature projects and making sub-optimal decisions.
2.3.4 Robustness Check
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The first concern is the endogeneity of policy uncertainty and firms’ investments. As Julio and
Yook (2012) and others point out, the policy uncertainty index also reflects the economic uncer-
tainty that partially results from the general investment of firms. This leads to a possible reverse
causality that influences the test. The baseline specification has partly alleviated the problem by
adding one-year lag to the policy uncertainty index and controlling for macroeconomic measures
and the firm fixed effect. However, there are also possibilities that other time-varying omitted
variables may bias the results. To address this concern, I use the partisan-conflict index from the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia as an instrumental variable and re-estimate the effect of joint
ventures using 2-stage least square model. The index, as is discussed in Azzimonti (2013), is con-
structed by searching through newspaper articles that contain terms related to lawmakers’ policy
disagreement. It is not directly related to firms’ investments but can influence it by adding pol-
icy uncertainty and affecting the efficiency of government policy (Azzimonti (2017)). In the first
stage, I regress the BBD index on the partisan-conflict index, the macroeconomic controls used in
Table 3 as well as the annual averages of the firm-level controls following Bonaime, Gulen and Ion
(2018). The results show that partisan-conflict index is significantly correlated with the BBD index
and the F-statistics of the regression is higher than 10, suggesting that it is not a weak instrument.
In the second stage, I re-estimate equation (2) using the fitted value of BBD index from the first
stage. The results in Table 8 implies that the possible endogeneity is not driving the main results.
The second concern is that the number of the newly granted patents may not fully reflect firms’
innovation portfolio. On one hand, the long lags in patents’ examination process lead to severe
truncation problem for the end-of-period data. On the other hand, newly granted patents can only
lead to joint implications of the results, reflecting not only firms’ innovation investments but also
firms’ innovation that are successfully patented. To alleviate the truncation problem, I restrict the
sample period to the fiscal year 2014 by looking at the status of each patent up to January 31th, 2017
in all the specifications of the paper. To address the issue of the joint implications, I re-estimate
equation (2) by replacing the dependent variable to the total number of patent applications. To be
specific, I gather all the patent applications published on the website of the USPTO and supplement
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it with any granted patents that are not published to generate the overall number of applications
that filed by the firms. The results, as reported in the second column of Table 8, are consistent with
the basic one.
The third concern of the baseline results is that the interaction term may also reflect the differ-
ence in firms’ investment opportunities for firms with past joint ventures and firms without. To see
whether it is driving the results, I re-estimate equation (2) by adding interactions of joint ventures
and firms’ investment opportunities (the market to book ratio, sales growth, cash flow). The results
are summarized in the third column of Table 8. The magnitude is not changing much compared to
the original results, suggesting that the differences are not driving the results.
All the robustness tests work for the number of the business-partners measure as well, which
are summarized in panel B of Table 8.
2.4 Mechanism
I now turn to test the mechanism for the results above. The basic strategy is to separate the joint
ventures measure into different types. More precisely, for a subsample of firms that have at least
one R&D joint venture in the window[t-4, t-1], I run the following interactive specification:
yit = αi +β1PUt−1 +δ1PUt−1 × JV0,i,t−4,t−1 +β2JV0,i,t−4,t−1
+δ2PUt−1 × JV1,i,t−4,t−1 +β3JV1,t,t−4,t−1+
β4Controli,t +β5Controli,t−1 +β6Mt−1 + εit (3)
where JV0and JV1 are components of the joint-venture measures based on the mechanism I
am testing. Control variables include the same firm, industry and macroeconomic variables as
discussed above.
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2.4.1 Competition Reduction vs Supplements
Joint ventures can be established by firms from the same industry (JV0) or different industries (JV1).
The former ones reduce potential competition in the future as competitors share the exclusive
technology and patent rights; the latter ones make full use of each firm’s specialty as supplements
to generate synergy and offset obstacles. As firms come from different industries in this situation,
it is not a type of cooperation that will reduce the competitive threat in the future. According to the
discussions above, firms defer the investment further if cooperation eases the preemption concern
and alleviate future competition, thus I would expect a sharp negative estimated δ1that drive out
the impact of δ2.
The results are summarized in Table 9. Consistent with the prediction, the estimated δ2 is
positive and insignificant and the negative impact only comes from δ1: the interaction of policy
uncertainty with the number of the competition-reduction type of joint ventures. The results hold
for not only the overall level of BBD index but also the subcomponents. The comparison provides
strong support for competition reduction as one important mechanism that drives the results. For
the impact of supplementary cooperation, the positive estimated δ2 suggests that, on one hand, it
motivates firms to invest quicker due to the synergy of cooperation; on the other hand, however,
the impact is weakened by the cost of cooperation such as one needs to coordinate between people
of different background, leaving the impact of supplementary cooperation to diminish to zero.
In Panel B I change the proxy of cooperation to the number of business partner measure. The re-
estimated results are also consistent with the prediction. The coefficient of interest is the negative
and significant δ1 on the 4th row and the positive and insignificant δ2 on the 5th row. Again, the
difference implies that if joint ventures cannot ease the preemption concern and future competition,
firms will not defer their innovation investment even though the value of the first-mover advantage
gets diluted by the shared feature of innovation.
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2.4.2 Foreign-Dominant vs Domestic-Dominant
If 50% of the participants in a joint venture are foreign firms, such diversification makes firms’
investment decisions less influenced by the policy uncertainty of the U.S.. In addition, as discussed
above, establishing joint ventures with domestic firms is more effective in reducing future domestic
competition and preemption concern of patenting. I would expect a stronger deferral effect from
such type of cooperation. In this subsection, I explore the idea and re-estimate equation (3) for
domestic-dominant cooperation measure (JV0) and foreign-dominant cooperation measure (JV1).
The discussions suggest that I would expect δ1, the interaction of policy uncertainty with the
number of the domestic-dominant joint ventures, to be more negative then δ2.
Table 10 presents the results. In panel A, a joint venture is defined as the domestic-dominant
one if 50% of its participants are U.S. firms. Otherwise, it is defined as the foreign-dominant one.
The total number of the joint ventures is separated into the total number of the domestic joint
ventures and the total number of the foreign joint ventures, both with a natural logarithm transfer.
The results of interest are the estimated coefficient for the interaction terms: δ1, which is found
to be negative and significant and δ2, which is found to be insignificant. The pattern is true for
not only the overall level of BBD index but also the majority of its subcomponents. When policy
uncertainty changes from minimum level to maximum level, the sensitivity of the number of firms’
patents to the number of the foreign joint ventures changes from 0.031 to 0.008 and the sensitivity
to the number of the domestic joint ventures changes from 0.18 to -0.17.
In panel B, the total number of business partners is separated into the total number of the
domestic partners and the number of the foreign partners. Similar results can be found under such
a specification.
2.4.3 Competition
The previous discussions show that competition is an important factor that drives the deferral
effect. In this subsection, I explore it directly and assess whether the deferral effect caused by
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past joint ventures is different when firms face different levels of competition. On one hand, firms
can fully appreciate the flexibility value by deferring the investment when joint ventures reduce
the competition and the strategic value of proprietary patenting. On the other hand, when firms
face more fierce competition, joint ventures established by a limited number of partners cannot
effectively reduce the preemption concern. As a result, I would expect a weaker deferral effect
when the competition is severe.
I assess the prediction as the following. First, I re-estimate the effect on a subsample of firm-
year with the higher-than-median competition and a subsample of firm-year with the lower-than-
median competition. The competition is measured as the Herfindahl Index (HHI) on sales for
each 3-digit SIC industry. It indicates the degree of product market concentration. Firms face a
low competition if the HHI is above the sample median and high competition otherwise. All the
specifications are the same as in equation (2). The results are summarized in Table 11. The deferral
effect disappears if the market competition is severe, as suggested by the estimated δ in column one
which is not significant from zero. By contrast, the significant and negative interaction term for
the low competition sample is consistent with the prediction. In terms of economic magnitude, for
any firms that have the median number of joint ventures and face severe market competition, the
sensitivity of the number of firms’ patent projects to policy uncertainty changes from positive 0.16
to positive 0.07 when the number of R&D joint ventures increases by one unit; By contrast, the
sensitivity changes from positive 0.12 to negative 0.18 if the competition is low.
Second, to facilitate the comparison of the economic magnitudes, I test the effect of competition
through a triple interaction term specified as the following:
yit = αi +β1PUt−1 +δ1PUt−1 × JVi,t−4,t−1 ×Dumht +∑δ interactions+
β2JVi,t−4,t−1 +β3Controli,t +β4Controli,t−1 +β5Mt−1 + εit (4)
where Dumht is set to one when the competition of firm i, measured as the Herfindahl-Hirschman
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Index, is in the lower 50% of the HHI and zero otherwise. ∑δ interactions is the sum of all the
interactions I add as controls. To be specific, these interactions are PUt−1 × JVi,t−4,t−1; PUt−1 ×
Dumht and JVt,t−4,t−1 ×Dumht . Firm-level controls and macroeconomic controls are the same as
before. JVi,t−4,t−1 is measured as either the cumulative number of joint ventures or the cumulative
number of partners.
The results are summarized in Table 11. The negative and significant coefficient for PUt−1 ×
JVi,t−4,t−1 is consistent with the baseline results. The effect is weaker when firms face a higher
level of competition as suggested by the estimated δ1 that is positive and significantly different
from zero. The results hold for both types of joint-venture measures as suggested by the results in
panel A and panel B.
In terms of the effects of joint ventures, the positive coefficient for the number of joint ventures
implies that such cooperation motivates firms’ innovation in normal times, but not in the periods
of policy uncertainty as suggested by the negative coefficient of PUt−1 × JVi,t−4,t−1. Moreover,
the positive effect of joint ventures will be weaker when firms face more severe competition as
suggested by the negative coefficient of JVt,t−4,t−1 ×Dumht .
2.5 Conclusion
The paper studies the influence of R&D joint ventures on firms’ proprietary innovation invest-
ments during the period of policy uncertainty. I find that firms who have established R&D joint
ventures defer their proprietary innovation further during the period of policy uncertainty. The re-
sults support the idea that cooperation and shared proprietary rights reduce the value of first-mover
advantages and alleviate the concern of patent race, making firms fully appreciate the value of
flexibility by deferring the investment during the uncertain periods. The deferral effect is mainly
driven by joint ventures that group together potential competitors and is weaker when firms diver-
sify the risk by cooperating with foreign firms. Moreover, the joint venture-induced deferral effect
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is weaker when firms face more severe competition.
One extension that is not discussed in this paper is the contract structure of the strategic al-
liance and the endogenous choice of forming the strategic alliance in the first place. Firms form
strategic alliance for a variety of reasons like technology competition, financial benefit, or simply
technology. The endogenous issue will bias the results in the paper when there is a valid mecha-
nism showing that firms who cut down investments more during the period of policy uncertainty
are more likely to form R&D joint ventures in previous years. It is a very weak argument if policy
uncertainty is hard to predict in advance. The other limitation of this paper is that I do not compare
the analysis with Bonatti and Horner (2011) who model the deferral effect through moral hazard
and free-rider problem. To slightly address this issue, in unreported results, I add triple interac-
tion of policy uncertainty, joint ventures and manager pay-performance sensitivity that stands for
the severeness of the moral hazard problem. The results show that the deferral effect can be im-
proved slightly by aligning managers’ interest to the shareholders but it cannot be fully wiped out,
suggesting the validity of the explanation provided in this paper.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics For R&D Joint -Venture Measures
This table reports summary statistics for firm-fiscal year level variables used in this paper. The
sample ranges from 1987 to 2014 and covers non-financial, non-utility but otherwise all Compustat
firms with positive book assets and have at least one patent application in history. The information
on R&D joint ventures is from the SDC database. Innovation measures are generated by all patents
that are granted between 1976 and January 31th 2017. Ln(1+npat) is the total number of patent
grants; Ln(1+napp) is the total number of patent applications.Ln(1+ncopat) is the total number
of patents that are shared by more than one assignees.Ln(1+ nsinglepat) is the total number of
patents with only one assignee. Firms’ financial data is from the Compustat database and stock
information is from the CRSP database. All the financial variables are trimmed at 1th and 99th
percentiles. Please check Appendix A for detailed definition of other variables.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics For R&D Joint-Venture Measures
mean sd p50 min max
Panel A: R&D Joint Venture
ln(1+NJV ) 0.066 0.302 0.000 0.000 4.078
ln(1+NJV S) 1.354 0.737 1.099 0.000 4.956
ln(1+NJVC) 0.204 0.466 0.000 0.000 3.714
ln(1+NJV F) 0.167 0.379 0.000 0.000 2.565
ln(1+NJV D) 0.366 0.609 0.000 0.000 3.850
ln(1+N partners) 0.101 0.447 0.000 0.000 5.273
ln(1+NPartnersc) 0.268 0.600 0.000 0.000 4.595
ln(1+NPartnerss) 1.305 0.781 1.099 0.000 4.595
ln(1+NPartnersd) 0.425 0.734 0.000 0.000 4.956
ln(1+NPartners f ) 0.207 0.461 0.000 0.000 2.996
Panel B: Number of patents and applications
Ln(1+npat) 1.030 1.375 0.693 0.000 7.754
Ln(1+napp) 1.100 1.409 0.693 0.000 8.052
Ln(1+ncopat) 0.071 0.302 0.000 0.000 4.234
Ln(1+nsinglepat) 1.066 1.386 0.693 0.000 7.780
Panel C: Financial variables
Market toBook 2.067 1.448 1.592 0.537 11.988
Cash Flow 0.062 0.173 0.093 -1.398 0.560
Log (sales) 1.359 1.888 1.354 -4.048 5.630
Sales Growth 0.146 0.339 0.088 -0.619 3.262
Firm return SD 8.141 76.766 11.077 -518.404 561.202
Capital expenditure 0.060 0.061 0.042 0.000 0.624
R&D 0.271 0.195 0.204 0.037 1.000
R&D dummy 0.233 0.177 0.187 0.011 0.869
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (sales) 2.725 0.789 2.773 0.693 4.025
Tangibility 0.435 0.206 0.430 0.053 0.974
ln (age) 3.582 1.026 3.488 0.158 8.111
Leverage 0.068 0.099 0.027 0.000 0.706
LnKL 0.769 0.421 1.000 0.000 1.000
Panel D: Macroeconomic Variables
BBD Index 4.546 0.320 4.528 3.915 5.137
News 4.629 0.261 4.610 4.111 5.162
Fed. Spend 4.397 0.356 4.369 3.788 5.151
CPI disagreement 4.510 0.184 4.454 4.220 4.983
Tax_expiration 4.087 1.658 3.158 1.580 7.376
CS return SD 0.148 0.034 0.143 0.106 0.258
VXO 20.512 6.640 19.394 11.825 42.005
CS profit SD 30.130 31.730 21.357 6.295 168.551
JLN_Uncertainty 0.910 0.047 0.906 0.853 1.103
JLN_FIN 0.982 0.056 0.978 0.904 1.109
Consumer Sentiment 88.041 11.730 89.242 60.092 108.158
Leading Index 1.185 0.683 1.433 -1.505 2.074
GDP Growth 2.662 1.634 2.700 -2.800 4.700
Number of Obs 36,777
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Table 2.3: The Effect of Policy Uncertainty on Innovation
This table summerizes the results of firms’ respnes to policy uncertainty following the specification
of equation (1): yi,t = αi + β1PUt−1 + β2Controli,t + β3Controli,t−1 + β4Mt−1 + εit (1). PU is
measured by the overall BBD index. The dependent variable is specified on the first row of each
collumn. The sample for the first column contains all non-financial, non-utiltiy firms with non-
missing R&D reported in the Compustat database. The sample for the other columns contains
all innovative firms, defined as firms with at least one patent application in history. Appendix A
summarizes the definitions for the variables in details. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,
** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2.3: The Effect of Policy Uncertainty on Innovation
R&D ln(1+Npat) ln(1+Copat) ln(1+SinglePat)
PU 0.00307* 0.151*** 0.0132 0.144***
(1.87) (6.23) (1.58) (6.55)
Market to Book 0.00980*** 0.0140*** 0.00227 0.0108**
(21.98) (2.61) (1.36) (2.00)
Cash Flow -0.0567*** -0.178*** -0.0112 -0.194***
(-13.71) (-4.10) (-1.06) (-4.58)
Size -0.0102*** 0.140*** 0.0185*** 0.175***
(-9.00) (8.34) (4.43) (10.20)
HHI -0.00500 -0.0517 -0.0357 -0.0213
(-0.90) (-0.62) (-1.32) (-0.25)
Tangibility 0.0543*** -0.0891 -0.0105 0.0420
(9.23) (-0.88) (-0.39) (0.39)
Age -0.00108 0.0605 -0.0252** 0.0667*
(-0.52) (1.63) (-2.23) (1.78)
Leverage 0.0143*** -0.125*** -0.00176 -0.0798*
(4.61) (-2.82) (-0.12) (-1.79)
Consumer Sentiment Index -0.000211*** 0.00895*** 0.000863** 0.00955***
(-3.38) (8.76) (2.52) (9.56)
Leading Index 0.00441*** -0.0705*** -0.0131*** -0.0911***
(4.46) (-4.38) (-2.67) (-5.79)
Real GDP Growth 0.0000556 0.0143*** 0.00461*** 0.0122***
(0.20) (3.06) (3.19) (2.81)
CS return SD 0.000184 -0.0103*** 0.00243** -0.00914***
(1.23) (-3.45) (2.50) (-3.10)
VXO 0.0145 0.555*** 0.332*** 0.405*
(1.13) (2.62) (4.28) (1.93)
CS profit growth SD 0.000825*** -0.00258 0.000725 -0.00240
(8.16) (-1.62) (1.39) (-1.57)
JLN_Uncertainty -0.0000542*** 0.000330*** -0.0000199 0.000365***
(-6.46) (2.66) (-0.45) (3.04)
JLN_Fin_Uncertainty -0.00543 -0.467** -0.161*** -0.441***
(-0.45) (-2.48) (-2.59) (-2.58)
Trend -0.0923*** 0.252 -0.139* -0.146
(-5.73) (1.01) (-1.66) (-0.61)
Sales Growth -0.0296** -0.00568 -0.0519***
(-2.04) (-1.13) (-3.86)
Firm SD 0.000112** -0.00000206 0.0000623
(2.39) (-0.15) (1.42)
Capital Expenditure -0.249** -0.0448 -0.256**
(-2.25) (-1.32) (-2.43)
lnKL 0.0644*** 0.0139*** 0.0583***
(3.60) (2.78) (3.16)
R&D 0.473*** 0.0980** 0.445***
(3.54) (2.28) (3.43)
R&D Dummy -0.00983 0.00375 -0.00604
(-0.26) (0.64) (-0.16)
N 53,529 36,777 36,777 36,777
adj. R2 0.788 0.794 0.493 0.813
r2_within 0.0955 0.0333 0.00871 0.0373
Firm Fixed Effect (FE) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm&Year Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.4: The Impact of R&D Joint Ventures During the Period of Policy Uncertainty
This table summarizes the influence of R&D joint ventures on firms’ innovation investment during
the period of policy uncertainty. The regressions follow the specification of equation (2): yit =αi+
β1PUt−1 +δPUt−1 × JVi,t−4,t−1 +β2JVi,t−4,t−1 +β3Controli,t +β4Controli,t−1 +β5Mt−1 + εit (2)
PU is measured as the overall BBD index. The joint venture is measured by the total number of
R&D joint ventures for firm i from t-4 to t-1. The dependent variable is specified on the first row
of each column. The sample for the first column contains all non-financial, non-utiltiy firms with
non-missing R&D reported in the Compustat database. The sample for the other columns contains
all innovative firms, defined as those with at least one patent in history. Appendix A summarizes
the definitions for the variables in details. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2.4: The Impact of R&D Joint Ventures During the Period of Policy Uncertainty
R&D ln(1+Npat) ln(1+Copat) ln(1+SinglePat)
PU 0.00318* 0.167*** 0.0233*** 0.159***
(1.94) (6.79) (2.70) (7.20)
ln(1+NJV ) 0.0415* 1.266*** 0.842*** 1.101***
(1.90) (3.97) (4.86) (3.66)
PU × ln(1+NJV ) -0.00707 -0.272*** -0.179*** -0.243***
(-1.47) (-3.83) (-4.84) (-3.57)
Market to Book 0.00973*** 0.0134** 0.00180 0.0103*
(21.93) (2.49) (1.10) (1.92)
Cash Flow -0.0566*** -0.181*** -0.0130 -0.196***
(-13.70) (-4.16) (-1.24) (-4.61)
Size -0.0103*** 0.140*** 0.0183*** 0.176***
(-9.13) (8.37) (4.38) (10.26)
HHI -0.00493 -0.0475 -0.0332 -0.0170
(-0.90) (-0.57) (-1.25) (-0.20)
Tangibility 0.0538*** -0.0904 -0.0113 0.0403
(9.18) (-0.90) (-0.42) (0.38)
Age -0.00121 0.0595 -0.0261** 0.0664*
(-0.58) (1.60) (-2.33) (1.77)
Leverage 0.0143*** -0.125*** -0.00169 -0.0795*
(4.60) (-2.81) (-0.12) (-1.78)
Consumer Sentiment Index -0.000206*** 0.00900*** 0.000895*** 0.00957***
(-3.29) (8.78) (2.60) (9.56)
Leading Index 0.00445*** -0.0709*** -0.0133*** -0.0917***
(4.51) (-4.42) (-2.72) (-5.84)
Real GDP Growth 0.0000215 0.0146*** 0.00477*** 0.0126***
(0.08) (3.13) (3.28) (2.93)
CS return SD 0.00675 0.534** 0.309*** 0.421**
(0.53) (2.53) (4.13) (2.03)
VXO 0.000786*** -0.00325** 0.000244 -0.00288*
(7.78) (-2.05) (0.48) (-1.89)
CS profit growth SD -0.0000509*** 0.000359*** 0.00000241 0.000379***
(-6.11) (2.88) (0.06) (3.16)
JLN_Uncertainty -0.00163 -0.415** -0.124** -0.407**
(-0.13) (-2.22) (-1.98) (-2.39)
JLN_Fin_Uncertainty -0.0849*** 0.290 -0.104 -0.144
(-5.30) (1.16) (-1.27) (-0.60)
Sales Growth -0.0284** -0.00482 -0.0512***
(-1.96) (-0.96) (-3.81)
Firm SD 0.000111** -0.00000272 0.0000616
(2.36) (-0.19) (1.40)
Capital Expenditure -0.246** -0.0436 -0.252**
(-2.22) (-1.30) (-2.39)
lnKL 0.0633*** 0.0131*** 0.0578***
(3.55) (2.65) (3.12)
R&D 0.454*** 0.0830* 0.435***
(3.44) (1.96) (3.39)
R&D Dummy -0.0107 0.00304 -0.00640
(-0.28) (0.52) (-0.17)
Trend 0.000195 -0.0104*** 0.00234** -0.00937***
(1.31) (-3.51) (2.47) (-3.18)
N 53,529 36,777 36,777 36,777
adj. R2 0.788 0.794 0.496 0.813
R2_within 0.0971 0.0346 0.0140 0.0382
Firm FE, Firm&Year Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.5: The Impact of R&D Joint Ventures : the Number of Partners
This table summarizes the influence of R&D joint ventures on firms’ innovation investment during
the period of policy uncertainty. The regressions follow the specification of equation (2):yit = αi+
β1PUt−1 +δPUt−1 × JVi,t−4,t−1 +β2JVi,t−4,t−1 +β3Controli,t +β4Controli,t−1 +β5Mt−1 + εit (2)
PU is measured by the overall BBD index. The joint venture is measured by the total number of
firms’ business partners from t-4 to t-1. The dependent variable is specified on the first row of
each column. The sample for the first column contains all non-financial, non-utiltiy firms with
non-missing R&D reported in the Compustat database. The sample for the other columns contains
all innovative firms, defined as firms with at least one patent in history. Appendix A summarizes
the definitions for the variables in details. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2.5: Impact of R&D Joint Ventures : the Number of Partners
R&D ln(1+Npat) ln(1+Copat) ln(1+SinglePat)
PU 0.00320* 0.167*** 0.0240*** 0.159***
(1.95) (6.80) (2.78) (7.20)
ln(1+N partners) 0.0266* 0.847*** 0.578*** 0.734***
(1.80) (3.98) (4.88) (3.64)
PU × ln(1+N partners) -0.00448 -0.181*** -0.123*** -0.162***
(-1.38) (-3.84) (-4.86) (-3.55)
Market to Book 0.00973*** 0.0134** 0.00180 0.0103*
(21.94) (2.49) (1.10) (1.91)
Cash Flow -0.0566*** -0.181*** -0.0129 -0.196***
(-13.71) (-4.16) (-1.23) (-4.61)
Size -0.0103*** 0.140*** 0.0184*** 0.176***
(-9.13) (8.37) (4.40) (10.26)
HHI -0.00495 -0.0476 -0.0330 -0.0169
(-0.90) (-0.57) (-1.25) (-0.20)
Tangibility 0.0539*** -0.0901 -0.0111 0.0405
(9.18) (-0.90) (-0.42) (0.38)
Age -0.00120 0.0593 -0.0262** 0.0664*
(-0.57) (1.59) (-2.33) (1.77)
Leverage 0.0143*** -0.125*** -0.00172 -0.0795*
(4.60) (-2.81) (-0.12) (-1.78)
Consumer Sentiment Index -0.000205*** 0.00900*** 0.000900*** 0.00957***
(-3.28) (8.79) (2.62) (9.56)
Leading Index 0.00445*** -0.0709*** -0.0134*** -0.0917***
(4.50) (-4.41) (-2.73) (-5.84)
Real GDP Growth 0.0000234 0.0146*** 0.00478*** 0.0126***
(0.09) (3.12) (3.29) (2.92)
CS return SD 0.00700 0.530** 0.309*** 0.418**
(0.55) (2.51) (4.14) (2.02)
VXO 0.000788*** -0.00328** 0.000226 -0.00290*
(7.80) (-2.07) (0.45) (-1.91)
CS profit growth SD -0.0000511*** 0.000360*** 0.00000258 0.000380***
(-6.13) (2.89) (0.06) (3.18)
JLN_Uncertainty -0.00158 -0.413** -0.122** -0.406**
(-0.13) (-2.21) (-1.97) (-2.39)
JLN_Fin_Uncertainty -0.0854*** 0.294 -0.105 -0.141
(-5.33) (1.18) (-1.28) (-0.59)
Sales Growth -0.0284** -0.00486 -0.0512***
(-1.96) (-0.96) (-3.81)
Firm SD 0.000111** -0.00000251 0.0000619
(2.37) (-0.18) (1.41)
Capital Expenditure -0.246** -0.0432 -0.252**
(-2.22) (-1.29) (-2.39)
lnKL 0.0633*** 0.0131*** 0.0578***
(3.55) (2.66) (3.12)
R&D 0.454*** 0.0839** 0.436***
(3.44) (1.98) (3.39)
R&D Dummy -0.0106 0.00313 -0.00630
(-0.28) (0.54) (-0.16)
Trend 0.000195 -0.0104*** 0.00233** -0.00938***
(1.31) (-3.51) (2.47) (-3.18)
N 53,529 36,777 36,777 36,777
adj. R2 0.788 0.794 0.496 0.813
r2_within 0.0970 0.0346 0.0141 0.0382
Firm FE&Firm&Year Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.6: The Subcomponents of The Policy Uncertainty Index
The table summaries the results by replacing the overall level of policy uncertainty index to its
subcomponents. The regression is specified following equation (2): yit =αi+β1PUt−1+δPUt−1×
JVi,t−4,t−1+β2JVi,t−4,t−1+β3Controli,t +β4Controli,t−1+β5Mt−1+εit (2). PU is measured by the
sub-components of BBD index as specified in the first row of each column. In Panel A, ln(1+NJV )
is measured as the total number of R&D joint ventures for firm i from t-4 to t-1. In Panel B,
ln(1+N partners) is measured as the total number of business partners who have established R&D
joint ventures with firm i from t-4 to t-1. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm transfer
of the number of patent grants. The sample contains all innovative firms, defined as those with
at least one patent in history. Appendix A summarizes the definitions for the variables in details.
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively.
News Gov. Spend CPI Tax
Panel A: the number of joint ventures
PU 0.141*** -0.0661*** -0.0234 -0.00452
(4.91) (-3.29) (-0.88) (-0.83)
ln(1+NJV ) 1.206*** 1.008*** 3.043*** 0.169**
(2.81) (3.10) (3.47) (2.00)
PU × ln(1+NJV ) -0.257*** -0.218*** -0.672*** -0.0406*
(-2.71) (-2.95) (-3.41) (-1.79)
N 36,777 36,777 36,777 36,777
adj. R2 0.794 0.794 0.794 0.794
r2_within 0.0337 0.0342 0.0342 0.0331
Panel B: number of partners
PU 0.142*** -0.0658*** -0.0225 -0.00444
(4.95) (-3.27) (-0.84) (-0.82)
ln(1+N partners) 0.819*** 0.681*** 2.025*** 0.113**
(2.87) (3.13) (3.54) (2.06)
PU × ln(1+N partners) -0.174*** -0.146*** -0.447*** -0.0265*
(-2.76) (-2.99) (-3.48) (-1.78)
N 36,777 36,777 36,777 36,777
adj. R2 0.794 0.794 0.794 0.794
r2_within 0.0337 0.0342 0.0342 0.0331
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm&Year Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.7: The Influence Over Time
This table summarizes the results of the influence of R&D joint ventures over time. The tests are
estimated following the speficiation of equation (2):In(1+ npat)it∗ = αi + β1PUt−1 + δPUt−1 ×
JVi,t−4,t−1+β2JVi,t−4,t−1+β3Controli,t∗+β4Controli,t∗−1+β5Mt∗−1+εit∗ (2). Policy uncertainty
is measured as the overall level of the BBD index. In Panel A, ln(1+NJV ) is measured as the
cumulative number of R&D joint ventures for firm i from t-4 to t-1. In Panel B, ln(1+N partners)
is measured as the total number of partners who have established at least one R&D joint venture
with firm i from t-4 to t-1. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm transfer of the number
of patent grants in year t, t+1, t+2, t+3,t+4,t+5. All specifications include firm-level controls and
macroeconomic controls that are related to the dependent variable simultaneously or with a one-
year lag. Appendix A summarizes the definitions in details. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
npatt npatt+1 npatt+2 npatt+3 npatt+4 npatt+5
Panel A
PU 0.0447*** 0.167*** 0.0267 0.0285 0.0662*** -0.0192
(2.91) (6.79) (1.59) (1.45) (3.85) (-1.09)
ln(1+NJV ) 1.212*** 1.266*** 1.110*** 0.637** 0.404 0.323
(3.63) (3.97) (4.06) (2.07) (1.37) (1.09)
PU × ln(1+NJV ) -0.267*** -0.272*** -0.237*** -0.133* -0.0809 -0.0596
(-3.57) (-3.83) (-3.91) (-1.95) (-1.25) (-0.92)
N 36,777 36,777 36,469 34,270 31,599 29,049
adj. R2 0.794 0.794 0.795 0.801 0.808 0.815
r2_within 0.0337 0.0346 0.0338 0.0336 0.0330 0.0325
Panel B: Number of partners
PU 0.0452*** 0.167*** 0.0267 0.0281 0.0663*** -0.0197
(2.94) (6.80) (1.58) (1.43) (3.85) (-1.12)
ln(1+N partners) 0.843*** 0.847*** 0.729*** 0.400* 0.261 0.171
(3.79) (3.98) (3.91) (1.89) (1.30) (0.83)
PU × ln(1+N partners) -0.184*** -0.181*** -0.156*** -0.0829* -0.0527 -0.0308
(-3.71) (-3.84) (-3.77) (-1.76) (-1.19) (-0.69)
N 36,777 36,777 36,469 34,270 31,599 29,049
adj. R2 0.794 0.794 0.795 0.801 0.808 0.815
r2_within 0.0337 0.0346 0.0337 0.0335 0.0330 0.0324
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm&Year cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.8: Robustness Checks
This table summarizes the results for robustness checks. Column (1) summarizes the results of
the second statge from 2SLS where the partisan conflict index of Azzimonti (2016) is used as an
instrumental variable for the overall level of BBD index. All the macroeconomic variables and
the annual averages of the firm-level controls in the main regression are included in the first stage.
F-statistics for the first stage regression is reported on row 8. In column (2), the dependent variable
is the natural logarithm transfer of one plus the total number of new patent applications for firm i
at time t. In column (3), the dependent variable is the number of new patent grants. Interactions
of the joint-venture measures and firms’ investment opportunities (Market to Book ratio, sales
growth, cash flow) are added as additional controls. All the regressions follow the specification
of column (2) in Table 4 and Table 5 on the sample of innovative firms. Appendix A summarizes
the definitions for the variables in details. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Instrument Variable Total application Interaction
Panel A: the number of joint ventures
PU 0.145*** 0.188*** 0.169***
(4.10) (7.50) (6.85)
ln(1+NJV ) 1.967*** 1.179*** 1.352***
(3.54) (3.72) (3.99)
PU × ln(1+NJV ) -0.427*** -0.257*** -0.282***
(-3.45) (-3.62) (-3.91)
Panel B: number of partners
PU 0.146*** 0.188*** 0.169***
(4.14) (7.51) (6.85)
ln(1+N partners) 1.326*** 0.794*** 0.895***
(3.60) (3.73) (3.98)
PU × ln(1+N partners) -0.287*** -0.172*** -0.187***
(-3.51) (-3.63) (-3.88)
First stage F 18.45
N 36,777 36,777 36,777
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm&Year Cluster Yes Yes Yes
Firms’ opportunities interaction No No Yes
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Table 2.9: Competition-Reduction Joint Ventures and Supplementary Joint Ventures
This table summarizes the tests for the mechanism by separating joint ventures into competition-
reduction ones and supplementary ones. The estimation is specified following equaiton (3):In(1+
npat)it = αi + β1PUt−1 + δ1PUt−1 × JV0,i,t−4,t−1 + β2JV0,i,t−4,t−1 + δ2PUt−1 × JV1,i,t−4,t−1 +
β3JV1,t,t−4,t−1 +β4Controli,t +β5Controli,t−1 +β6Mt−1 + εit (3). The test is based on a subsam-
ple of innovative firms (firms with at least on patent application in history) that have at least one
R&D joint venture in the year t-4 to t-1. JV0,t,t−4,t−1 represents competition reduction (CR) joint
ventures and JV1,t,t−4,t−1 represents the supplimentary (SU) type measures. Firms are defined as
competitors if they share the same 4-digit SIC code and supplements if they are not defined as
competitiors. The joint venture is defined as the competition-reduction (supplementary) joint ven-
ture if 50% of the participants are competitors (supplements) of the firm. In panel A, JV0,t,t−4,t−1
(JV1,t,t−4,t−1 ) is measured as the number of CR (SU) joint ventures within window t-4 to t-1. In
panel B it is measured as the total number of competitors (supplements) that have participated in
at least one R&D joint ventures of firm i from t-4 to t-1. PU (policy uncertainty) is measured as
either the overall BBD index (column 2) or the subcomponents (column 3 to 6). Controls are the
same as specified in previous tables. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Overall News Gov. Spend CPI Tax
Panel A
PU 0.368 -0.194 -0.245 -1.086 -0.0493
(1.07) (-0.47) (-0.82) (-1.68) (-0.46)
ln(1+NJVC) 2.242*** 3.616*** 1.989*** 6.794*** 0.296
(3.07) (2.95) (3.11) (3.14) (1.68)
ln(1+NJV S) 0.803 0.0984 0.319 -2.036 0.0490
(0.92) (0.07) (0.47) (-1.01) (0.19)
PUt−1 × ln(1+NJVC) -0.442*** -0.743*** -0.392*** -1.470*** -0.0152
(-2.96) (-2.86) (-3.16) (-3.10) (-0.32)
PUt−1 × ln(1+NJV S) -0.164 -0.00968 -0.0587 0.464 0.00368
(-0.86) (-0.03) (-0.39) (1.04) (0.06)
N 1,012 1,012 1,012 1,012 1,012
adj R2 0.855 0.855 0.856 0.857 0.854
within_r2 0.134 0.137 0.139 0.147 0.129
Panel B
PU 0.382 -0.136 -0.178 -0.951 -0.0391
(1.23) (-0.36) (-0.60) (-1.64) (-0.37)
ln(1+NPartnersc) 1.848** 3.040** 1.750*** 6.449*** 0.172
(2.46) (2.63) (3.12) (4.10) (1.20)
ln(1+NPartnerss) 0.771 0.193 0.438 -1.636 0.0713
(1.03) (0.18) (0.75) (-1.05) (0.36)
PUt−1 × ln(1+NPartnersc) -0.366** -0.634** -0.345*** -1.404*** -0.000355
(-2.32) (-2.57) (-2.94) (-4.04) (-0.01)
PUt−1 × ln(1+NPartnerss) -0.153 -0.0286 -0.0816 0.376 0.00162
(-0.94) (-0.12) (-0.62) (1.09) (0.03)
N 1,012 1,012 1,012 1,012 1,012
adj. R2 0.855 0.856 0.857 0.857 0.854
r2_within 0.137 0.138 0.145 0.150 0.128
Macro and Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm&Year cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.10: Foreign and Domestic Joint Ventures
This table summarizes the tests for the mechanism by separating joint ventures into domestic-
dominant ones and foreign-dominant ones. The estimation is specified following equa-
tion (3):In(1 + npat)it = αi + β1PUt−1 + δ1PUt−1 × JV0,i,t−4,t−1 + β2JV0,i,t−4,t−1 + δ2PUt−1 ×
JV1,i,t−4,t−1 +β3JV1,t,t−4,t−1 +β4Controli,t +β5Controli,t−1 +β6Mt−1 + εit (3). The test is based
on a subsample of innovative firms (firms with at least on patent application in history) that have at
least one R&D joint venture in the year t-4 to t-1. JV0,t,t−4,t−1 represents domestic-dominant joint
venture measures and JV1,t,t−4,t−1 represent the foreign-dominant joint venture measures relatively.
Firms are defined as domestic (foreign) firms if they are reported as U.S. firms (Non-U.S. firms )
in the SDC database and the joint venture is defined as a domestic-dominant (foreign-dominant)
joint venture is 50% of the participants are domestic firms (foreign firms). In panel A, JV0,t,t−4,t−1
(JV1,t,t−4,t−1 ) is measured as the cumulative number of domestic-dominant (foreign-dominant)
joint ventures. In panel B it is measured as the total number of domestic firms (foreign firms) that
have participated in at least one R&D joint ventures of firm i from t-4 to t-1. PU (policy uncer-
tainty) is measured as either the overall BBD index (column 2) or the subcomponents (column 3
to 6). Controls are the same as specified in previous tables. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Overall News Gov. Spend CPI Tax
Panel A
PU 0.230** 0.0322 -0.103 -0.0853 0.0136
(2.56) (0.25) (-0.92) (-0.43) (0.34)
ln(1+NJV F) 0.103 -0.214 0.277 1.365 -0.0385
(0.17) (-0.28) (0.35) (0.80) (-0.23)
ln(1+NJV D) 1.290** 1.552* 0.795* 2.376* 0.360**
(2.55) (1.94) (1.75) (1.83) (2.45)
PU × ln(1+NJV F) -0.0185 0.0510 -0.0580 -0.300 0.0186
(-0.13) (0.30) (-0.32) (-0.77) (0.43)
PU × ln(1+NJV D) -0.284** -0.339* -0.176 -0.531* -0.111**
(-2.57) (-1.94) (-1.70) (-1.82) (-2.57)
N 4,364 4,364 4,364 4,364 4,364
adj. R2 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.848
r2_within 0.0623 0.0610 0.0619 0.0633 0.0650
Panel B
PU 0.226** 0.0293 -0.0982 -0.0841 0.00588
(2.56) (0.23) (-0.88) (-0.44) (0.15)
ln(1+NPartners f ) 0.363 -0.144 0.501 1.551 -0.0897
(0.69) (-0.20) (0.86) (1.11) (-0.68)
ln(1+NPartnersd) 0.936* 1.291* 0.618 1.880 0.282**
(2.05) (1.89) (1.53) (1.63) (2.48)
PU × ln(1+NPartner f ) -0.0787 0.0316 -0.111 -0.346 0.0278
(-0.67) (0.20) (-0.84) (-1.09) (0.79)
PU × ln(1+NPartnerd) -0.205* -0.281* -0.135 -0.418 -0.0864**
(-2.04) (-1.87) (-1.46) (-1.61) (-2.53)
N 4,364 4,364 4,364 4,364 4,364
adj. R2 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.848 0.847
within_r2 0.0620 0.0608 0.0627 0.0637 0.0633
Macro and Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm&Year cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.11: The Impact of Product Market Competition
The table summarizes the results for the heterogeneity test in terms of market competition which
is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of sales for each 3-digit SIC industry. In the first
two columns I re-estimate the equation (2) on a subsample of innovative firms with high compe-
tition and a subsample of innovative firm-year with low competition. High (Low) competition is
defined as any firm-year observations with a lower (higher)-than-median value of the HHI. The
last column summarizes the results for the interaction terms following the the specification of
equation (4) on a sample of innovative firms (firms with at least one patent application in history)
yit = αi +β1PUt−1 +β2JVi,t−4,t−1 +β3HHIi,t−1 +δ1PUt−1 × JVi,t−4,t−1 +δ2PUt−1 ×Dumhit−1 +
δ3JVi,t−4,t−1×Dumhit−1+γPUt−1×JVi,t−4,t−1×Dumhit−1+β3Controli,t +β4Controli,t−1+β5Mt−1+
εit (4). Dumht is equal to one if the value of HHI for the firm-year observations is in the lower 50%
of the overall innovative firms sample and zero otherwise. Firm Controls and Macroeconomic
Controls are the same as in Table 3. The dependent variable is the number of firms’ patent grants.
PU is measured as the news component of BBD index following Gulen and Ion (2016). Appendix
A summarizes the definitions for the variables in details. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,
** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2.11: The Impact of Product Market Competition
Hi-Competition Low-Competition Interaction
Panel A Number of R&D joint ventures
PU 0.159*** 0.114*** 0.137***
(3.66) (2.88) (4.75)
ln(1+NJV) 0.616 2.006** 2.453***
(1.31) (2.27) (2.82)






PU × ln(1+NJV )×Dumh 0.418*
(1.84)
N 17,945 18,516 36,777
adj. R2 0.796 0.808 0.794
r2_within 0.0373 0.0347 0.0340
Panel B Number of Partners
PU 0.159*** 0.115*** 0.138***
(3.67) (2.90) (4.78)
ln(1+Npartners) 0.399 1.315** 1.645***
(1.24) (2.32) (2.94)






PU × ln(1+N partners)×Dumh 0.281*
(1.90)
N 17,945 18,516 36,777
adj. R2 0.796 0.808 0.794
r2_within 0.0373 0.0346 0.0340
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic and Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm&Year Cluster Yes Yes Yes
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions
Below is the sources and definitions of the main variables used in this paper.
A.1 Joint Venture Measures
The section summarizes the definitions for the R&D joint venture measures. A natural logarithm
is taken for all the measures to control for skewness. One joint venture is defined into 4 different
types. The joint venture is defined as a competition-reduction joint venture if at least 50% of the
participants are the industry competitors of firm i and supplementary if otherwise. (industry is
defined following the 4-digit SIC code). The joint venture is defined as a foreign -dominant joint
venture if at least 50% of the participants are non-U.S. firms and a domestic-dominant joint venture
if otherwise. The business partner is defined as firms that participate in R&D joint ventures of firm
i. The measures are generated using all the completed R&D joint ventures that are reported in SDC
database within the test period.
1. Ln(1+NJV ): the cumulative number of completed R&D joint ventures for firm i from year
t-4 to year t-1.
2. ln(1+NJV S): the cumulative number of supplementary type R&D joint ventures for firm i
from year t-4 to year t-1.
3. ln(1+NJVC): the cumulative number of competition-reduction type R&D joint ventures
for firm i from year t-4 to year t-1.
4. ln(1+NJV F): the cumulative number of foreign-dominant R&D joint ventures for firm i
from year t-4 to year t-1.
5. ln(1+NJV D): the cumulative number of domestic-dominant R&D joint ventures for firm i
from year t-4 to year t-1.
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6. Ln(1+N partners): the cumulative number of business partners for firm i from year t-4 to
year t-1.
7. ln(1+NPartnersc): the cumulative number of competitors for firm i from year t-4 to year
t-1.
8. ln(1+NPartnerss): the cumulative number of non-competitive partners for firm i from year
t-4 to year t-1.
9. ln(1+NPartnersd): the cumulative number of domestic partners for firm i from year t-4 to
year t-1.
10. ln(1+NPartners f ): the cumulative number of foreign partners for firm i from year t-4 to
year t-1.
A.2 Macro Level Controls
The following variables are used to control for the overall investment opportunities and uncertainty
of the economy. For data that is not reported annually, I match the calendar dates to firms’ fiscal-
year and take the arithmetic mean each year.
1. Real GDP growth: the data is from Federal Reserve Economic Database14. It is a quarterly
data but annualized and seasonally adjusted. I match the data to firms’ fiscal year by quarter.
2. Consumer sentiment index: the monthly, survey-based index of consumer sentiment devel-
oped by the University of Michigan15
3. VIX: Daily Volatility Index (VIX) from Chicago Board Options Exchange.
14https://fred.stlouisfed.org/
15http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/
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4. CS return SD: following Gulen and Ion (2016). It is measured as the cross-sectional standard
deviation of firm-level monthly stock returns. It is used to measure overall equity market
uncertainty.
5. CS profit SD: the cross-sectional standard deviation of firm-level profit growth which is
measured as the annual growth rate of ROA.
6. VXO index: daily index of implied volatility based on S&P 100 Options. It is released by
the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE).
7. Leading economic indicator: an national index from the Conference Board to measure future
economic activity.
8. JLN_Uncertainty: Macroeconomic uncertainty index following Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng
(2015). It is generated from the unforeseeable component in a system of 279 macroeconomic
variables.
9. JLN_fin_Uncertainty: financial uncertainty index following Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015).
10. Eindex: Uncertainty index following Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2014) that is constructed
by the first component of 8 macroeconomic risk factors.
A.3 Industry Level Controls
1. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: the sum of squared market shares of all firms,based on sales,in
a given three-digit SIC industry in each year.
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A.4 Firm Level Controls
The overall sample contains firms that are listed on the main exchange (NYSE, AMEX and NAS-
DAQ), following the literature, I exclude financial firms (sic 6000-7000) and utilities (sic 4900 to
5000) and firms with negative book assets and firms whose stock price is lower than 5. For tests
that use R&D as dependent variable, I include firm-year data with non-missing reported R&D; For
tests with patent based dependent variable, I use a sample of firms who report at least one patent
application in history. The data ranges from 1989 to 2014. The financial information and stock
informaiton come from Compustat annual file and CRSP. R&D joint venture comes from SDC
database. All the variables are winsorized at the lst and 99th percentiles.
1. CAPXit/Ai,t−1 is the measure of capital expenditure over beginning year Total asset.
2. Size: natural logarithm of sales (SALE) measured in 2005 U.S. dollars.
3. Cash flow: The sum of Income Before Extraordinary items (IB) and Depreciation and Amor-
tization (DP) over Total asset (AT) at the beginning of the fiscal year.
4. Sales growth: percentage change in sales (Compustat annual item SALE).
5. Market-to-Book: market value of equity divided by book value of equity. Market value of
equity is the share price (Compustat annual item PRCC_F) times common shares outstanding
(item CSHO). Book value of equity is shareholders’ equity (item SEQ) minus preferred stock
plus deferred taxes (item TXDITC). I measure the preferred stock using liquidation value
(item PSTKL), redemption value (item PSTKR) or carrying value (item PSTK) in order,
depending on availability. If SEQ is missing, I measure book value of equity as common
equity (item CEQ) plus the carrying value of preferred stock (item PSTK). Finally, if CEQ is
missing, I measure book value of equity as total assets (item AT) minus total liabilities (item
LT). I use the lag of market to book in the regression.
6. Book leverage: the sum of long term debt (Compustat annual item DLTT) and debt in current
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liabilities (item DLC) over total assets (item AT), I use the lagged book leverage in the
regression.
7. R&D: Research and Development Expense (XRD) over Sales (SALE), replace XRD to zero
if missing.
8. R&D missing Dummy: equal to one if Research and Development Expense (XRD) is miss-
ing.
9. Tangibility: Property, Plant and Equipment (PPENT) over Total assets (AT), I use the lagged
book leverage in the regression.
10. Age: natural logarithm of the number of years when firm i is in the Compustat database.
11. The standard deviation of firms’ stock returns : Std. Deviation of Daily stock returns for
each fiscal year.
12. Capital to labor ratio (Ln(K/L)): following Amore, Schneider and Žaldokas (2013). It is the
logarithm of property, plants, and equipment (PPENT) over the number of employees.
Appendix B: Additional Tables
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Table 2.13: Appendix B-Tables: The Impact of Joint Ventures During the Period of Uncertainty
The table summarizes the effect of R&D joint ventures using alternative uncertainty mea-
sures. All the columns follow the specification as equation (2) yit = αi + β1PUt−1 + δPUt−1 ×
JVi,t−4,t−1 + β2JVi,t−4,t−1 + β3Controli,t + β4Controli,t−1 + β5Mt−1 + εit (2), the dependent vari-
able is R&D investment. The uncertainty measures are specified on the first row of each col-
umn, including the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX), The CBOE S&P 100 Volatility Index (VXO),
JLN_Uncertainty and JLN_Fin_Uncertainty index following Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015),
Euindex is the first component of 8 macroeconomic risk factors following Bali, Brown, and Caglayan
(2014) and policy uncertainty measure is the overall level of BBD index. Uncertainty_first_factor
is the first component of all the uncertainty measures mentioned in the previous columns. Uncer-
tainty_first_factor2 is the first component that exlude Euindex and VIX as both are not available
in early 1987. Macroeconomics controls Mt−1 include leading Index, Consumer sentiment index
and real GDP growth. All the firm-level controls are the same as in Table 2.3. Detailed variable
definitions can be found in Appendix A. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Ripple Effect of Patent Litigation Shock
3.1 Introduction
Patent case filings in U.S. district courts have been rising at an alarming rate since 2009. According
to RPX’s patent litigation report of 2015, the number of filings is more than doubled from about
2000 in the year 2000 to over 5000 in the year 2015 and the number of defendants increased by
60% at the same time. Such a trend concerns both scholars and policy makers1.
Most of the researches on the real impact of patent infringements focus upon the suffering of
the defendants. For firms, getting involved in patent litigation lawsuits is costly. Letting alone the
direct costs of legal fees and the possible payment to settle the suits, the indirect costs include the
sunk cost of firms’ R&D, the shutdown of production and sales, the influence on firms’ reputation
1In 2013, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported the factors that affect the trend
of patent infringement litigation so as to respond to a congressional mandate in Section 34 of Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act of 2011 (AIA). In June 2016, GAO issued a new report on intellectual property in which they review the
patent litigation trend and recommend a consistent definition of patent quality, reassess the examination incentives
and improve clarity. Both have motivated the United States Pat net and Trademark Office (USPTO) to carry out
investigations and issue guidance to ensure consistency in the patent examination process. Several laws were passed by
the United States Congress during the period, including the American Inventor’s Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA), The
Coorperative Research and Technology Enhancement Act of 2004 (CREATE) and the leahy-Smith America Invents
Act of 2011 (AIA) that change the system from “first to invent” to “ first inventor to file”. Several reform bills are under
discussion. On Jue 4th 2015, the Senate Judiciary Committee votes 12-4 in favor of the Protecting American Talent
and Entrepreneurship Act (PATENT). Moreover, the innovation act bill has been introduced to both 113th and 114th
U.S. Congress that aim to reduce the patent litigation under the new AIA law and the House Judiciary Committee
voted 24-8 in favor of the act on June 11, 2015.
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that leads to the possible loss in business and potential customers and a higher cost of capital arising
from higher risk of future litigations. Using stock market event studies around patent lawsuits
filings, Bessen and Meurer (2012) focus on the sample of public firms who are involved in patent
litigations and suggest that the cost is over $16 billion per year for alleged infringers by the late
1990s. The work is followed by Henry (2013) who finds that if a firm loses a patent litigation
lawsuit, it will suffer a loss of about 0.85% of its value but just gains 0.7% if it wins. The situation
is even worse as emphasized by a growing number of papers that explore the influence of non-
practicing entities (NPE)2 -initiated litigation. Bessen and Meurer (2012) find the loss of wealth
is more than 83 billion per year for NPE targeted defendants from 2006 to 2010. Moreover, firms
reduce their research and development (R&D) investment substantially after settling or losing the
lawsuit with NPEs as discussed by Cohen, Gurun and Kominers (2014).
However, as Marco et al. (2015), Marco and Miller (2018) point out, the average patent has
never been involved in litigation disputes and the number of disputed patents or firms are rela-
tively small, which suggest that the majority of firms in the market are only potential-infringers
(infringees), making innovation decision as observing their industry peers suffering from patent
litigation challenges. In this paper, I explore how firms respond to industry-wide patent litigation
risk, when they find their industry peers involved in patent lawsuits, in their choice of research and
development (R&D) investment and patent filings, whether or not firms themselves are involved in
any patent lawsuits.
Compared to the negative effect of a firm’s own litigation suffering, the peer effects of patent
litigation is not certainly completely negative. First, the threat enhances firms’ awareness of intel-
lectual property rights protection, which motivates them to file more patents, especially for their
high-quality innovation projects, so as to get their R&D protected. Second, firms can take advan-
tage of peer’s suffering by increasing R&D and holding more patents in order to obtain a favorable
position in future competitions. In spite of that, the negative effect is also plausible. As is implied
2Non-practicing entity (NPE), the entity that specializes in the ownership, licensing and enforcement of patent
rights. Among all, one type of NPE named patent assertion entities (PAEs) is also referred to as “patent troll”. It
is defined as firms that do not produce end products or services but primarily acquire patents and seek to generate
revenue by asserting against accused infringers (Federal Trade Commission definition).
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by the real option theory3, firms postpone their investment when uncertainty increases the value
of flexibility, especially when the investment is irreversible. If R&D investment requires a high
upfront irreversible expense, firms are prone to delay their R&D when litigations on its peers lead
to overall uncertainty. In addition, if firms make their investment decisions only based on their
own investment opportunities, they may not respond to peers’ situations at all. In view of these
possibilities, how firms respond to peers’ litigation risk is an empirical question.
Using the patent litigation data from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO),
I generate two types of peer patent litigation measures. The first one captures litigation frequency
which is measured as the number of patent-infringement cases that peer firms get involved in at
time t. The second measure captures the span of influence which is defined as the number of peers
that get involved in at least one patent litigation infringement in the industry over the total number
of firms in the industry in year t. Since the identification comes from the exogeneity of which
peer firms get involved in patent lawsuits, the only endogenous problem I need to deal with is to
make sure the peers’ litigation measure does not contain a link with the firm’s own litigation risk
and does not contain the firm’s responses to the changes of other characteristics of its peers. To
alleviate the first concern, I exclude all the patent infringement cases that contain both the firm and
its peers to generate the frequency-type measure and I exclude the firm itself if it gets involved
in at least one case to generate the span-type measure. To alleviate the second concern, I follow
Leary and Roberts (2014) by controlling for the characteristics of both firms and their peers in all
the specifications.
The basic results show that firms’ innovation decisions are significantly influenced by the
industry-wide patent litigation risk. Firms increase their R&D investment and file more patents
after peers are involved in an increasing number of patent lawsuits and more and more peers are
getting in trouble. In terms of innovation quality, firms file more patents for their high-quality
3Bernanke (1983), who points out that high uncertainty gives firms an incentive to delay investment and hiring
when investment projects are costly to undo or workers are costly to hire and fire. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) offer a
review of the early theoretical literature. Empirically, Bloom (2009) find rapid drop and rebound in aggregate output
and employment around major shocks, Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta and Terry (2014) find that reasonably
calibrated uncertainty shocks can explain drops and rebounds in GDP of around 3%.
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projects as suggested by an increase in the total adjusted number of citations, originality and gen-
erality. The results of peer effect draw a completely different picture of the real impact of patent
litigation to firms compared with the existing literature which centers on the firm’s suffering while
being caught in. Similar results can be found here when turning into the impact of firms’ suffering
of their own litigation, as firms reduce R&D investment when caught in an infringement. In spite
of that, their responses to their peers’ litigation risk remain positive.
While the basic results show the effect of overall peers’ litigation risk, it is not clear whether
the results are driven by more peers being targeted or more peer asserters arising in the market.
In particular, it is not clear whether firms respond differently to non-practicing entities (NPEs)-
initiated risk and practicing entities (PEs)-initiated risk. According to RPX’s reports on NPEs
activities, NPEs play a leading role in patent lawsuits, which rises from 26% in the year 2008 to
70% in the year 2013 and maintains at 69% in the year 2015 4. An increasing number of papers
argue that NPEs play as evils in the patent system and lead to a huge loss to the defendants but
fail to transfer the benefits to small and individual investors. If NPE risk makes harm to the overall
industry innovation environment, I would expect a negative effect if more peers are targeted by
NPEs. To address the first issue, I separate the span-type measure into the number of plaintiffs and
the number of defendants. The results show that the firms respond positively when more peers get
targeted but do not respond or even reduce their R&D when more peer asserters are playing in the
market. To explore the impact of NPE, I separate the peers’ litigation risk into NPE-initiated risk
and PE-initiated risk 5. Without an access to the full NPE database, I deal with the limitation in two
different ways. First, I define NPE firms as those that fail to be identified as public firms since the
majority of NPEs are private firms and they are always structured with many affiliates according to
Patent Assertion Entity Activity Report from Federal Trade Commission (2016). Second, I use the
4RPX is a defensive NPE company that buy patent license and share with all its members. It starts to report the
NPE activity quarterly and annually after acquiring Patent Freedom.
5Most of the papers that focus on the cost of NPEs center on the impact of patent assertion entities (PAEs) or
“patent trolls”. However, Both names are mixed up even though NPEs still include other defensive firms such as RPX
which do not belong to “patent trolls”. For example, Cohen, Gurun and Kominers (2014) test the characteritics and
cost of NPE-targeted firms, 87.98% of cases in their sample are PAE-initiated and 9.63% of patent litigation cases are
small inventor-initiated, In this paper, I report the results for both generally defined NPEs and PAEs in particular.
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Stanford NPE database that contains 20% randomly generated data from all NPE cases between
2000 and 2015. If let’s assume that the NPE-based peers’ litigation measure generated from the
random sample is proportional to the real measure, testing on these measures can lead to plausible
results. Both methods offer consistent results, demonstrating that firms respond significantly to
NPE initiated risk by increasing their R&D, increasing their patent filings and increasing their
filings for high-quality innovations. By contrast, the positive impact disappears for PE-initiated
peers’ litigation risk. As Cohen et al. (2014) point out PE litigation can hardly be explained by
common firms’ characteristics compared with NPE litigations. I would expect that the peer risk
initiated by PE is more idiosyncratic and case-specific. As a result, I cannot see firms respond to
the risk. Overall, I find a positive effect of peers’ patent litigation on firms’ innovation when the
risk reflects a growing number of peers being targeted.
What is driving the positive effect?
First, I consider whether it is related to changes in firms’ awareness of intellectual property
protection. The motivation comes from the seemly inconsistent results that defendants reduce their
R&D expenditure due to the litigation cost but at the same time increase their number of patents.
The inconsistency is likely to be explained as firms that previously held their R&D as “secrets”
are now asking for patent protection even though the litigation suffering lead to a reduction in
their R&D. I test the mechanism using a Probit model on a subsample of firms that report positive
R&D expenditure. The dependent variable is set to one if firms report positive R&D and have
filed any patents and zero otherwise. The results show that firms are more likely to file patents for
their R&D during the period of high industry-wide patent litigation threat. The results add a new
angle to understand the cost of litigation. As is discussed above, the literature emphasizes the high
cost of getting involved in patent lawsuits; the results in this paper demonstrate the externality.
More and more legal actions enhance firms’ awareness of intellectual property rights and motivate
the government to put emphasis on patent quality and improve the examination process. In the
end, firms increase their innovation investment and seek for high-quality projects which benefit the
whole society.
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Second, I explore whether firms respond differently if they are more likely to be targeted. The
literature suggests that startups (Chien (2011)) and the small and median-sized companies (Bessen
et al. (2012)) are more likely to be targeted and suffer higher litigation cost. Furthermore, firms
that are cash-rich or having on-going litigation issues are always targeted by NPEs (Cohen et al.
(2014)). If the positive effect reflects firms’ response to increasing litigation threat, the peer effect
should be stronger for firms that are smaller, younger, hold more cash and are currently caught in
other patent lawsuits. I find consistent results for the arguments.
Third, I investigate whether firms respond differently if they face a different level of industry
competition. I consider firms’ competition in both the product market, as is measured by prod-
uct similarity (fluidity measure following Hoberg, Phillips and Prabhala (2014)), and the patent
market, as is measured by industry patent density. If the positive effect is driven by firms taking
advantage of their peers’ suffering and gaining competitive power, I would expect higher R&D
and more patents for firms performing in a more competitive market. Nonetheless, if the positive
effect is driven by firms’ concern for litigation threat, I would expect weaker responses in R&D but
stronger responses in patent protection. When patents are concentratedly held by a small number
of firms, the overall litigation threat is lower as NPEs find it harder to get patents or license. Firms
facing higher patent density thus may have weaker responses. The threat story is largely borne out.
I find that firms facing higher product market competition have a weaker response in their R&D
but a stronger response in their patent filings. Moreover, firms facing a concentrated patent market
have weaker responses in both R&D and patents. Following the same logic, I explore whether the
response is different for firms who own a large portion of patents in certain technology classes. As
these firms are less sensitive to the litigation threat due to the ownership, they should have weaker
responses to their peers’ litigation risk. I find support for this argument.
Forth, I take a look at whether different manager incentives lead to different reactions to peers’
litigation risk. The results suggest that for firms whose managers have high pay-performance
sensitivity, they are less likely to increase overall R&D investment but are more prone to seek patent
protection, especially for their high-quality R&D projects. The results are consistent with the
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compensation literature (for example, Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006), Aggarwal and Samwick
(2006)) which argue that high pay-performance sensitivity motivates managers to take lower risk
investments due to the extra risk exposure. On the other hand, more option-based compensation
encourages managers to take more risk, as a result, I find no clear evidence that these managers
seek more patent protection.
Taken as a whole, the paper belongs to a few papers that shed light on the spillover effect
of patent litigation risk on firms’ innovation investment. It links to a newly developed literature
on the impact of patent litigation risk and the impact of NPEs and is related to a wider range
of literature on litigation risk. For example, Cohen, Gurun and Kominers (2014) find that NPE
litigation makes the targeted firms reduce their R&D after settling with or losing to NPEs. Bessen
and Meaurer (2012) and Henry (2013) use stock market event study around patent lawsuits filings
dates and find a high cost of being caught in a litigation case. Galasso et al. (2015) use the random
allocation of judges at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and find an increase in the
citations to focal patents, which they argue is entirely driven by the follow-on related innovation
from small firms triggered by the patent invalidity. This paper contributes to the picture by showing
a positive spillover effect of peer litigation risk for firms that are not caught in patent infringements
themselves. Related to this paper, Arena and Julio (2015) explore the effect of security class action
lawsuits on firms’ cash holding and find that firms increase their cash holdings and reduce capital
expenditures with higher litigation risk after controlling for the endogeneity issue with industry
peers litigation. Gande and Lewis (2009) find that losses are capitalized in stock price prior to
the shareholder-initiated lawsuit filing dates when investors react to peer cases. Papers also find
the influence of security litigation risk on firms’ IPO underpricing (Tinic (1988), Lowry and Shu
(2002), Walker et al. (2015)), executive compensation (Peng and Roell (2008)), cash holding
(Bolton et al. (2011), Malm and Kanuri (2017)), accounting disclosure (Bourveau et al. (2017)),
institution (Cheng et al. (2014)), leverage (Crane (2011)) and so on.
Apart from that, the paper belongs to the literature on firms’ innovation investments. The ex-
isting literature has explored a variety of factors that influence firms innovation. For example,
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tolerance of failure (for example, Manso (2011), Tian and Wang (2014), He and Tian (2013) ),
the cost of capital (for example, Fang, Tian and Tice (2014), Cornaggia et al. (2015)), financial
choice (for example, Ferreira, Manso and Silva (2012), Maksimovic and Pichler (2001)), finan-
cial situation (for example, Hall et al. (2015), Almeida, Hsu and Li (2013)), institutional holding
(for example, Aghion et al. (2013)), M&A (for example, Bena and Li (2014)) and so on. The
paper adds to the literature by providing a different factor that is related to firms’ patents filing
and firms’ awareness of patenting rights, i.e. the threat of industry-wide patent litigation risk. It is
not a paper that applauds for patent litigation but a paper that emphasizes a stronger awareness of
patent rights and a better patent system. In addition, as Maksimovic and Pichler (2001) point out,
competitive market motivates firms to do innovation but may also prohibit firms to do so if ask-
ing for patent protection requires them to disclose crucial innovation information to competitors.
Litigation suffering of their peers makes the benefit of patent protection outweigh the cost.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section2 I describe the data and main
variables. Section3 summarizes the discussion on the basic results and section 4 reports the robust-
ness tests.. In section 5 I extend the basic results and in section 6 I discuss the possible mechanisms
while section 7 concludes.
3.2 Data and Methodology
The empirical model of peer effect follows a linear specification of what is used throughout the
empirical peer effect literature (e.g. Leary and Roberts (2014)):
yi jt = α +β1lit−i jt−1 +β2liti jt−1 + γControli jt−1 + γ2Control−i jt−1 +δ µi +φνt + εi jt (3.1)
where the indices i, j, t correspond to firm, industry and year, respectively. The focus of this
paper is β1which implies firm i’s response if its peers are caught in patent lawsuits after controlling
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for a firm’s own litigation and other financial characteristics of both the firm and its peers. The
model is estimated with year fixed effect and firm fixed effect, represented by µi and νt , to control
for common shocks that are specific to firm and year. εi jt , the specific error of firm i, is assumed
to be correlated within firms and heteroskedastic and thus is clustered at the firm level. Peers are
defined as firms that operate in the same Fama French 48 industry as firm i in the baseline test.
3.2.1 Litigation Data
I obtain information on patent infringement lawsuits from the patent litigation data pilot conducted
by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). According to Marco, Teafayesus and
Toole (2017), the data cover all docket reports on patent litigation cases from Public Access to
Court Electronic Records (PACER) database and RECAP which provide all cases litigated in US
district courts. The database includes a nearly complete patent litigation cases from 1999 up to
20156. I include lawsuits that are directly related to patents infringement and validity following
Allison, Lemley and Schwartz (2014), Hentry (2012), Bessen and Meurer (2012) et al.7. The
database is linked to the Compustat database by the firm name and the case filing year following
the algorithm of Bessen (2009) and Bernstein, Giroud and Townsend (2016). To get enough firms’
financial information, I only include lawsuits with at least one U.S. publicly-listed firm involved in
and end up with 15,099 such cases in total.
There are a couple of limitations on the data. First, litigation outcomes for these lawsuits are
not available, making it impossible to separate cases that request a jury trial from those that get
settled beforehand 8. Second, the specific patent-in-suit is not available. This prevents me from
6The data covers from 1963 to 2015. But according to Marco, Teafayesus and Toole (2017), the coverage of pre-
1999 patent litigation cases “ is incomplete and decreases substantially going back in time from 1998”. In addition,
according to Marco and Miller (2016), earlier patents “may differ substantially from those issued under current prac-
tice” since several acts of legislation were passed recently starting from American Inventor’s Protection Act of 1999
that change the patenting system.
7Other types of litigation such as lawsuits caused by inventorship and licensing disputes, malpractice actions,
trademark infringements are available in the raw database. Including these infringements gives me similar results. The
data restriction is chosen following the patent litigation routine so as to make the results comparable for studies using
the RPX database.
8Even though the data contains variables like jury demand and settlement, they are missing for a significant number
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controlling for any patent specific characteristics. In addition, there is no distinction between non-
practicing entities (NPE) initiated lawsuits and practicing entity (PE) initiated ones.
To get more information on the effect of NPE, I use the Stanford NPE litigation Database
9 to generate NPE initiated litigation measure for section 5. The database contains all patent
lawsuits filed in U.S. district court. Moreover, the project researchers separate patent (s) asserting
parties into 13 categories based on the litigation literature10, which makes it possible to identify
NPE and PE initiated cases. Following the database guidelines, I define lawsuits as PE-initiated
if they belong to category 8 (Product company) and 12 (IP subsidiary of product company) and
NPE-initiated if they belong to other categories. In addition, to get the effect of patent assertion
entity (PAE), one type of NPE who assert patents against others, I narrow down the definition
of NPEs to lawsuits that belong to category 1 (Acquired patents), 4 (Corporate heritage) and 5
(Individual-inventor-started company) following the project report. By the end of 2017, only 20%
of all lawsuits (up to 10,800 lawsuits) are available for public download. Up until 2017, the 20%
random sample has been used by at least sixteen studies according to the database introduction and
proved to be working properly. Since the 20% sample is randomly generated, I assume that the
NPE and PE based litigation measures generated by the sample are proportional to the “true” ones.
To be consistent with the previous database, I only include lawsuits with at least one U.S. publicly
listed firms involved in and end up with 5,452 cases.
3.2.2 Patent Database
The existing patent database is not applicable to this study due to the limited data period. As
discussed above, the litigation data start from 1999. In the literature, there are three widely used
of the observations.
9https://law.stanford.edu/projects/stanford-npe-litigation-dataset/#slsnav-brief-dataset-methodology
10These categories include the following: 1. Acquired patents; 2. University heritage or tie; 3. Failed startup; 4.
Corporate heritage; 5. Individual-inventor-started company; 6. University/Government/Non-profit; 7. Startup, pre-
product; 8. Product company; 9. Individual; 10. Undetermined; 11. Industry consortium; 12. IP subsidiary of product
company; 13. Corporate-inventor-started company. Please refer to database guidelines Table 2 for detailed definition
CHAPTER 3. RIPPLE EFFECT OF PATENT LITIGATION SHOCK 140
patent databases. The NBER patent database covers all the applications granted from 1976 to 2006;
Kogan et al. (2017) patent database and the Harvard Patent Network database cover all granted
patents from 1976 to 2010. Taking into account the patent examination latency11, one may find that
the data from the last 2 or 3 years suffer severe truncation problem. Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1996),
Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001,2005) suggest to use distribution to adjust for the problem, but
each method has limitations as Lerner and Seru (2017) argue. If I drop the data from the last 2 or
3 years, my study fails to cover the period after 2007 when the majority of patent infringements
happen. As a consequence, it is important to have the patent data extended.
To achieve this, I gathered the weekly publications of newly granted patents and new patent
applications from U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and manually collected granted
utility patents and regular utility applications12 data starting from 2000 to January 31th 201713. The
data are merged to the Compustat database by the firm name following the same algorithm used
by the NBER patent database as explained in Bessen (2009) and Bernstein, Giroud and Townsend
(2016). In order to keep the consistency in firms’ identification, I use the NBER patent database
and the database of Kogan et al. (2017) for a double check and guarantee that firms that are
identified with a Compustat link in previous patent databases are also identified properly in the
extended database.
3.2.3 Financial Data
The financial data come from the Compustat database and the CRSP database and covers a period
from 1999 through 2015. Following the literature, I exclude financial firms (SIC 6000-7000) and
utilities (SIC 4900 to 5000) and firms with missing or negative book assets, I also restrict the sam-
ple to firms whose stock prices are higher than $5 and are traded on the main exchange (NYSE,
11On average approximately 3.2 years according to Farre-Mensa, Hegde and Ljungqvist (2016)
12There are also patents for designs and plants. The majority of patents for manufacturing firms are utility patents
so referring to utility patents only is used as a routine in the patent literature.
13To make it as a comprehensive database, I get the early data from the NBER patent database which contains the
patent granted within 1976 to 1999
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AMEX and NASDAQ) so as to get valid stock related measures. For tests whose dependent vari-
able is either patent or patent citation, I restrict the sample to innovative firms, i.e. firms with at
least one patent application in their history. For tests using R&D expenditure as the dependent
variable, I restrict the sample to firms that report non-missing R&D expenditure.
3.2.4 Litigation Measures
I consider two types of measures for litigation challenges to capture both the frequency and the
span of litigation threat. The first one is the number of lawsuits that peers (or firms) get involved
in. The second one is the number of peers involved in patent lawsuits. In situations when the
majority of patent lawsuits are centered on one or two peer firms, the frequency measure indicates
high industry-wide patent litigation threat but the span type measure indicates a low industry-wide
patent litigation threat.
Specifically, the peers’ litigation measures are generated as the following. For frequency type
measures, Peer ncase−i j is calculated as the number of lawsuits that happen to peer firms in year
t. To make the peer measure exogenous, I exclude those lawsuits that contain both firm i and its
peers. Peer groups are based on Fama-French 48 industries. For further robustness check, I change
the definition of industries into 2 digit SIC code and 3 digit SIC code in section 4. The span type
measure f irm−i j% is defined as the number of peers that have at least one patent infringement
lawsuits over the total number of firms in industry j. Moreover, I generate two related measures
based on whether firms are plaintiffs or defendants. Plainti f f f irm−i j% is the number of peers
that act as plaintiffs over the total number of firms in the industry j. De f endant f irm−i j% is the
number of peers that act as defendants over the total number of firms in the industry. j
To control for the firm’s own patent litigation risk, I generate the frequency type measure
for firm i itself. To be specific, ncaseit is defined as the number of infringement lawsuits that
firm i encounters in year t, nplainti f fit is the number of lawsuits when firm i is the plaintiff and
nde f endantit is the number of lawsuits when firm i is the original defendant. For robustness check,
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I also take a natural logarithm transfer of all frequency type measures to control for the skewness
and report the results in Appendix B Table B-5.
Despite the limitations of the database discussed before, the litigation measures are informative
in terms of the following sense: First, the peers’ litigation measures capture the general situation
of litigation risk in the overall industry. The litigation outcome does not really matter in this
sense. Second, litigation decisions are exogenous. Whether peer firms get involved in patent
infringement lawsuits with other public firms, private firms or individuals are not influenced by
firm i’s innovation strategy choice.
3.2.5 Patent and Application Based Measures
I look at the effect of peer’s patent litigation on firms’ R&D investments, defined as firms’ R&D
expenditure over the beginning-of-the-year total assets, as well as on firms’ innovation outputs,
defined as the total number of newly granted patents14.
The patent is linked to firms’ financial data with the earliest time it is filed with the government
to better identify the period when the real innovation decision is made. Most papers use the patent
application date, yet some applications are recorded even before that. Inventors can file priorities
for their innovations before they reach a stage for the official application. This will guarantee the
patenting priority for the near-simultaneous inventors who file applications for the same invention
in the future15. On average, 44% of the patents from US public firms have a priority date that
is earlier than the application date. In this study, in order to capture the earliest time when one
innovation project is shown to the government, the earliest priority year is replacing the applied
year in the measure generation while the application year is still used when priority date is not
14If one patent is assigned to multiple assignees, I treat it as one patent project for each of them so the measure
captures the number of patent projects the firms get involved in.
15The adjustments used in the paper also reflect the idea of Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA). It is
the most significant change to the U.S. patent system since 1952. The pass of the leahy-Smith America Invents Act
of 2011 (AIA) changes the U.S. innovation system from “first to invent” to “ first inventor to file”. It gives patenting
priority to inventors who disclose the idea publicly first instead of inventors who file applications first.
CHAPTER 3. RIPPLE EFFECT OF PATENT LITIGATION SHOCK 143
applicable. For robustness check, I also follow the literature and use patent application date to
match to firms’ financial data, the results are reported in Appendix Table B-2.
To see whether the results are driven by the truncation of the data or the successful rate of
patents, I also use the total number of all firms’ new applications as a robustness check. A natural
logarithm transfer is taken for both measures following the patent literature.16
In addition, I explore the effect of the peers’ litigation on firms’ innovation quality. I consider
three citation-based quality measures explained in the following subsections.
The first measure is the natural logarithm transfer of one plus the adjusted number of citation
following the literature (for example, Bena and Li (2014)). The adjusted number of citation is







The numerator is the total number forward citation (up until January 2017) made to firm i’s
patent p applied in year t 17that belongs to patent class c. The denominator is the median number
of forward citation (up until January 2017) made to patents that applied in year t and in patent
class c. Firm i’s adjusted citation in year t is the sum of adjusted citation for all its patents at time t.
Patent class (c) is the NBER two digit patent subclass following Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001)
and Marco et al. (2015).
The second and third measure follow Trajtenberg et al. (1997) which are used to indicate
technology breadth. A patent that cites a broader array of technology classes is viewed as having
greater originality and a patent that is cited by a broader array of technology classes is viewed as





16The publications for patent application filings have a latency of 18 months if firms have not filed for even longer
delay, the lag restricts my sample period to year 2015. Total application measure is different from granted patent
measure after year 2000.
17I use the application year because patents are able to be cited before it is granted but after it is officially filed.
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For Originality, Np is the total number of citations made by patent p, Npcis the number of
patents cited by patents that belong to class c. Firm-level Originality measure is the mean of
originality for all its patents in year t.
For Generality, Np is the total number of citations made to patent p, Npcis the number of
citations to patent p that are made by patents in class c. Firm-level Generality measure is the
mean of generality for all its patents in year t.
The number of citation is the cumulative number from the patent application date to January
31th 2017 and exclude the number of citations made by examiners. As citations made by examiners
during the examination process are not really noticed by the applicants, including them exaggerates
the patent influence. On average, patent loses 40% of its citations while excluding the citation from
examiners. As a robustness check, I also report the results for quality measures that are generated
by the overall cumulative citations in Appendix Table B-3.
3.2.6 Firm and Peer Characteristics
I include both peer average characteristics and firm-specific characteristics following Leary and
Roberts (2014). To be specific, peer characteristics are constructed as the average of all firms
in the same industry-year combination that excludes firm i; firm-specific characteristics represent
firm i’s value at fiscal year t or t-1 based on whether it comes from the balance sheet or income
statement.
Following the investment literature (for example, Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007) and Baker,
Stein, and Wurgler (2003)), I include the controls that influence firms’ R&D investment decisions
for all regressions with R&D as the yi jt : Market to Book ratio at t-1, Cash flow at time t for
both firms and peers. In addition, I also include peers’ average R&D expenditure to control for
the mimicking channel of investment strategy (Leary and Roberts (2014)). Following the patent
and innovation literature (example: He and Tian (2013), Tian and Wang (2014) and so on ), I
include additional controls that may affect firms’ innovation investment decisions for all regres-
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sions with patent-related measure as the yi jt : profitability (sales growth), firm-specific risk (the
standard deviation of firms’ daily stock return) firms’ investments (R&D, R&D indicator, capital
expenditure) and firms’ fundamental characteristics (size, tangibility at t-1, book leverage at t-1
and firm age). In addition, I further control for the industry competition faced by the firm using
sales-based Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and control for peers’ average number of patents to get
rid of the effect of the total number of patents on the probability of peers’ litigation cases. Detailed
definitions are summarized in Appendix A. Variables used throughout this study are presented after
winsorizing all ratios at 1st and 99th percentile to mitigate the influence of extreme observations.
Table 1 summarizes the statistics for the main litigation and innovation variables for the full
sample, innovative firm sample and a subsample of innovative firms year with no litigation chal-
lenges. The summary statistics for other variables are summarized in Appendix A. Table 1 shows
that innovative firms with more patents and high-quality patents are more likely to be caught in
litigation issue. It is consistent with what is found in Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001), Allison
(2009), Chien (2011) and so on. As Miller (2013) pointed out, high-quality patents possess strong
property rights and are more likely to be infringed. In addition, the high cost of litigation makes
low-quality patent less attractive. In Table A-1, innovative firms that are not involved in litigation
challenges have less cash. It is consistent with Cohen et al. (2014) who find that firms with large
cash stock are more likely to be targeted by NPE (non-practicing entities).
3.3 Baseline Results
In this section, I explore firms’ response to peers’ litigation risk following the specification of
equation (1). Frequency-type measures are used in Table 2 to 4 while span-type measures are used
in Table 5.
Table 2 presents the results for firms’ R&D investment. The estimated β1 implies that firms
reduce their R&D investment when they are plaintiffs but increase their R&D significantly when
CHAPTER 3. RIPPLE EFFECT OF PATENT LITIGATION SHOCK 146
peers get involved in patent infringement lawsuits. In terms of the magnitude, one standard de-
viation increase in peer lawsuits lead to 2.8% standard deviation change of firms’ R&D. As for
the control variables, the estimated coefficients for peer controls implies an interdependent R&D
strategy. The positive coefficient for peer R&D suggests that firms have higher R&D when peers
increase their R&D, which is consistent with the mimicking channel in Leary and Roberts (2014).
In addition, firms increase R&D investment when there are investment opportunities for both the
peers and the firms as suggested by the significant coefficients for the market to book ratio. How-
ever, the negative coefficient on cash flow measure indicates that firms reduce R&D investment
with higher cash flow, which is in line with the literature. One explanation is that high cash flow
leads to higher agency problem as pointed out by Jensen and Meckling (1976).
Table 3 presents the results for firms’ innovation outcome. The sample contains all innovative
firms, which is defined firms that have at least one patent application in history. The dependent
variable measures the number of innovations that finally get granted before January 2017, which
not only reflects how successful the firm’s innovations are, but also reflects how many innovation
projects are protected by patents. The positive estimated coefficients of the litigation measures
for both the firm and its peers imply that firms have more patent protected projects no matter
whether they face litigation challenges themselves or they find peers getting in trouble. In terms of
magnitude, the magnitude of peer effect is larger than the firm’s reaction to its own litigation issue
and is larger than the firm’s response to its own investment opportunities. As shown in Table 3,
one standard deviation increase in the number of patent lawsuits for firm i lead to 0.026% standard
deviation increase in the number of patents. One standard deviation increase in peer litigation
lead to 0.038% standard deviation increase in the number of patents. For the control variables,
the number of patents of peer firms has a positive and significant effect on the firm’s own patents.
Firms also have more innovation when good investment opportunities (measured by the market
to book ratio) exist for both firms themselves and their peers. One explanation for the positive
effect of peer volatility is that firms take advantage of increasing idiosyncratic risk of the peers by
increasing their own innovation. The negative coefficients for peer size and R&D imply that firms
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may avoid competition if their peers are in the dominating position.
Table 4 summarizes the results for firms’ innovation quality. Overall, firms choose higher
quality innovation projects if their peers have more patent lawsuits as suggested by the positive
and significant estimated β1. Or it can also be viewed as firms are prone to have their high quality
R&D protected as these valuable projects are more likely to be litigated (Marco et al. (2015),
Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001)). To be specific, the innovations chosen to be protected by
patents turn out to have more citations and have higher generality and originality when firms find
their peers getting into more patent litigation lawsuits. By contrast, firms do not choose better
projects when firms themselves are involved in patent litigation issue. The only exception is for
plaintiffs who choose more original projects afterwards.
Table 5 presents the results for peers’ litigation risk using span type measures. Panel A suggests
that firms increase R&D investment, ask for more patent protection and choose to protect higher
quality projects when more peers face litigation challenges. In Panel B, I separate the number
of peers into the number of plaintiffs and the number of defendants. The results suggest that the
positive effect mainly comes from the defendant side based on the significance of the estimated
coefficients. According to the results, firms reduce their innovation investment and choose to pro-
tect more original and general projects when they face an increasing number of peer asserters, but
the effect of plaintiffs is almost not significantly different from zero. By contrast, firms signifi-
cantly increase their innovation investment and seek more patent protection when they face more
peers being targeted. Two possible mechanisms help to explain the defendant-side effect. First,
firms strategically take advantage of peers’ suffering to expand. Second, firms feel the threat to
be targeted thus start to seek for high-quality projects and are more aware of the importance of
seeking for patent protection. In terms of the magnitudes, however, the wald tests suggest that the
coefficents are not significantly different from each other.
CHAPTER 3. RIPPLE EFFECT OF PATENT LITIGATION SHOCK 148
3.4 Robustness
In this section, I run several robustness tests to see the validity of the basic results. For brevity, I
only report the results for peer patent litigation measure, the results are summarized in table 6.
The identification threat comes from the link between firms’ own litigation challenges and
peers’ litigation challenges. As the peer measures exclude lawsuits that include firm i, the threat
is diminished to some extent. To avoid further concerns, I restrict the sample to firms that do not
have any patent lawsuits at time t-1 and re-exam the basic test. The results are reported in Panel A.
Moreover, I further restrict the sample to firms that never get involved in patent lawsuits and report
the re-estimated results in Panel B. Both results show that the peer measure remains predictive,
which suggest that the explanatory power of peer measure is not driven by the link through the
firm’s own litigation issue.
In addition, I explore whether the results are informative for different peer definitions. To be
specific, I change the definition of peers to firm 2-digits, 3-digits and 4-digits SIC industries. For
brevity, panel C reports the results for 2-digits SIC peers, there are 62 industries represented in the
innovative firm subsample. The results are consistent with basic tests. In unreported results, I find
similar results for span type measures.
Finally, I test whether the results are driven by the succesful rate of the patents. To be specific, I
change the dependent variable in Table 3 to the total number of applications by firm i. The measure
is generated using all announced applications on USPTO website as well as those that never get
announcement but eventually granted before January 2017. The results are summarized in Table
B-1. Overall, the successful rate of patent applications is not the main driving factors of the results.
3.5 Basic Results Extension
In this section, I separate the peer effect into non-practicing entities (NPE)-initiated litigation risk
and practicing entities (PE)-initiated litigation risk. Following Cohen, Gurun and Kominers (2014),
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I include patent infringement lawsuits in which the plaintiffs are either NPE or PE and the defen-
dants are publicly traded firms. Cohen et al. (2014) and Risch (2015) compare the behavior of
NPEs and PEs and find that NPEs tend to be more opportunistic by targeting firms who are more
willing and able to settle, they tend to have shorter litigation duration and twice as many invalida-
tions; their lawsuits are more firm-characteristics-driven than patent-characteristics-driven. Given
these facts, if peers are targeted by NPEs, I would expect firms to respond positively by seeking
more patent protection and filing patents for higher quality projects. Nevertheless, if peers are tar-
geted by PEs, the effect is not clear. On one hand, as PE cases are driven by patent characteristics,
I would expect no significant response from firms as the risk is idiosyncratic to peers’ patents. On
the other hand, a more aggressive PEs may spur a negative response from firms who want to avoid
patent race even though the litigation threat may motivate firms to get more patent protection. If
firms themselves are targeted by NPE, as discussed above, I would expect firms perform nega-
tively taking into consideration of the high litigation cost (Cohen, Guren and Kominers (2014),
Bessen and Meurer (2012), Bessen et al. (2014)). By contrast, if firms themselves are targeted by
PE, I would expect more severe negative response given the longer litigation duration and patent
idiosyncratic feature of the lawsuits.
The obstacle that hinders such an extension is to find a way to separate non-practicing entities
(NPEs)-initiated lawsuits from practicing entities (PEs)-initiated ones. According to RPX Corpo-
ration, whose NPE database is widely used in both academia and industry, the non-practicing entity
(NPEs) is defined as “A firm that derives the majority of its revenue from licensing and enforcement
of patents”. In the litigation literature, the other related term is called the patent assertion entity
(PAE). According to the Federal Trade Commission, PAE is defined as the firm that “primarily
acquires patents and seeks to generate revenue by asserting them against accused infringers.......
Patents are PAE’s principal assets; a PAE does not manufacture, distribute, or sell products.”. Even
though both terms are interchangeably used and referred to as “patent trolls” throughout the liter-
ature, it is important to clarify that patent assertion entity (PAEs) is just one type of NPEs which
perform as “patent trolls” as the latter also include universities, technology development compa-
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nies (see Stanford NPE database report) and defensive NPEs who acquire patents and share the
license to all its members so as to protect them from being targeted. (Such as RPX Corporation).
In this section, I explore the effect using both definitions. Without access to RPX’s database, I use
two conservative methods to handle the problem.
First, I take advantage of the difficulty for NPEs to find a valid link in the Compustat database.
As Bessen, Ford and Meurer (2011) point out, very little NPEs are publicly traded back to 2012
and may probably be so until now. According to Patent Assertion Entity Activity Report from
Federal Trade Commission (2016), NPEs are often structured with more than one affiliates to
handle different patent portfolios. These facts make it hard for them to get a link id (GVKEY) to
the Compustat database in comparison with PEs. I measure NPEs as firms without an identified
firm id for the Compustat database and PEs for the rest of firms. To distinguish the results from
those in Table 8 which are based on the NPE database, I call NPEs as private firms and PEs as
public firms. The proxies are subjected to noises as private firms can also be PEs and public firms
can also be NPEs.
To get a more direct measure, I then use the 20% random sample of NPE lawsuits from Stan-
ford NPE Litigation Database to identify NPE and PE cases. As discussed above, the database is
generated by professional researchers who go over all patent lawsuits between the year 2000 and
2015 and carefully separate the asserting parties into 13 categories. I generate the frequency-type
(the number of lawsuits) measures based on NPE and PE for both the firm and its peers. In addi-
tion, I generate the measure based on PAEs and non-PAEs so as to get a more direct link to “patent
trolls”. A comparison of these two definitions suggests that about 918 cases out of 10,800 are
defined differently when I restrict the categories to PAEs and about 407 out of 5,452 are defined
differently for public firm subsample. The results are informative if the measures generated from
the 20% random sample are proportional to the true ones. Moreover, given the incompleteness of
the litigation data, the span-type measure (the portion of peers get involved) is not informative.
The following specification is used to explore the problem:
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yi jt = α +β1NPEliti jt−1 +β2PEliti jt−1 +β3NPElit−i jt−1 +β4PElit−i jt−1 (3.2)
+ γControli jt−1 + γ2Control−i jt−1 +δ µi +φνt + εi jt
The dependent variables include firms’ R&D investments, the number of patent-protected
projects and innovation quality as discussed in section3. The litigation measures for both the firm
and its peers are included. The financial characteristics of both firms and their peers are discussed
in section 2.3. The model is estimated with year fixed effect and firm fixed effect, represented by
µi and νt , to control for common shocks that are specific to firm and year. εi jt , the specific error of
firm i, is assumed to be correlated within firms and heteroskedastic. Peers are defined as firms that
are in the same Fama French 48 industry as firm i.
Table 7 summarizes the results for the effect of NPE, which is defined as firms with missing
the Compustat ID (GVKEY). In panel A, the number of cases initiated by private firms is the total
number of cases in which the plaintiff (s) include at least one private firm. The cases initiated
by public firms include cases in which all the plaintiffs are public firms. The separation helps
generate mutually exclusive measures that contain all lawsuits. In panel B, I generate the private-
initiated measure using only cases in which the plaintiff (s) are all private firms. If NPEs are more
likely to be identified as private firms, the specification in panel B provides more clear evidence
to the behavior of NPEs. The results suggest that firms respond differently to different types
of peers’ litigation risk. To be specific, the estimated β3 implies that firms increase their R&D
investment, seek more patent protection and choose better projects when their peers are targeted
by NPEs but is less likely to do so and even cut down their R&D if its peers are targeted by PEs,
as suggested by estimated β4. When firms themselves are caught in litigation issues, the estimated
β1 and β2 suggest that firms cut down their R&D investment but in the meantime seek more patent
protection. In panel B, when NPE initiated cases are restricted to those with only private plaintiffs,
I get a similar conclusion for the peer effect. As for the effect of a firm’s own litigation issue, the
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estimated β1 and β2 suggest that firms targeted by NPEs cannot increase their R&D investment
and patent while firms targeted by PEs increase their innovation investment and file better projects.
This is consistent with the literature that NPE initiated lawsuits are costly and have a negative
effect on innovation at targeted firms (Cohen, Gurun and Kominers (2014)).
Table 8 provides results based on the Stanford NPE database. To be specific, the number of
NPE cases include all lawsuits with at least one NPE (s) acting as the plaintiff, as categorized in
the database. The definition of NPE cases in panel A refers to all lawsuits that do not belong to
category 8 and 12 which are defined as product companies. In panel B, the definition is narrowed
down to PAEs (category 1 (acquired patents), 4 (the corporate heritage) and 5 (the individual-
inventor started company)). The results in Table 7 are largely borne out. To be specific, the
estimated β3 and β4 suggest that the positive peer effect comes from cases when peers are targeted
by NPEs as firms increase their own R&D investment, seek more patent protection and choose to
file higher quality projects. When peers are targeted by PEs, however, firms do not respond in terms
of patent filing and meanwhile significantly reduce their R&D investment. If firms themselves are
targeted by NPEs, they slightly reduce their R&D investment but are not prone to seek more patent
protection. By contrast, when firms are targeted by PEs, they reduce their R&D and meanwhile
seek more patent protection. Similar results can be found using a narrower definition of NPE as
reported in panel B. In case the results are driven by the correlation of NPEs and PEs measure, I
add a robustness check by re-estimating table 3 on PAE-based firm measures and peer measures.
The results in Table B-4 show that firms respond positively by increasing their patents when their
peers are targeted by PAEs.
3.6 Mechanism
In this section, I explore the mechanism underneath firms’ positive response to their peers’ patent
litigation risk. I begin with a test to see whether peers’ litigation risk changes firms’ awareness
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of innovation protection; then I conduct a variety of heterogeneity tests to see whether the effect
is different for firms with different likelihood to be litigated and firms facing different levels of
industry competition. I put an end to the section by testing whether the effect is different for firms
with different types of managerial incentives.
The heterogeneity tests follow the specification in equation (3) which shares a similar logic
with Leary and Roberts (2014). I focus on the span-type peer litigation measure in all the tests,
i.e. the number of firms that get involved in at least one patent lawsuits (exclude the firm itself if
it is involved in patent lawsuits) over. The measure is interacted with an indicator variable DumHi j
that is set to one if the variable is valued in the upper 50% of the distribution and zero otherwise. I
include the level of the variable of interest in the regression as an additional control:
yi jt = α +β1lit−i jt−1 +β2DumHi jt−1 × lit−i jt−1 +β3Xi jt−1 + γControli jt−1 (3.3)
+ γ2Control−i jt−1 +δ µi +φνt + εi jt
The dependent variables of interest include R&D expenditure, the number of patent-protected
projects and citation-based innovation quality. The inferences come from the sign and significance
of β2.
3.6.1 Likelihood of Seeking Patent Protection
As shown in Table 3, firms increase their patent-protected projects no matter whether the litigation
risk comes from their own or their peers. This motivates me to take a look at a certain mecha-
nism that results in positive effects even when firms themselves are defendants, I refer to the first
mechanism as the enhanced firms’ needs for patent protection when more and more challenges of
patent litigation are in the industry. To shed light on this, I conduct a Probit regression model on a
subsample of firms who report positive R&D expenditure. The dependent variable is a dummy that
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equals to one if firms have positive R&D and at least one patent application and zero otherwise. It
indicates situations when firms have innovation investment but choose to ask for a patent protec-
tion. If firms are intensely aware of the needs for patent protection, I would expect to see a positive
estimated coefficient suggesting firms are less likely to leave their innovation “naked”. Table 9
reports the standardized results from the Probit model regression. I control for the variables that
may influence R&D expenditure and the number of patents for both firm i and its peers following
the patent literature as discussed in section 2.3. The model is specified with year fixed effect and
industry fixed effect to control for the shocks to specific year and industry. The error is clustered by
firm to remove potential cross-sectional correlation. The frequency-type peer measures are used in
column (1) to column (3) and the span-type measure is used in column (4). The argument is borne
out by the results in table 9. The significant negative coefficients for all litigation measures suggest
that firms are more likely to seek patent protection either when firms themselves get involved in
more patent litigation cases or when their peers meet with more litigation challenges.
3.6.2 Litigation Likelihood
Firms vary in the likelihood of being caught in litigation issue. If the positive peer effect is the
result of a precautious response to potential litigation threat, I would expect the effect varies with
firms’ likelihood to be litigated. The more likely the firms are to be litigated, the stronger the
positive effect will be.
The literature suggests that the likelihood is not only related to cases’ or patents’ characteristics
but also certain firms’ characteristics. For example, Bessen et al. (2014) find that small and
medium-sized firms are more likely to be targeted by non-practicing entities (NPEs). Chien (2011)
finds that smaller firms and startups suffer more from PAE asserters. Cohen et al. (2014) find that
firms with larger cash in stock and firms involved in other lawsuits are more likely to be targeted
by NPEs. As the positive effect is dominated by NPE initiated lawsuits, the peer effect should be
stronger to firms that are smaller, younger, hold more cash and are surrounded by ongoing lawsuits.
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Table 10 shows that the predictions for β2 are largely borne out. To be specific, I generate
three dummy indicators and run the estimation following equation (3). DumSmall is set to one if
firm size is in the lower 50% of the distribution and 0 otherwise. The results in Panel A suggest
that small firms are more prone to seek patent protection and file better projects to patent when
more peers are caught in patent lawsuits. However, they are less likely to increase their R&D. One
possible explanation would be that the disadvantage position for small firms in R&D competition
makes them more conservative in choosing long-term investments when facing the short-term liti-
gation threat in the industry, which leads to a weaker increase in their R&D for new projects but a
stronger precautious response in seeking patent protection.
In Panel B, I report the results for firm age. DumYoung is set to one if firm age is in the
lower 50% of the distribution and 0 otherwise. The results indicate that younger firms respond
more positively after facing a more severe litigation threat in the industry as they are more likely
to be litigated. To be specific, they look for more patent protected projects and file higher quality
innovation after more peers face litigation issue.
In Panel C, I explore whether firms with more cash in stock perform differently. DumCash is
set to one if the firm’s cash holding is in the upper 50% of the distribution and 0 otherwise. The
results show that firms with more cash in hand respond more positively in their R&D investment
when patents’ litigation risk increases throughout the industry. However, I fail to see any additional
effect on patents and innovation quality. One possible explanation one may refer to is the agency
problem induced by free cash flow as pointed out by Jensen and Meckling (1976). To be specific,
even though firms with more cash face stronger litigation threat, the ability to settle a case quickly
and the low motivation for managers to protect the firm value lead to an insignificant difference in
firms’ response.
In Panel D, I compare the response of firms with on-going patent lawsuits and firms without.
DumLitigated is set to one if the firm has at least one on-going lawsuits at t-1 and 0 otherwise.
The results imply that firms with other on-going lawsuits respond more positively by seeking patent
protection but they are less likely to increase more R&D investment. The results are consistent with
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the discussion above. One possible explanation for the weaker R&D response is that the ongoing
lawsuits weaken firms’ ability to conduct new long-term investment.
3.6.3 Competition Channel
In this subsection, I test the heterogeneity of the positive peer effect for firms facing different levels
of competition.
I use three measures for competition. The first one is the product market fluidity following
Hoberg, Phillips and Prabhala (2014) that captures a firm’s product similarity with its rivals. A
higher fluidity reflects not only greater product market threats but also higher similarity in terms of
their patents and technology. Two potential mechanisms are related. On one hand, if the positive
peer effect is driven by firms that take the advantage of their peers’ suffering to win in the com-
petition, I would expect a stronger effect for firms that perform in a more competitive market, i.e.
a stronger positive increase in both R&D investment and patents. On the other hand, firms who
produce similar products with their rivals are more likely to be litigated if more and more peers are
caught in patent lawsuits. If the industry-wide threat motivates firms to seek patent protection, I
would expect more patent filings for firms performing in a market with high fluidity.
The second measure I use for competition is the patent density, aiming at capturing the direct
competition in the patent market. I generate the patent density for each industry using the report of
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) on the U.S. Patenting Trends18. To be specific, the
report profiles patenting in 30 product fields based on either 3 digits or 4 digits North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS) of 2002. As the report link each patent to NAICS industry
which is not necessarily the same as the firm’s NAICS code, the patent density measure captures
more accurate information on the patent concentration of each industry based on patents’ functions
that are impervious to firms’ production complexity or diversification. To be specific, I generate a
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index style measure at the patent level for each NAICS class. The measure
18https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/naics/naics_toc.htm
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is specified as the following:
Patent Density jt0 = ∑
j
(
Number o f granted Patenti jt0
Number o f granted Patent jt0
)2
Where j is either the 3-digit or 4-digit NAICS class as specified in the report. t0 is the granted
year for each patent. The numerator is the number of patents granted at t0 that belong to firm i
and industry j. The denominator is the total number of patents granted at t0 that belong to industry
j. The measure is first linked to each firm by 4-digit NAICS code and then 3-digit if unmatched.
Higher density suggests that the firm is performing in an industry in which the majority of core
patents are held by a small number of innovative firms. Higher patent concentration makes it harder
for NPEs to seek litigation opportunities, thus I would expect a weaker effect for firms that perform
in a patent concentrated industry.
On the same track, I generate the third measure that reflects whether or not the firm itself is the
main patent owner. To begin with, I first generate a patent share measure for each firm, year and
patent class j (Patent Sharei jt0), then I calculate the firm-year patent share measure by taking the
maximum Patent Sharei jt0 if the firm has patents in different classes in the same year. In robustness
check, I also take the mean patent share and it leads to a similar conclusion. The patent share for
each firm year at patent class j is measured as the following:
Patent Sharei jt0 =
Number o f granted Patenti jt0−10,t0
Number o f granted Patent j,t0−10,t0
where Patent Sharei jt0 denotes for the patent share of the firm (i) in the patent class (j) at the
grant year (t0). The numerator is the cumulative number of patents owned by firm i over the
total number of patents granted in the same patent class j up to time t0. The denominator is the
cumulative number of patents granted in class j up to time t0. The patent class follows the two-
digit NBER patent class generated by Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) and Marco et al. (2015)
19. To take into account the patent protection period, I count the number in a cumulative 10-year
19The reason why I didn’t use NAICS is that the patent share measure captures the patent ownership of each firm,
which is imperious to what patent class I use. Following NAICS class may add noise since it is not perfectly matched
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window20 i.e. the total number of the granted patents in [t-10,t] window where t is the time of
grant. The big patent owner is defined as firms whose patent share belongs to the upper 50% of
the overall sample distribution. Firms that have high patent share fear less for litigation threat. If
the threat is the driving force, I would expect they respond less to peers’ litigation risk. On the
contrary, if competition strategy is the main mechanism, as they may still take advantage of peers’
suffering by increasing R&D investment, I would expect a stronger response.
Panel A in Table 11 summarizes the results for fluidity. The indicator DumHi jt−1 equals to
one for firms with higher than median fluidity in the sample that is specified in each regression.
The results in row two show that firms who face higher product similarity respond less positively
in their R&D expenditure but respond more positively to look for more patent-protected projects
when more peer firms get involved in patent litigation issues. The results are not fully consistent
with the competition strategy story but are more supportive of the threat-side story.
Panel B tabulates the results for patent density. It indicates that firms are less influenced by the
increased industry-wide litigation risk if they perform in an industry with higher patent density.
Panel C shows the result for big patent owners. The negative estimated β2 is consistent with
the implication of the threat side story but not the competition side story. It implies that firms with
a large portion of patents in hand would not respond too actively when more peers are involved in
litigation issue even though getting more patents may benefit them in terms of competition, their
weaker response is in line with the weaker litigation threat they face given their large patent pool.
3.6.4 Manager Motivation
In this subsection, I test whether firms respond differently to peers’ patent litigation risk if they
use different types of manager incentives. Following Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006), I consider
two types of manager incentives. The first one is managers’ pay-performance sensitivity (or delta),
to all patent classes.
20As robustness check, I also tried 3 year, 5 year and current year windows to calculate the share measure and get
similar results.
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measured as the change in the dollar value of manager wealth to 1% change in stock price. Accord-
ing to Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006), delta aligns the incentives of managers with the interests
of shareholders by exposing managers to more risk. Higher Delta indicates higher manager re-
sponsibility for firms’ performance and less risk-taking incentives. The second type is managers’
risk-taking incentives measured as change in the dollar value of manager wealth to 0.01 change
in the standard deviation of annualized stock return following Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006).
Vega motivates managers to take more risk, as Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) find that higher
Vega is related to riskier policy choices, more R&D expenditure, less property plant and equipment
(PPE) and higher leverage. If increasing peers’ patent litigation risk motivates managers with high
delta to choose more conservative innovation strategy, these firms may cut down more R&D and in
the meantime seek more patent protection. The predictions are largely borne out by the results in
panel A Table 12. The estimated β2 is significantly negative for R&D and significantly positive for
the number of patents and the adjusted number of citations. For managers with high Vega, they are
prone to choose riskier innovation strategy. The results in panel B Table 12 suggest that managers
with high Vega do not significantly seek more patent protection or choose to protect higher quality
investment, but are more prone to cut down their R&D expenditure when more peers get caught
in patent litigation challenges. If higher patent litigation risk already increases the overall risk of
R&D investment, managers may benefit from the additional risk even no additional actions are
taken. This is one possible reason why I do not see a significant difference in innovation strategies
between higher and lower Vega firms.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I explore how firms respond to industry-wide patent litigation threats. Overall, firms
increase their investment in research and development and seek more patent protection when there
is increasing patent litigation threat throughout the industry. The effect is driven by the threat
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when more peers are targeted rather than the threat of more active peer asserters in the industry.
Moreover, firms respond positively to NPE initiated peer risk but not so when firms themselves
are targeted by NPE. The results imply that peers’ patent litigation suffering enhances their patent
protection awareness and lead to more precautious response immediately afterwards. The effect is
different for firms who have different probabilities to be litigated, firms who face different industry
competition and firms who use different manager incentive schemes.
For future studies, first of all, a more accurate analysis of NPE and PE initiated lawsuits is
necessary. Secondly, the effect may be extended to non-public firms who hold a large portion
of patent grants. As the theories suggest, the validity of the existence of non-practicing entities
(NPEs) is that they can protect small inventor’s rights, the threat for public firms may be a good
thing for private or individuals thus lead to an even more positive response. Finally, firms may have
different responses if they hold different types of patents. For example, as papers show that patents
with blurry boundary are more likely to be targeted. Firms hold more of such innovation may
choose even stronger responses. In a word, a better understanding of which patent get challenged
may draw a more accurate picture of this topic.
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3.8 Figures
Figure 3.1: Patent Litigation in U.S.
Source: USPTO website :https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/ip-policy/economic-
research/drastic-rise-patent-litigation-2000-2015
Source: RPX 2015 Report
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3.9 Tables
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
This table reports the summary statistics (mean, standard deviation (SD) and median) for the lit-
igation variables and firms’ innovation measures used in the paper. The first row illustrates the
sample used for the analysis. All firm-year include all non-financial, non-utility Compustat firms
that report non-missing values for these variables. Innovative firm-year contains a sample of inno-
vative firms with non-missing values for the variables used in the tests. Innovative firms is defined
as all non-financial, non-utility Compustat firms that have at least on patent application in history.
The last column contains innovative firms that do not have patent litigation lawsuits at t-1. ncase
is the number of patent litigation cases that firm i gets involved in. It is separated into two follow-
up measures by whether the firm is the original plaintiff (nplaintiff) or defendant (ndefendant).
Peer ncase−i j is generated as the number of cases (exclude those with firm i) in which peer firms
get involved. Peer is defined as firms that operate in the same Fama French 48 industry as firm
i. f irm−i j% is defined as the number of peers that get involved in at least one patent infringe-
ment lawsuits over the total number of firms in the industry. R&D is the R&D expenditure over
beginning-of-year assets. Npat is the natural logarithm transfer of one plus the number of patents.
Ancit is the total number of adjusted citation following Bena and Li (2014) which is the weighted
sum of citation for all the patents in year t with the weight defined as the median number of forward
citations for patents in the same NBER class. Originality and Generality measures are generated
following Trajtenberg et al. (1997). The status of patent is determined at January 31th 2017. The
number of cumulative forward citations is defined as the total number of citation recieved by the
patent before January 31th 2017 that exclude the number of citaitons made by examiners. Innova-
tion starting point t is measured as the patent’s priority year if applicable otherwise as the patent’s
application year.
All Firm-Year Innovative Firm-Year Inno Firm−Yearlitigation f ree
Mean SD Median Mean SD Median Mean SD Median
Firm Litigation
ncase 0.331 1.157 0.000 0.428 1.270 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ndefendant 0.241 0.895 0.000 0.297 0.958 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
nplaintiff 0.093 0.606 0.000 0.134 0.700 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Peer Litigation
Peer ncase−i j 56.681 64.141 33.000 59.305 60.847 41.000 56.465 58.403 38.000
f irm−i j% 0.123 0.082 0.119 0.130 0.075 0.129 0.123 0.071 0.125
Innovation
Npat 9.223 61.052 0.000 12.687 63.657 0.000 6.220 31.465 0.000
R&D 0.054 0.099 0.005 0.071 0.101 0.030 0.076 0.115 0.026
Qualitycitation
Ancit 0.187 0.398 0.000 0.285 0.463 0.000 0.252 0.448 0.000
Originality 0.160 0.273 0.000 0.245 0.305 0.000 0.222 0.303 0.000
Generality 0.134 0.243 0.000 0.205 0.276 0.000 0.185 0.273 0.000
Firms 8,741 3,108
N 36,961 22,498 18,868
Source: USPTO, Compustat, 1999-2015
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Table 3.2: R&D Investment and Peer Patent Litigation Effect
This table summarizes the results for firms’ R&D investments. It is specified as equation (1)
yi jt =α+β1lit−i jt−1+β2liti jt−1+γControli jt−1+γ2Control−i jt−1+δ µi+φνt +εi jt and estimated
using a sample of firms that report non-missing R&D expenditure. The estimated coefficients are
standardized by variable mean and standard deviation. Definitions for litigation variables can be
found in Table 1 and definitions for all financial controls can be found in Appendix A. The depen-
dent variable R&D is defined as the R&D expenditure over beginning-of-year total assets. Peers
are defined following Fama French 48 industries. T-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and
within-firm dependence as reported in pare’ntheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance




nde f endant -0.002
(-0.39)
nplainti f f -0.007**
(-2.36)
Peer ncase 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.027***
(3.40) (3.33) (3.36)
MT B 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.148***
(19.13) (19.14) (19.11)
CashFlow -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.145***
(-14.09) (-14.09) (-14.09)
Peer R&D 0.166*** 0.166*** 0.165***
(5.39) (5.40) (5.37)
Peer MT B -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.047***
(-4.62) (-4.63) (-4.62)
PeerCashFlow 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069***
(7.04) (7.03) (7.02)
N 35,130 35,130 35,130
adj. R2 0.091 0.091 0.091
Firm Fixed Effect (FE) Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect (FE) Yes Yes Yes
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.3: The Number of Patents
This table summarizes the effect of peer litigation risk on firms’ number of patents. The estimations
are specified in equation (8)yi jt = α +β1lit−i jt−1 +β2liti jt−1 + γControli jt−1 + γ2Control−i jt−1 +
δ µi +φνt + εi jt . The dependent variable is the natural logarithm transfer of one plus the number
of granted patents. Detailed definitions for the control variables can be found in Appendix A. The
standardized estimated coefficients are reported in this table. T-statistics are report. *, ** and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
CHAPTER 3. RIPPLE EFFECT OF PATENT LITIGATION SHOCK 165




nde f endant 0.017***
(2.88)
nplainti f f 0.023***
(3.30)
Peer ncase 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.041***
(3.66) (3.73) (3.93)
MT B 0.019** 0.019** 0.019**
(2.36) (2.29) (2.32)
CashFlow -0.015** -0.015** -0.015**
(-2.04) (-2.07) (-2.05)
Size 0.178*** 0.181*** 0.179***
(5.75) (5.85) (5.77)
SalesGrowth -0.013** -0.013*** -0.013***
(-2.55) (-2.59) (-2.58)
FirmreturnSD -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.18) (-0.19) (-0.17)
Capital Expenditure 0.005 0.005 0.004
(0.71) (0.71) (0.68)
R&D 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.043***
(2.97) (2.94) (2.98)
R&DDummy 0.007 0.006 0.005
(0.44) (0.42) (0.36)
HHI -0.015 -0.015 -0.014
(-0.83) (-0.86) (-0.79)
Tangibility -0.006 -0.007 -0.008
(-0.36) (-0.36) (-0.45)
Age -0.056 -0.057 -0.056
(-1.53) (-1.53) (-1.50)
Leverage -0.014 -0.014 -0.013
(-1.43) (-1.42) (-1.36)
Peer N pat 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.054***
(2.72) (2.70) (2.76)
Peer MT B 0.038** 0.038** 0.039**
(2.34) (2.35) (2.42)
PeerCashFlow -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(-0.15) (-0.13) (-0.09)
Peer Size -0.080** -0.081** -0.080**
(-2.30) (-2.32) (-2.31)
Peer SalesGrowth -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(-0.24) (-0.17) (-0.23)
Peer returnSD 0.029** 0.029** 0.029**
(2.00) (2.03) (2.02)
PeerCapital Expenditure -0.010 -0.011 -0.011
(-0.74) (-0.77) (-0.80)
Peer R&D -0.106*** -0.108*** -0.106***
(-3.07) (-3.12) (-3.07)
Peer Tangibility 0.041 0.041 0.046
(1.38) (1.36) (1.54)
Peer Age 0.009 0.009 0.009
(0.72) (0.74) (0.76)
Peer Leverage -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.10) (-0.05) (-0.09)
N 22,008 22,008 22,008
adj. R2 0.079 0.078 0.079
Firm FE, YearFE, cluster by firm Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.4: The Influence of Peer Litigation on Firms’ Innovation Quality
This table summarizes the standardized estimated coefficients following the specification of equa-
tion (1). It is estimated using a sample of innovative firms (non-financial, non-utility Compustat
firms with at least one patent application in history) from 1999 to 2015. The dependent variable
for each panel is specified in the title. All the regressions include the same controls for both firms
and their peers as in previous tables. The detailed definitions can be found in Appendix A. The
total number of forward citations to each patent is the number of all the citations received by the
patent that excludes the number of citations made by examiners. Following Bena and Li (2014),
the number of adjusted citations for the firm is the weighted average of the total number of citations
to firms’ patents, with the weight defined as the median number of citations recieved by patents
in the same class that applied at the same year. Originality and Generality measures are generated
following Trajtenberg et al. (1997). Higher Originality indicates that the patent cites a broader
array of technology classes. Higher generality indicates that the patent is cited by a broader array
of technology classes. T-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-firm dependence as
reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respectively.
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nde f endant -0.003
(-0.32)
nplainti f f -0.001
(-0.16)
Peer ncase 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.047***
(3.31) (3.30) (3.28)
N 22,008 22,008 22,008




nde f endant 0.003
(0.40)
nplainti f f 0.012**
(2.31)
Peer ncase 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.051***
(3.32) (3.38) (3.39)
N 22,008 22,008 22,008




nde f endant -0.001
(-0.09)
nplainti f f 0.008
(1.54)
Peer ncase 0.055*** 0.056*** 0.055***
(3.66) (3.71) (3.69)
N 22,008 22,008 22,008
adj. R2 0.043 0.043 0.043
Peer Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Yes Yes Yes
CHAPTER 3. RIPPLE EFFECT OF PATENT LITIGATION SHOCK 168
Table 3.5: The Effect of Span-Type Peer Litigation Measures
This table summarizes the standardized estimated β1 following the specification of equation
(1)yi jt = α + β1lit−i jt−1 + γControli jt−1 + γ2Control−i jt−1 + δ µi + φνt + εi jt . In panel A, peer
litigation is measured as the number of peers that get involved in patent lawsuits at t-1 over the
total number of firms in the industry. In panel B, peer litigation measure is separated into the
number of plaintiffs and the number of defendants. Column (2) is estimated using a sample of
non-financial, non-utility Compustat firms that report non-missing R&D expenditure. Column (3)
to (6) are estimated using a sample of innovative firms, defined as non-financial, non-utility Com-
pustat firms with at least one patent application in history. Control variables for both firms and
their peers are included as specified in Table 2 and Table 3. Detailed definitions of the variables
can be found in Appendix A. T-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-firm depen-
dence as reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% level, respectively.
R&D Npat Ancit Originality Generality
Panel A
f irm−i j% 0.017*** 0.037*** 0.028** 0.027** 0.055***
(3.43) (4.20) (2.28) (2.35) (4.44)
N 35,130 22,008 22,008 22,008 22,008
adj. R2 0.090 0.077 0.071 0.021 0.043
Panel B
Plainti f f f irm% -0.013** 0.009 -0.002 0.019* 0.023*
(-2.49) (1.16) (-0.14) (1.74) (1.94)
De f endant f irm% 0.025*** 0.030*** 0.025** 0.015 0.041***
(4.00) (3.48) (2.06) (1.26) (3.39)
N 35,209 22,008 22,008 22,008 22,008
adj. R2 0.095 0.077 0.071 0.021 0.043
Peer Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.6: Robustness Tests
This table summarizes the standardized estimated β1 for robustness tests discussed in section 4
following the specification of equation (1) yi jt = α + β1lit−i jt−1 + β2liti jt−1 + γControli jt−1 +
γ2Control−i jt−1 +δ µi +φνt + εi jt .Only Peer ncase−i j,t−1 is reported to save space. f irm−i j,t−1%
shows similar results in unreported robustness checks. The sample used for column (1) contain
non-financial and non-utility Compustat firms that report non-missing R&D. The sample of all
innovative firms (non-financial, non-utility Compustat firms with at least one patent application in
history) is used for estimations reported in column (2) to (5). In the test of Panel A, the sample
is restricted to firms that are not caught in patent litigation at t-1. In Panel B, the sample is re-
stricted to firms that never have patent litigation case in history. Peers are defined as 2 digit SIC in
Panel C. Control variables for both firms and their peers are included as specified in Table 2 and
Table 3. Detailed definitions of the variables can be found in Appendix A. T-statistics are robust to
heteroskedasticity and within-firm dependence as reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
R&D Npat Ancit Originality Generality
Panel A: no litigation issue in t-1
Peer ncase 0.023** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.053*** 0.056***
(2.37) (3.27) (2.74) (3.12) (3.28)
N 29,294 17,938 17,938 17,938 179,38
adj. R2 0.091 0.061 0.054 0.021 0.038
Panel B: no litigation in history
Peer ncase 0.012 0.102*** 0.079*** 0.100*** 0.044*
(0.87) (3.89) (3.37) (3.47) (1.77)
N 14,930 67,79 67,79 67,79 67,79
adj. R2 0.092 0.052 0.039 0.016 0.025
Panel C: change industry to sic2
PeerSIC2ncase 0.026** 0.021* 0.034** 0.036** 0.039**
(2.44) (1.68) (2.04) (2.08) (2.27)
N 35,129 21,996 21,996 21,996 21,996
adj. R2 0.089 0.079 0.071 0.022 0.043
Peer Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
YearFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.7: Patent Infringements: Public Firm-Initiated and Private Firm-Initiated
This table summarizes the estimated results for equation (2) yi jt = α + β1NPEliti jt−1 +
β2PEliti jt−1 + β3NPElit−i jt−1 + β4PElit−i jt−1 + γControli jt−1 + γ2Control−i jt−1 + δ µi + φνt +
εi jt .on a sample of non-financial, non-utility Compustat firms that report non-missing R&D in col-
umn (1) and a sample of innovative firms (non-financial, non-utility Compustat firms with at least
one patent application in history) in column (2) to (5). For brevity, only β1to β4 are reported.
In Panel A, Privatencasei j,t−1 and Peer Privatencasei j,t−1 are calculated as the total number of
cases in which plaintiff (s) contain at least one private firm. In Panel B, they are calculated as the
number of cases in which all the plaintiffs are private firms. In both panels, Publicncasei j,t−1 and
Peer Publicncasei j,t−1 are generated as the number of cases in which all plaintiffs are public firms.
Control variables for both firms and their peers are included as specified in Table 2 and Table 3.
Detailed definitions of the variables can be found in Appendix A. Walt test reports the differences
in the estimated coefficients of Peer Privatencasei j,t−1 and (Peer Publicncasei j,t−1). T-statistics
are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-firm dependence as reported in parentheses. *, ** and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
R&D Npat Ancit Originality Generality
Panel A
Privatencase -0.001 0.014** -0.005 0.004 0.002
(-0.25) (2.40) (-0.74) (0.50) (0.30)
Publicncase -0.004** 0.013*** 0.010 0.001 -0.006
(-2.00) (2.61) (1.45) (0.12) (-0.98)
Peer Privatencase 0.046*** 0.025** 0.012 0.033** 0.054***
(4.95) (2.07) (0.76) (2.16) (3.42)
Peer Publicncase -0.052*** 0.006 0.019 0.026* -0.008
(-4.37) (0.50) (1.32) (1.72) (-0.49)
Wald Test 22.81*** 0.00641 1.169 1.487 1.033
N 35,195 21,997 21,997 21,997 21,997
adj. R2 0.098 0.078 0.071 0.021 0.043
Panel B
Privatencase -0.002 0.010* -0.005 0.002 -0.003
(-0.34) (1.66) (-0.64) (0.30) (-0.45)
Publicncase -0.004** 0.013*** 0.010 0.001 -0.005
(-2.02) (2.68) (1.44) (0.16) (-0.92)
Peer Privatencase 0.052*** 0.024** 0.010 0.031** 0.057***
(5.79) (2.18) (0.70) (2.19) (3.84)
Peer Publicncase -0.047*** 0.009 0.021 0.030** -0.003
(-4.06) (0.82) (1.47) (2.07) (-0.19)
Wald Test 21.30*** 0.114 1.561 2.394 0.712
N 35,195 21,997 21,997 21,997 21,997
adj. R2 0.099 0.078 0.071 0.021 0.043
Peer Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
YearFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.8: Patent Infringements: NPE Based on the Stanford NPE Database
This table summarizes the results for equation (2) yi jt = α + β1NPEliti jt−1 + β2PEliti jt−1 +
β3NPElit−i jt−1 + β4PElit−i jt−1 + γControli jt−1 + γ2Control−i jt−1 + δ µi + φνt + εi jt . where the
litigation measures are generated from the Stanford NPE database. The test is based on a sample
of non-financial, non-utility Compustat firms that report non-missing R&D in column (1) and a
sample of innovative firms (non-financial, non-utility Compustat firms with at least one patent ap-
plication in history) in column (2) to (5). For brevity, only β1to β4 are reported. NPE is defined
as lawsuits that do not belong to Category 8 (Product company) and Category 12 (IP subsidiary
of product company). NPE ncasei j,t−1 (PE ncasei j,t−1) is defined as the number of lawsuits to
firm i that belong to NPE (PE)-initiated lawsuits. Peer NPE ncasei jt−1 (Peer PE ncasei jt−1) is the
number of lawsuits to peers that belong to NPE (PE) initiated and exclude the number of cases in
which both firm i and its peers are involved. In panel B, PAE is defined as lawsuits that belong to
Category 1 (acquired patents), Category 4 (corporate heritage) or Category 5 (individual-inventor
started company). Control variables for both firms and their peers are included as specified in Table
2 and Table 3. Detailed definitions of the variables can be found in Appendix A. Walt test reports
the differences in the estimated coefficients of Peer NPE ncasei jt−1 and (Peer PE ncasei jt−1). T-
statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-firm dependence as reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
R&D Npat Ancit Originality Generality
Panel A
NPE ncase 0.003 0.007 -0.008 0.005 0.001
(0.90) (1.53) (-1.09) (0.75) (0.19)
PE ncase -0.008*** 0.016*** 0.001 -0.002 0.003
(-3.60) (2.87) (0.17) (-0.51) (0.51)
Peer NPE ncase 0.042*** 0.032*** 0.016 0.039*** 0.055***
(4.97) (3.22) (1.19) (2.95) (3.98)
Peer PE ncase -0.040*** -0.004 0.010 0.014 -0.018
(-3.34) (-0.44) (0.74) (1.10) (-1.37)
Wald Test 23.80*** 6.471*** 0.108 2.076 14.05***
N 35,209 22,008 22,008 22,008 22,008
adj. R2 0.098 0.078 0.071 0.022 0.043
Panel B
PAE ncase 0.001 0.004 -0.004 0.003 -0.003
(0.42) (0.97) (-0.56) (0.40) (-0.34)
NPAE ncase -0.006** 0.018*** -0.003 -0.001 0.005
(-2.54) (3.10) (-0.48) (-0.13) (0.97)
Peer PAE ncase 0.042*** 0.030*** 0.009 0.037*** 0.050***
(5.10) (3.05) (0.73) (2.83) (3.75)
Peer NPAE ncase -0.044*** -0.002 0.018 0.016 -0.016
(-3.36) (-0.19) (1.18) (1.13) (-1.06)
Wald Test 23.90*** 5.124** 0.0632 1.834 11.08***
N 35,209 22,008 22,008 22,008 22,008
adj. R2 0.098 0.078 0.070 0.022 0.043
Peer Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
YearFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.9: Probability of Seeking Patent Protection
This table summarizes the standardized estimated β1 and β2 for the Probit regression model
specified as the following Prob(Dumnew)i jt = α + β1lit−i jt−1 + β2liti jt−1 + γControli jt−1 +
γ2Control−i jt−1 + δ µ j + φνt + εi jt . The estimation is based on a subsample of firms who report
positive R&D expenditure. The dependent variable is set to one if firms have positive R&D and
at least one patent application (including those get granted, abandoned or pending) and zero other-
wise. The frequency-type measures (the number of patent lawsuits) for both firms and their peers
are used in column (1) to (3). The span-type measure (the number of peers who get involved in at
least one patent lawsuits over the total number of firms in the industry) is used in column (4). Con-
trol variables for both firms and their peers are included as specified in Table 3 and exclude R&D
expenditure and R&D dummy. Detailed definitions of the variables can be found in Appendix A.
T-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-firm dependence as reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Dumpatent Dumpatent Dumpatent Dumpatent
ncase 0.417***
(7.21)
nde f endant 0.266***
(5.15)
nplainti f f 0.371***
(6.18)
Peer ncase 0.235*** 0.240*** 0.268***
(4.61) (4.71) (5.35)
f irms−i j% 0.173***
(4.02)
N 18,004 18,004 18,004 18,004
Pseudo R2 0.117 0.113 0.114 0.107
Peer Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
IndustryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
YearFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes
CHAPTER 3. RIPPLE EFFECT OF PATENT LITIGATION SHOCK 173
Table 3.10: Heterogeneity Test: Likelihood of Being Targeted
This table summarizes the heterogeneity analysis for firms that have different likelihood to be liti-
gated. The estimation is specified in equation (3) yi jt =α+β1lit−i jt−1+β2DumHi jt−1× lit−i jt−1+
β3Xi jt−1+γControli jt−1+γ2Control−i jt−1+δ µi+φνt +εi jt . The test is based on a sample of firms
that report non-missing R&D in column (1) and a sample of public innovative firms (non-financial,
non-utility Compustat firms with at least one patent application in history) in column (2) to (5).
DumSmalli j (DumYoungi j) is set to one if firm size (age) is in the lower 50% of the distribution
and zero otherwise, DumCashHi j is set to one if the firm’s cash holding is in the upper 50% of
the distribution and zero otherwise. DumLitigatedi j is set to one if firm i is involved in at least
one patent related lawsuits at time t-1 and 0 otherwise. Control variables for both firms and their
peers are included as specified in Table 2 and Table 3. Detailed definitions of the variables can
be found in Appendix A. T-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-firm dependence
as reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respectively.
R&D Npat Ancit Originality Generality
Panel A: Size
% f irms−i j 0.038*** 0.033*** 0.021* 0.024** 0.050***
(3.85) (3.80) (1.76) (2.09) (4.09)
DumSmall ×% f irms−i j -0.025*** 0.026*** 0.034** 0.024 0.006
(-2.98) (2.63) (2.26) (1.53) (0.40)
N 34,410 21,980 21,980 21,980 21,980
adj. R2 0.111 0.078 0.070 0.021 0.042
Panel B: Age
% f irms−i j 0.013 0.035*** 0.024** 0.027** 0.050***
(1.61) (4.07) (1.96) (2.28) (4.09)
DumYoung×% f irms−i j 0.005 0.023** 0.035*** 0.008 0.030***
(0.83) (2.52) (3.06) (0.73) (2.72)
N 35,130 22,008 22,008 22,008 22,008
adj. R2 0.090 0.078 0.070 0.021 0.042
Panel C: Cash
% f irms−i j 0.009* 0.037*** 0.027** 0.024* 0.052***
(1.76) (4.17) (2.18) (1.90) (4.06)
DumCashH ×% f irms−i j 0.020*** 0.003 -0.001 0.009 0.011
(4.34) (0.36) (-0.09) (0.81) (0.95)
N 33,894 21,565 21,565 21,565 21,565
adj. R2 0.105 0.078 0.071 0.021 0.042
Panel D: Firms involved in other lawsuits
% f irms−i j 0.021*** 0.031*** 0.028** 0.025** 0.053***
(3.96) (3.53) (2.30) (2.09) (4.16)
DumLitigated ×% f irms−i j -0.008*** 0.014** -0.001 0.005 0.005
(-2.60) (2.35) (-0.13) (0.74) (0.62)
N 35,130 22,008 22,008 22,008 22,008
adj. R2 0.090 0.078 0.071 0.021 0.043
Firm and Peer Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
YearFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.11: Heterogeneity Test: Competition
This table summarizes the heterogeneity analysis for firms facing different levels of competition.
The estimation is specified in equation (4) that is similar to Leary and Roberts (2014): yi jt = α +
β1lit−i jt−1 +β2DumHi jt−1 × lit−i jt−1 +β3Xi jt−1 + γControli jt−1 + γ2Control−i jt−1 + δ µi +φνt +
εi jt . where i,j,t represents the firm, industry and year. Xi jt−1 is the value of the competition measure
in year t-1. Only the standard estimated β1 and β2 are reported to save space. yi jt is specified on
the first row of each column. DumFluidityHi j,t−1 (DumDensityHi j, DumShareH ji) is set to one if
the fluidity (industry patent density, firms’ patent share) is in the upper 50% of the distribution and
zero otherwise. The fluidity measure is taken from Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014). A higher
fluidity reflects a higher similarity in products and technologies and greater product market threats
from rivals. The patent market density measure is defined as ∑ j(
Number o f granted Patenti jt0
Number o f granted Patent jt0
)2for each
4-digit or 3-digit NAICs industry. Patent share is the percentage of patents hold by the firm. To
be specific, for each firm, patent class and year, patent share is the total number of patent owned
by firm i over the total number of patents get granted in the same NBER patent class. Patents are
counted cumulatively for each [t-10,t] window where t is the time of grant year. When firms have
patents from different class, the maximum patent share is used to a firm-year level measure that
represents firms’ market power. Control variables for both firms and their peers are included as
specified in Table 2 and Table 3. Detailed definitions of the variables can be found in Appendix A.
T-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-firm dependence as reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
R&D Npat Ancit Originality Generality
Panel A: Fluidity
% f irms−i j 0.020*** 0.034*** 0.027** 0.024** 0.050***
(3.80) (3.74) (2.16) (2.04) (3.93)
DumFluidityH ×% f irms−i j -0.016*** 0.015** 0.004 0.011 0.009
(-3.24) (2.29) (0.43) (1.12) (0.83)
N 31,557 21,566 21,566 21,566 21,566
adj. R2 0.096 0.079 0.072 0.022 0.043
Panel B: Patent Density
% f irms−i j 0.028*** 0.037*** 0.065*** 0.044** 0.060***
(3.24) (2.63) (3.48) (2.46) (3.39)
DumDensityH ×% f irms−i j -0.026** -0.020 -0.045** -0.031 -0.030
(-2.34) (-1.16) (-2.01) (-1.37) (-1.33)
N 18,794 12,692 12,692 12,692 12,692
adj. R2 0.111 0.065 0.024 0.019 0.037
Panel C: Patent Share
% f irms−i j 0.027*** 0.053*** 0.050*** 0.044*** 0.054***
(2.78) (5.54) (4.12) (3.52) (4.21)
DumShareH ×% f irms−i j -0.012 -0.069*** -0.087*** -0.062*** -0.046***
(-0.91) (-7.52) (-6.87) (-5.01) (-3.92)
N 20,599 26,413 26,413 26,413 26,413
adj. R2 0.108 0.138 0.100 0.041 0.065
Firm and Peer Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmFE, Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.12: Heterogeneity Test: Manager Incentives
The table summarizes the heterogeneity analysis for firms facing different type of manager in-
centives. The estimations are specified in equation (4) : yi jt = α +β1lit−i jt−1 +β2DumHi jt−1 ×
lit−i jt−1 + β3Xi jt−1 + γControli jt−1 + γ2Control−i jt−1 + δ µi + φνt + εi jt where i,j,t represent the
firm, industry and year. Xi j,t−1 is the value of the incentive measure in year t-1. Only the stan-
dard estimated β1 and β2 are reported to save space. The DumDeltaHi j is set to one if manager
pay-performance sensitivity (or delta), measured as the change in the dollar value of manager
wealth to 1% change in stock price, is in the upper 50% of the distribution and zero otherwise.
DumVegaHi j,t−1 is set to one if manager’s risk taking incentives, measured as the change in the
dollar value of manager wealth to 0.01 change in the standard deviation of annualized stock return,
is in the upper 50% of the distribution and zero otherwise. Both measures are from Coles, Daniel
and Naveen (2006). The data is limited to 2014 where the incentive measures are available. De-
pendent variables are specified on the title. Other peer-level controls and firm-level controls are
the same as discussed in previous table. Detailed variable definitions are discussed in Appendix A.
T-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-firm dependence as reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
R&D Npat Ancit Originality Generality
Panel A: Pay-performance sensitivity (Delta)
% f irms−i j 0.040*** 0.018 0.007 0.015 0.042**
(3.67) (1.47) (0.37) (0.88) (2.42)
DumDeltaH ×% f irms−i j -0.042*** 0.020** 0.026* 0.020 -0.003
(-3.83) (2.16) (1.82) (1.56) (-0.25)
N 13,666 11,397 11,397 11,397 11,397
adj. R2 0.066 0.090 0.083 0.023 0.039
Panel B: Risk taking incentives (Vega)
% f irms−i j 0.041*** 0.023** 0.027 0.024 0.040**
(3.72) (2.04) (1.49) (1.47) (2.36)
DumVegaH ×% f irms−i j -0.039*** 0.012 -0.014 0.001 0.002
(-3.37) (1.13) (-0.86) (0.11) (0.16)
N 13,834 11,549 11,549 11,549 11,549
adj. R2 0.057 0.092 0.083 0.023 0.040
Peer Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
YearFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions
Peer-level and Firm-level controls:
The sample contains Compustat firms that list on the main exchange (NYSE, AMEX and NAS-
DAQ), following the literature, I exclude financial firms (sic 6000-7000) and utilities (sic 4900 to
5000). The data ranges from 1999 to 2015. I restrict the sample to firms whose stock price is
higher than $5 so as to get valid stock-level data. All the variables are winsorized at the lst and
99th percentiles. The data comes from the Compustat annual file and CRSP daily stock return file.
Measures for peer firms are the average of all firms in the same industry-year combination exclude
firm i. For tests whose dependent variable is firms’ R&D, the sample used contains firms that re-
port non-missing R&D. For tests whose dependent variables are patents and citations, the sample
contains innovative firms only which is defined as firms that have at least one patent application in
history. Detailed definitions for control variables are explained as the following.
1. CAPXit/Ai,t−1 is the measure of capital expenditure over beginning year total asset (AT).
2. Size: natural logarithm of sales (SALE) measured in 2005 U.S. dollars.
3. Cash flow: The sum of Income Before Extraordinary items (IB) and Depreciation and Amor-
tization (DP) over Total asset (AT) at the beginning of the fiscal year.
4. Sales growth: percentage change in sales (SALE).
5. Market-to-Book: market value of equity divided by book value of equity. Market value of
equity is share price (Compustat annual item PRCC_F) times common shares outstanding
(item CSHO). Book value of equity is shareholders’ equity (item SEQ) minus preferred
stock plus deferred taxes (item TXDITC). I measure preferred stock using liquidation value
(item PSTKL), redemption value (item PSTKR) or carrying value (item PSTK) in this order,
depending on availability. If SEQ is missing, I measure book value of equity as common
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equity (item CEQ) plus carrying value of preferred stock (item PSTK). Finally, if CEQ is
missing, I measure book value of equity as total assets (item AT) minus total liabilities (item
LT). I use the lag of market to book in the regression.
6. Book leverage: long term debt (Compustat annual item DLTT) plus debt in current liabilities
(item DLC), all divided by total assets (item AT). I use the lagged book leverage in the
regression.
7. R&D: Research and Development Expense (XRD) over beginning-of-year assets (AT), re-
place XRD to zero if missing.
8. R&D missing Dummy: equal to one if Research and Development Expense (XRD) is miss-
ing
9. Tangibility: Property, Plant and Equipment (PPENT) over Total assets (AT). I use the lagged
book leverage in the regression.
10. Age: natural logarithm of the number of years that firm i is in the Compustat database.
11. Firm return SD: the standard deviation of Daily stock returns for firms’ fiscal year.
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Table A-1: Summary Statistics
Table 3.13: Appendix A: Summary Statistics
Table A-1 reports the summary statistics for the control variables for both firm i and its peers
used in the paper. The variable name is specified in the first column of each row. The sample in
column (2) to (4) include all non-financial, non-utility firms that are traded on the main exchange
(NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ) in the annual Compustat database between fiscal year 1999 to
2015 with non-missing data for all analysis variables (Check Appendix A for details). Column (5)
to (7) report the statistics for the subsample of innovative firms and Column (8) to (10) reports the
statistics for of subsample of firm-year with no patent litigation challenges.
All Firm Innovative Firm Innovative Firmslit f ree
Mean SD Median Mean SD Median Mean SD Median
Firm−Speci f ic
MTB 1.991 1.446 1.530 2.087 1.428 1.634 2.104 1.535 1.609
Cash Flow 0.053 0.185 0.084 0.045 0.181 0.082 0.033 0.203 0.079
Size 1.503 1.832 1.549 1.478 1.853 1.527 1.241 1.872 1.253
Sale Growth 0.145 0.362 0.083 0.128 0.331 0.079 0.148 0.383 0.083
Firm Stock SD 0.033 0.017 0.029 0.033 0.017 0.029 0.034 0.018 0.030
Capital Expenditure 0.057 0.066 0.035 0.047 0.051 0.032 0.049 0.055 0.032
R&D 0.054 0.099 0.005 0.071 0.101 0.030 0.076 0.115 0.026
HHI 0.274 0.196 0.210 0.280 0.199 0.210 0.279 0.198 0.212
Tangibility 0.232 0.205 0.165 0.196 0.167 0.145 0.199 0.173 0.145
Age 2.692 0.799 2.708 2.805 0.731 2.833 2.752 0.783 2.773
Book Leverage 0.446 0.214 0.437 0.422 0.207 0.412 0.420 0.212 0.409
Peer−Speci f ic
MTB 1.813 0.498 1.741 1.893 0.523 1.863 1.897 0.526 1.867
Cash Flow 0.012 0.068 0.026 0.000 0.070 0.015 0.000 0.071 0.015
Size 0.753 0.854 0.698 0.565 0.844 0.500 0.554 0.841 0.492
Sale Growth 0.131 0.102 0.132 0.130 0.100 0.134 0.134 0.102 0.136
Firm Stock SD 0.022 0.008 0.020 0.022 0.008 0.021 0.022 0.008 0.021
Capital Expenditure 0.051 0.029 0.041 0.045 0.022 0.039 0.046 0.024 0.040
R&D 0.051 0.050 0.033 0.065 0.051 0.060 0.065 0.051 0.060
Tangibility 0.231 0.134 0.178 0.201 0.111 0.161 0.204 0.114 0.162
Age 2.341 0.269 2.356 2.354 0.279 2.357 2.343 0.283 2.340
Book Leverage 0.404 0.069 0.404 0.388 0.069 0.385 0.388 0.069 0.385
N 36,575 22,498 18,521
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Appendix B: Additional Tables
Table 3.14: Appendix B-Tables: Measures Based on Total Number of Applications
The table summarizes the robustness check following the specification in Table 3 where the de-
pendent variable is the natural logarithm transfer of one plus all the patent applications filed by the
firm at t. The peer litigation measure is defined as the number of cases that peers get involved in at
t-1 (that exclude the number of cases in which both firms and peers get involved). Control variables
for both firms and their peers are included as specified in Table 3. Detailed definitions of the vari-
ables can be found in Appendix A. Standardized estimated coefficients are reported in the table.
T-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-firm dependence as reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Total Application Total Application Total Application
ncase 0.032***
(3.58)
nde f endant 0.016***
(3.03)
nplainti f f 0.032***
(2.88)
Peer ncase 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.047***
(4.32) (4.48) (4.69)
N 22,498 22,498 22,498
adj. R2 0.060 0.058 0.061
Peer Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes
YearFE Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.15: Appendix B-Tables: Patents Matched by Application Dates
The table summarizes the results for the the effect of peer litigation when firms’ patents
are matched with firms’ financial information by the patent application date. The estima-
tion follows the specification in equation (1)yi jt = α + β1lit−i jt−1 + β2liti jt−1 + γControli jt−1 +
γ2Control−i jt−1 +δ µi +φνt + εi jt . Firm litigation is measures as the number of lawsuits that firm
i is involved in. Peer litigation is measured as the number of cases that peers get involved in at t-1
(that exclude the number of cases in which both firms and peers get involved). Peer is defined as
firms that operate in the same Fama Frech 48 industry as firm i. Column (1) is estimated on the
sample of firms that report non-missing R&D and the rest columns are estimated on the sample
of innovative firms, i.e. firms with at least one patent in its history. Control variables for both
firms and their peers are included as specified in Table 2 and Table 3. Detailed definitions of the
variables can be found in Appendix A. T-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-firm
dependence as reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively.
R&D Npat Ancit Originality Generality
ncase -0.005 0.036*** 0.003 0.018*** 0.005
(-1.08) (4.21) (0.39) (2.76) (0.78)
Peer ncase 0.028*** 0.046*** 0.050*** 0.057*** 0.063***
(3.40) (4.46) (3.43) (3.80) (4.15)
N 35,130 22,498 22,498 22,498 22,498
adj. R2 0.091 0.086 0.083 0.026 0.048
Peer Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
YearFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.16: Appendix B-Tables: The Influence of Peer Litigation on Firm Innovation Quality
Using All Number of Citations
This table summarizes the standardized estimated coefficients following the specification of equa-
tion (1) on a sample of innovative firms from 1999 to 2015. The dependent variable for each panel
is specified in the title. Control variables for both firms and their peers are included as specified
in Table 3. Detailed definitions of the variables can be found in Appendix A. Cumulated number
of citation is defined as the number of all the forward citations made to the patents before January
31th, 2017. The total number of adjusted citation follows Bena and Li (2014). Originality and
Generality measures are generated following Trajtenberg et al. (1997). T-statistics are robust to
heteroskedasticity and within-firm dependence in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical




nde f endant -0.003
(-0.32)
nplainti f f -0.001
(-0.16)
Peer ncase 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.047***
(3.31) (3.30) (3.28)
N 22,008 22,008 22,008




nde f endant -0.004
(-0.57)
nplainti f f 0.012**
(2.00)
Peer ncase 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.044***
(3.07) (3.15) (3.07)
N 22,008 22,008 22,008




nde f endant -0.018***
(-2.65)
nplainti f f 0.001
(0.18)
Peer ncase 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.052***
(3.52) (3.60) (3.39)
N 22,008 22,008 22,008
adj. R2 0.186 0.186 0.186
Peer Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes
YearFE Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.17: Appendix B-Tables: PAE Targeted
This table summarizes the standardized estimated β1 and β2 following the specification of equation
(1) yi jt = α +β1lit−i jt−1+β2liti jt−1+ γControli jt−1+ γ2Control−i jt−1+δ µi+φνt +εi jt . The de-
pendent variables are specified on the first row of each column. PAE Ncase. is the number of cases
in which firms are targeted by patent assertion entities (PAEs). Peer PAE Ncase is the number of
cases when peers are targeted by PAEs (that exclude the cases contain firm i). Control variables for
both firms and their peers are included as specified in Table 2 and Table 3. Detailed definitions of
the variables can be found in Appendix A. T-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-
firm dependence as reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
R&D Npat Ancit Originality Generality
PAE Ncase 0.002 0.007* -0.008 0.004 0.002
(0.73) (1.69) (-1.09) (0.73) (0.21)
Peer PAE Ncase 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.017 0.041*** 0.052***
(4.02) (3.20) (1.30) (3.10) (3.80)
N 35,130 22,008 22,008 22,008 22,008
adj. R2 0.091 0.077 0.071 0.022 0.043
Peer Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.18: Appendix B-Tables: Litigation Frequency Measures with Natural Logarithm Transfer
The table summarizes the results for robustness check aiming to explore whether the results are
driven by the right schewness of the litigation measures. The litigation measures are the natural
logarithm transfer of the number of cases measures mentioned in the previous tables. All the
regression settings follow equation (1) and controls are the same as in the Table 2 and Table 3.
T-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-firm dependence as reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
R&D Npat Ancit Originality Generality
Panel A
ln(1+ncase) -0.009** 0.027*** -0.006 0.009 0.006
(-2.55) (4.47) (-0.74) (1.26) (0.81)
ln(1+Peer ncase) 0.027*** 0.050*** 0.068*** 0.053** 0.085***
(2.98) (3.04) (3.25) (2.44) (3.89)
N 35,130 22,008 22,008 22,008 22,008
adj. R2 0.090 0.079 0.071 0.021 0.043
Panel B
ln(1+nde f endant) -0.006 0.018*** -0.003 0.002 -0.002
(-1.61) (3.16) (-0.38) (0.30) (-0.22)
ln(1+Peer ncase) 0.026*** 0.051*** 0.067*** 0.054** 0.086***
(2.92) (3.11) (3.23) (2.50) (3.95)
N 35,130 22,008 22,008 22,008 22,008
adj. R2 0.090 0.078 0.071 0.021 0.043
Panel C
ln(1+nplainti f f ) -0.009*** 0.025*** 0.001 0.014** 0.013*
(-2.68) (4.28) (0.17) (2.40) (1.92)
ln(1+Peer ncase) 0.025*** 0.053*** 0.067*** 0.054** 0.085***
(2.83) (3.26) (3.20) (2.48) (3.92)
N 35,130 22,008 22,008 22,008 22,008
adj. R2 0.090 0.079 0.071 0.021 0.043
Peer Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
YearFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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